Inequality, Social Protection, and Democratic Erosion in West Africa

West Africa is experiencing a prolonged period of democratic stress. Since 2020, the region has witnessed a succession of military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger, alongside increasing political repression in several electoral regimes. While these developments are often framed as symptoms of security crises or elite power struggles, they do not fully explain the scale or persistence of public disengagement from democratic governance. 

A 2024 report by the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel highlights the close relationship between poor socioeconomic conditions and political instability across the region. Of the ten countries ranked lowest on the UNDP’s Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), five are located in West Africa and the Sahel. These rankings reflect entrenched deficits in access to education, healthcare, housing, and basic infrastructure, rather than income deprivation alone. The concentration of such deficits in countries experiencing political instability suggests a structural relationship between inequality and democratic fragility. 

Governance data further reinforces this assessment. The 2024 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) shows that Africa’s overall governance progress stalled in 2022 after nearly a decade of modest improvement. In West Africa, indicators related to democratic participation, accountability, and civic space have declined, even where electoral processes continue. This divergence between procedural democracy and governance outcomes points to a legitimacy gap that elections alone have been unable to bridge. 

Public Attitudes and Youth Disillusionment 

Public opinion data provide further insight into this legitimacy gap. Afrobarometer surveys conducted between 2021 and mid-2023 across 39 African countries reveal rising dissatisfaction with democratic performance, and an unprecedented tolerance for military interventions. When disaggregated by age and region, dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy is most pronounced among youth in West Africa aged 18–35, at 69 percent, compared to 59 percent among those aged 36–45, 60 percent among those aged 46–55, and 59 percent among respondents aged 56 and above. Younger respondents also exhibit lower levels of enthusiasm for electoral democracy and a comparatively higher openness to alternative forms of governance, including military rule. 

An analysis of the Afrobarometer study by the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) further reveals that in West Africa, 68 percent of youth support democracy, slightly trailing older age groups (70–74 percent). Similarly, 77 percent support elections as the preferred method of choosing leaders, comparable to 80–81 percent among older respondents. However, youth still report the highest dissatisfaction with how democracy functions (69 percent), compared to 59–60 percent among older groups. 

This changing attitude reflects a governance context in which institutions are unable or unwilling to provide for the basic well-being of their populations. The data suggests that while young people have not abandoned democratic ideals, their growing disillusionment poses a serious challenge to the future of democratic governance in the region. This is particularly significant in light of the increased support of young people for the military takeovers across West Africa, especially in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. 

Inequality as Capability Deprivation 

This piece adopts the capabilities approach as a framework for understanding the relationship between inequality and democratic erosion. Developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, the capabilities approach defines inequality in terms of people’s substantive freedoms to live lives they value. This includes access to education, healthcare, security, and opportunities for political participation. 

In standard reports, inequality is often measured through income-based indicators, with the Gini Coefficient being the most widely used. The Palma Ratio, which contrasts the income share of the top 10 percent with that of the bottom 40 percent, is also used to bring attention to the extremes of inequality. While useful, these metrics do not fully capture the multidimensional nature of deprivation experienced by large segments of the population. Analysing inequality through the lens of the capabilities approach reveals how limited access to quality public services, weak social safety nets, and chronic insecurity constrain citizens’ ability to engage meaningfully with political institutions. 

The relevance of this broader conception of inequality is reflected in global governance assessments. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2024 identifies socioeconomic inequality as a key driver of democratic decline, concluding that severe inequality is incompatible with the effective functioning of democratic systems. Reflecting these challenges, Africa’s average democracy score fell to 4.04 out of 10 in the report, with Sub-Saharan Africa scoring even lower at 4.00. These trends underscore how inequality undermines political legitimacy along with economic outcomes. 

Social Protection Gaps and the Erosion of the Social Contract 

The weakness of social protection systems is a critical link between inequality and democratic decline in West Africa. According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the region allocates just 1 percent of GDP to social protection, the lowest share of any African subregion. 

This chronic underinvestment has left populations highly vulnerable to economic shocks, conflict, and climate stress. While the region recorded democratic successes between 2000-2020, a paper by the Africa Policy Research Institute argues that even the perception of democratic successes within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) during that era was based on a narrow definition of democracy that focused on elections at the expense of other measures of governance, such as human rights, state capacity, institutional quality and the rule of law. 

These vulnerabilities are further compounded by the structure of regional labour markets. In 2024, informal employment accounted for an estimated 87.3 percent of total employment in West Africa. Despite its centrality to livelihoods, the informal economy remains marginal in national development strategies, limiting workers’ access to social insurance, health coverage, and income protection. The economic disruptions associated with COVID-19 exposed these gaps, as informal workers experienced severe income losses with minimal state support. 

These governance failures have weakened the social contract between states and citizens. In contexts where governments are unable or unwilling to provide basic protection, alternative sources of authority gain traction. This dynamic has been particularly visible in conflict-affected areas of northern Nigeria, central Mali, and rural Burkina Faso, where non-state actors have sought to fill governance vacuums. Research on radicalisation in Northern Nigeria shows that those who are economically marginalised are more likely to join violent extremist groups who offer them basic services and inclusion.

In Mali, the distrust of key institutions in rural areas has directly led to the rise of insurgent groups offering rudimentary forms of protection and welfare. Recent studies on jihadist governance in the country show that as such groups become embedded in the local contexts, they are able to meet specific conditions that facilitate their potential institutionalisation. The same groups are also viewed by communities as more fair-minded and often more efficient than state judges in resolving local disputes. 

These perceptions reflect dissatisfaction with state performance rather than any concrete ideological alignment. Over time, however, the erosion of institutional legitimacy has contributed to political instability and created conditions in which military intervention is framed as a necessary corrective. 

Implications for Democratic Governance 

The growing tolerance for military rule among youth reflects frustration with democratic governments that have failed to deliver security and social protection. An analysis of Afrobarometer surveys conducted between 2021-2023 shows that while support for one-party (14%) and one-man rule (15%) is low and consistent across age groups, military rule receives the highest backing among youth (37%), exceeding that of older cohorts. This suggests that democratic decline in West Africa is driven less by authoritarian preference than by disillusionment with democratic performance. 

When democratic governments fail to deliver on the most basic expectations of social protection, they undermine their own legitimacy. In such contexts, elections lose their appeal not because citizens are against democracy, but because they feel democracy no longer offers a viable path to prosperity or dignity. The turn to non-state actors and the increasing acceptance of military rule can thus be seen not as irrational choices, but as desperate responses to an unresponsive political order. 

Policy Implications: Recentring Capabilities and Social Protection

Reversing democratic erosion in West Africa requires a shift from election-centric governance toward policies that enhance human capabilities and rebuild the social contract. The capabilities approach provides a framework for evaluating public policy based on its impact on people’s real freedoms, rather than aggregate growth alone. 

Inclusive social protection should be central to this shift. This includes sustained investment in education, healthcare, housing, and climate-resilient infrastructure, as well as the integration of informal workers into social policy frameworks. Social protection systems must be designed to reach conflict-affected and marginalised communities, where democratic legitimacy is weakest. Equally important are participatory mechanisms that enable citizens, particularly youth, to shape policy priorities. Without meaningful participation, social investment risks reinforcing dependency rather than restoring trust in democratic institutions.