Resilience amid risk: democratic vulnerability in Africa

African democracies are shaped by a dynamic interplay of resilience, omnipresent risk, and structural vulnerability. Deep structural vulnerability persists with the 2024 Ibrahim Index of Africa Governance (IIAG) data revealing that about two thirds of Africa’s population now experiences worse participation and accountability scores than a decade ago and security and democracy-related areas have deteriorated for the vast majority of Africa’s people, with 78% of the continent’s population living in a country where the IIAG's Security & Safety sub-category has declined in the past decade. This has contributed to an overall stagnation in Overall Governance with almost no change from 2018 and stopping completely in 2022. These vulnerabilities expose how political rights are intertwined with economic insecurity, and how governance failures amplify political risks which widen the gap between citizens’ democratic aspirations and elite incentives to consolidate unaccountable power. At the same time, Africa’s democracy endures not through its institutions, but through the tenacity of its people.

Youth-led mobilisations (particularly from Gen Z) have become central in safeguarding democratic resilience across Africa by reasserting civic agency amid institutional decline to continually reclaim and reimagine democratic capacitation from below. Further buttressed by recent protests in Madagascar, there is a noticeable uptake in the interplay between economic necessitation and civic participation. The Malagasy protests of September/October 2025 in Antananarivo are consistent with African governance insights that while the demand for African democracy is strong and resilient, satisfaction with democracy is stunted. According to the 2024 IIAG, despite slowing improvement (+5.0) in the Infrastructure sub-category in the past decade, and increasing improvement (+3.3) in the country’s Business & Labour Environment sub-category during the same time period, Madagascar is still ranked 41 out of 54 African countries in both sub-categories and 34th in Overall Governance in Africa. As 2025 Afrobarometer data reflects, participation is higher in countries with lower levels of economic well-being. Thus, when legitimising democratic values, the case of Madagascar serves as a reminder to African leaders to consolidate individual political and collective aspirations to mitigate risks for democratic backsliding.

Projects such as the launch of the €152 million cable car project in August 2025 catalysed citizen discontentment and led to President Rajoelina’s demise. The political deafness of this project not only increased Madagascar’s debt to France, but sought to serve 75,000 commuters per day at a rate which remained inaccessible for most at a price six times that of alternative local transport. Moreover, in a country where only 36% of people have access to electricity according to the African Development Bank (2023), compared to 47% of people in sub-Saharan Africa according to UNCTAD (2023), the prioritisation of such a project remained misguided. Protests which began with frustrations with service delivery expanded to systemic demands for accountability and ultimately regime change. Where narrow political economic settlements exclude the electorate they are meant to serve, democratic risks and vulnerabilities are illuminated. When elite political cultures prioritise rent-seeking and exclude the broader populace, the outcome is heightened disgruntlement buttressed by deepened socio-economic marginalisation. This is mirrored in the 2024/2025 Kenyan Finance Bill protests which show that young citizens are increasingly unwilling to settle for anything less than both governance and economic growth, with the oversight of legislative transparency. In Madagascar, the protests, which were initially led by a group called ‘Gen Z Mada’, are emblematic of this showing determination – even if the result is regime change.

In Madagascar, segments of the security apparatus aligned with youth movements, resulting in the installation of Colonel Michael Randrianirina as president and the escape of ousted President Rajoelina to France. This development underscores a fracturing of the state’s coercive monopoly and highlights trending risks which see how youth have been elevated as symbolic actors within the civil-military power balance, without genuine integration into militarised governance structures. A trend seen in Gabon and Sudan – both who have seen declines in the 2024 IIAG sub-categories of Accountability & Transparency and Participation in the past decade, and Rights in the case of Gabon. This is additionally concerning with 60% of Malagasy noting the legitimacy of the military to take control of the government in the eventuality of an abuse of bureaucratically elected power, with only 45% saying that the military should restore civilian rule as soon as possible. Despite a noted trend in demand for accountability increasing even in democratic regimes, there is thus a paradox in Africa’s governance landscape: while citizens’ demands for accountability even within democratic regimes rise, those vulnerable to political economic risks see actual declines in accountability and transparency despite civic efforts at retroactive resilience through protest. This is, more often than not, giving way to heightened autocratic or military influence growing in the face of democratic vulnerability and bred from governance stagnancy.

However, not all is lost. Young people continue to act as circuit breakers against unaccountable regimes. Youth movements act as correction mechanisms when formal institutions lag and additional digital mobilisation tools enable them to coordinate quickly and scale protests despite restrictions. The efficacy of hybrid movements such as #FreeSenegal, #EndSARS in Nigeria, #RejectFinanceBill in Kenya and #FeesMustFall in South Africa, positions digital media as a vital tool to urgently amplify protest information and government responses to the risks to democracy. Notably, declining overall trends in democracy-related sub-categories of Rule of Law, Security & Safety, Participation, Rights and Accountability & Transparency according to the 2024 IIAG must be seen as vulnerability points to proactively remedy. These vulnerabilities are seen where only 7% of young people (18-35) across the continent have posted about politics on social media. In Mauritius, which constantly ranks at the top two countries in Africa for governance according to the IIAG, only 6% are posting about politics online and only 14% admitting to frequently discussing politics, peaking at 16% in Morocco and Angola. Again, this is unsurprising with 21 government imposed internet blackouts in 15 countries in 2024, thus further highlighting the need to buffer against the dystopian outcomes aforementioned paradox.

As a point of caution, where national vulnerabilities become democratic risks, resilience through protest cannot be a standalone guardrail to safeguarding democratic values. To harness the momentum of Gen Z movements in precipitating democratic change, a transition to institutional influence is key. For democratic gains to endure, youth movements must link their activism to institutional mechanisms such as political parties, oversight bodies, and civic education platforms to translate protest energy into structural change. Yet, caution is warranted: the strength of these institutions cannot be taken for granted. Where institutions are weak, public trust in democratic systems erodes. Moreover, the corrective power of youth-led civic action is only sustainable when young people are integrated into institutions free from securocratic capture and authoritarian patronage networks. To reap democratic dividends, Africa must mitigate the loss of democracy through not only ensuring strong leadership, but by strengthening its institutions.

The resilience of African democracy and governance unfolds within contexts of omnipresent risk through: state repression, co-optation, and institutional erosion. Here, young civic actors must be seen as valuable pressure agents, with their activism reminding political actors and older civilians that in order to last, democratic legitimacy must be defended continuously, not simply when it is convenient. Even where democratic protest succeeds, gains remain precarious when contingent on fragile economies, elite manipulation, and the oxymoronic vital volatility of digital mobilisation. Risk is thus not episodic but constitutive of African political life. It is what citizens navigate daily in asserting voice and agency. Given present resilience, risks, and vulnerabilities, African democracy can be classified as neither failing nor fully secured. Rather, it is contested and adaptive – vibrantly resilient enough to resist autocracy, yet perpetually exposed to risks that can hollow out its substance. The challenge and promise then lies in converting the courage of civic resilience into institutional robustness capable of withstanding those omnipresent risks and reducing civic vulnerabilities over time to strengthen democratic resilience.