

2026 Ibrahim Index of African Governance — Index Report

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MO IBRAHIM FOUNDATION

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OVERALL GOVERNANCE



SECURITY & RULE OF LAW

Security & Safety



- Absence of Armed Conflict
- Absence of Violence against Civilians
- Absence of Forced Migration
- Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour
- Absence of Crime
- Public Perception of Security & Safety

Rule of Law & Justice



- Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law
- Impartiality of the Judicial System
- Judicial Processes
- Equality before the Law
- Law Enforcement
- Property Rights
- Public Perception of the Rule of Law

Accountability & Transparency



- Institutional Checks & Balances
- Absence of Undue Influence
- Civic Checks & Balances
- Disclosure of Public Records
- Accessibility of Public Records
- Public Perception of Accountability

Anti-Corruption



- Anti-Corruption Mechanisms
- Absence of Corruption in State Institutions
- Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector
- Public Procurement Procedures
- Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector
- Public Perception of Anti-Corruption



PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION

Participation



- Freedom of Association & Assembly
- Political Pluralism
- Civil Society Space
- Democratic Elections
- Deliberative & Participatory Governance
- Public Perception of Political Participation

Rights



- Personal Liberties
- Freedom of Expression & Belief
- Media Freedom
- Digital Freedom
- Protection against Discrimination
- Public Perception of Freedom of Speech

Inclusion & Equality



- Equal Political Power
- Equal Political Representation
- Equal Civil Liberties
- Equal Socioeconomic Opportunities
- Equal Access to Public Services
- Public Perception of Inclusion & Equality

Women's Equality



- Political Power & Representation of Women
- Rights & Civil Liberties for Women
- Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women
- Access to Public Services for Women
- Laws on Violence against Women
- Public Perception of Female Leadership



FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

Public Administration

- Civil Registration
- Capacity of the Statistical System
- Effective Administration
- Tax & Revenue Mobilisation
- Budgetary & Financial Management
- Public Perception of Easiness to Obtain an Identity Document

Business & Labour Environment

- Regional Integration
- Economic Diversification
- Business & Competition Regulations
- Access to Banking Services
- Labour Relations
- Secure Employment Opportunities
- Public Perception of Economic Opportunities

Infrastructure

- Transport Network
- Access to Energy
- Mobile Communications
- Internet
- Shipping & Postal Network
- Public Perception of Infrastructure

Rural Economy

- Rural Land & Water Access
- Rural Market Access
- Rural Economy Support
- Rural Representation & Participation



HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Health

- Access to Healthcare
- Access to Water & Sanitation
- Control of Communicable Diseases
- Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs)
- Child & Maternal Health
- Health Quality
- Public Perception of Health Provision

Education

- Equality in Education
- Education Enrolment
- Education Completion
- Human Resources in Education
- Education Quality
- Public Perception of Education Provision

Social Protection & Welfare

- Social Safety
- Poverty Reduction Policies
- Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation
- Decent Housing
- Food Security
- Public Perception of Social Protection & Lived Poverty

Sustainable Environment

- Promotion of Environmental Sustainability
- Enforcement of Environmental Policies
- Air Quality
- Sustainable Use of Land & Forests
- Land & Water Biodiversity Protection

Published since 2007, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) assesses governance performance in each African country over the latest available ten-year period.

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation defines governance as the provision of the political, social, economic and environmental public goods that every citizen has the right to expect from its government, and that every government has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens.

The 2026 IIAG covers the 2016-2025 decade. The data for the 2026 IIAG comes from 51 data sources, from which 319 variables, clustered into 96 indicators, are collected. In total there are more than 265,000 data points in the 2026 IIAG dataset.

The 96 indicators are organised under 16 sub-categories and four categories – *Security & Rule of Law; Participation, Rights & Inclusion; Foundations for Economic Opportunity; Human Development* – that make up the *Overall Governance* score.

Each category is composed of four sub-categories.

Each sub-category is composed of a number of indicators ranging from four to seven. When possible, each sub-category includes one indicator composed of public perception variables sourced from Afrobarometer.

Nearly 95% of the 2026 IIAG indicators (90 out of 96) are clustered indicators, which are composed of more than one variable collected from one source or several sources.

Categories	Sub-categories
Security & Rule of Law	Security & Safety Rule of Law & Justice Accountability & Transparency Anti-Corruption
Participation, Rights & Inclusion	Participation Rights Inclusion & Equality Women's Equality
Foundations for Economic Opportunity	Public Administration Business & Labour Environment Infrastructure Rural Economy
Human Development	Health Education Social Protection & Welfare Sustainable Environment

Four main criteria can be used to analyse the performance of a country or a governance measure: latest year score, latest year rank, change over the past decade and trend over that decade.

Scores and ranks

Rounded to one decimal point, the IIAG scores quantify a country's performance for each governance measure for each data year, expressed out of 100.0 (with 100.0 always being the best score).

Ranks are calculated based on the respective scores and are expressed out of 54. When two or more countries have the same score, they share the same place in the ranking table (tied ranks).


Changes and trends

Ten-year changes quantify the difference in absolute score between the last and the first data years of the decade under review. The 2026 IIAG ten-year changes compare the country's performance reached in 2025 to the one reached in 2016.

Trends are a fourth layer of analysis, complementing scores, ranks and ten-year changes. The IIAG trends serve to assess the trajectory over the decade, by comparing the average rate of change over the latest five years (2021-2025) to that of the full decade series (2016-2025). This comparison helps identify early signs of the direction and pace of country trajectories – 'trends within trends'.

Trend	Characteristic
Increasing Improvement	Score is better in 2025 compared to 2016, with the rate of improvement increasing since 2021.
Slowing Improvement	Score is better in 2025 compared to 2016, but the rate of improvement is slowing since 2021.
Warning Signs	Score is better/no change in 2025 compared to 2016, but showing decline since 2021.
Bouncing Back	Score is worse/no change in 2025 compared to 2016, but showing progress since 2021.
Slowing Deterioration	Score is worse in 2025 compared to 2016, but the rate of deterioration is slowing since 2021.
Increasing Deterioration	Score is worse in 2025 compared to 2016, with the rate of deterioration increasing since 2021.
No Change	Score has not changed at all over the decade 2016-2025.
Not Classified	Data is missing so trend cannot be assessed.

Country A: Overall Governance score (2016-2025)




18 26.1% of population

Algeria, Benin, Congo Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, South Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Score is better in 2025 compared to 2016, with the rate of improvement increasing since 2021.

Country B: Overall Governance score (2016-2025)




9 10.0% of population

Angola, Burundi, Chad, Gambia, Morocco, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo

Score is better in 2025 compared to 2016, but the rate of improvement is slowing since 2021.

Country C: Overall Governance score (2016-2025)




3 13.5% of population

Eritrea, Ethiopia, Tanzania

Score is better/no change in 2025 compared to 2016, but showing decline since 2021.

Country D: Overall Governance score (2016-2025)




11

17.5% of population

Botswana, Cameroon, Comoros, DR Congo, Eswatini, Ghana, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Uganda

Score is worse/no change in 2025 compared to 2016, but showing progress since 2021.

Country E: Overall Governance score (2016-2025)




1

15.3% of population

Nigeria

Score is worse in 2025 compared to 2016, but the rate of deterioration is slowing since 2021.

Country F: Overall Governance score (2016-2025)



12

17.6% of population

Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, São Tomé and Príncipe, South Africa, Sudan, Tunisia

Score is worse in 2025 compared to 2016, with the rate of deterioration increasing since 2021.



Overall Governance


African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	50.1
10-year change (2016-2025)	+0.8
5-year change (2021-2025)	+0.5
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Increasing Improvement

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Seychelles
Change 2016-2025	+8.3
Score/Rank (2025)	78.6/1st
Largest Deterioration	Burkina Faso
Change 2016-2025	-6.9
Score/Rank (2025)	50.7/26th

Underlying categories	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Security & Rule of Law	47.8	-1.7	
Participation, Rights & Inclusion	48.5	-1.0	
Foundations for Economic Opportunity	51.1	+3.7	
Human Development	53.2	+2.5	

Overall Governance: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF




Overall Governance in Africa ends up slightly better in 2025 than in 2016, despite faltering over the mid-point of the decade

Over the decade under review (2016-2025), Africa's *Overall Governance* score has slightly edged up by +0.8 points, moving from 49.3 to 50.1 via a bumpy road. Year-on-year gains were achieved until 2018 and then again from 2022. The period in between (2019-2021) was marked by stagnation or even slight decline, broadly corresponding to the COVID-19 pandemic.

30 countries, hosting 49.6% of the continent's population, have improved in *Overall Governance* since 2016

Africa: *Overall Governance* score & year-on-year change (2016-2025)



A total of 30 countries, home to almost half (49.6%) of the continent's population, record a higher *Overall Governance* score in 2025 than in 2016. Twenty-three have deteriorated and one remains unchanged. With some of Africa's most populous countries – Nigeria, DR Congo and South Africa – recording deterioration, just over half of Africa's citizens live in a country where *Overall Governance* has declined.

Overall Governance has deteriorated in some of the continent's most populous countries: Nigeria, DR Congo, South Africa

Strong alignment between *Overall Governance* and SDG performance across Africa, five years ahead of the SDG's deadline


Based on the IIAG's definition of governance as 'the provision of political, social, economic and environmental goods that a citizen has the right to expect from their state, and that a state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens', there is substantial conceptual overlap between the IIAG and the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Many of the outcomes captured by the IIAG are also relevant to countries' progress towards the SDGs. Both the IIAG's *Overall Governance* and the SDG Index identify Seychelles and South Sudan as the highest- and lowest-performing countries in 2025, and most countries occupy similar positions across the two.

Twenty-two (about 18%) of the SDG Index's 123 underlying variables are common to both frameworks and contained in the IIAG. While both indices remain distinct in scope and methodology, both assess related dimensions of governance and public service delivery: the SDG Index prioritises measures related to human development and inequality, while the IIAG complements that with an emphasis on security, rule of law, civil rights and participation.

Overall Governance and the SDG Index show similar country patterns

African countries: *Overall Governance* & SDG Index scores (2025)



SDG implementation level is strongly correlated with *Overall Governance* performance


Increasing improvement is the most widespread trend over the decade, both by number of countries and continent's population share

The slightly positive average *Overall Governance* trend masks varied movement beneath the surface. The continent's 54 countries have progressed and deteriorated at very different speeds, while developments across individual dimensions of governance have often moved in contrasting directions. In some cases, gains in one area have offset deterioration in another; elsewhere, recent trends mark a clear acceleration, slowdown or reversal of the longer-term trajectory.

Directions and magnitudes of travel remain mixed across Africa. Among the 30 countries (hosting 49.6% of the continent's population) that improved their *Overall Governance* between 2016 and 2025, 18 have done so at an accelerated rate, making *Increasing Improvement* the most common trend. Conversely, 12 countries have declined at an accelerated rate, classifying them as *Increasing Deterioration*.


1/3 of African countries hosting over 1/4 of the continent's population record increasing improvement in *Overall Governance*

African countries: *Overall Governance* trend (2016-2025)



Population weighting produces a somewhat different overall picture, largely because Nigeria alone accounts for 15.3% of Africa's population and is classified as *Slowing Deterioration*. As a result, a slight majority of Africans live in countries where *Overall Governance* has deteriorated over the decade. However, this is spread across three different trends: *Increasing Deterioration* (12 countries, 17.6%), *Slowing Deterioration* (15.3%, Nigeria only) and *Bouncing Back* (11 countries, 17.5%). *Increasing Improvement* therefore remains the single most prevalent trend, both by number of countries (18) and by share of Africa's population (26.1%).

Overall Governance: share of Africa's population by trend (2016-2025)



At country level, substantial improvement is taking place at different levels of *Overall Governance*

Seychelles stands out for both performance and progress: alongside being the top performer in 2025, it records the largest improvement of all countries since 2016 (+8.3). But substantial gains have also been made by countries still in the middle or lower ranks, demonstrating that some of the strongest improvements can take place at very different starting levels of *Overall Governance*: Gabon (+7.0, 24th), Gambia (+6.9, 21st), Angola (+6.1, 37th) and Zambia (+5.1, 15th). On average, the eleven (Chad and Togo being tied) largest improvers have gained an impressive +5.5 points between 2016 and 2025.

Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Morocco and Zambia are among the 10 most improved countries over the decade

Overall Governance: 10 most improved countries by 10-year change (2025)

Rank 2025	Country	Score 2025	Score 10-year change	Rank 10-year change	Trend
1	Seychelles	78.6	+8.3	+2	Slowing Improvement
24	Gabon	52.9	+7.0	+12	Increasing Improvement
21	Gambia	54.8	+6.9	+9	Slowing Improvement
7	Morocco	63.6	+6.4	+8	Slowing Improvement
37	Angola	44.7	+6.1	+8	Slowing Improvement
15	Zambia	58.4	+5.1	+6	Increasing Improvement
53	Somalia	26.6	+5.0	-	Slowing Improvement
35	Djibouti	45.0	+4.3	+7	Increasing Improvement
17	Côte d'Ivoire	58.1	+4.0	+2	Increasing Improvement
47	Chad*	36.9	+3.6	+1	Slowing Improvement
22	Togo*	54.3	+3.6	+1	Slowing Improvement

*Chad and Togo improved the same between 2016 and 2025.

Source: MIF

Average gains are larger than average losses among the biggest movers over the decade

The average decline in *Overall Governance* among the eleven most deteriorated countries (Mauritius and Mozambique being tied) is -3.1 points since 2016. This is around half the average progress recorded by the most improved countries, which gained on average +5.5 points. Concerningly, however, seven of the most deteriorated countries are declining at an accelerated pace: Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Niger, Sudan and Tunisia. Six of these seven countries (all except Mozambique) experienced a coup over the decade under review, driving the worsening trend.

Of the 11 most deteriorated countries over the decade, 7 underwent at least one coup

Overall Governance: 10 most deteriorated countries by 10-year change (2025)

Rank 2025	Country	Score 2025	Score 10-year change	Rank 10-year change	Trend
26	Burkina Faso	50.7	-6.9	-13	Increasing Deterioration
38	Nigeria	44.2	-5.2	-11	Slowing Deterioration
52	Sudan	27.4	-3.2	-1	Increasing Deterioration
11	Tunisia	60.9	-3.0	-3	Increasing Deterioration
36	Comoros	44.9	-2.8	-5	Bouncing Back
33	Mali	45.6	-2.4	-4	Bouncing Back
45	Guinea-Bissau	39.4	-2.2	-5	Increasing Deterioration
33	Niger	45.6	-2.1	-2	Increasing Deterioration
42	Guinea	41.2	-2.0	-3	Increasing Deterioration
2	Mauritius*	75.0	-1.9	-1	Bouncing Back
29	Mozambique*	48.8	-1.9	-6	Increasing Deterioration

*Mauritius and Mozambique deteriorated the same between 2016 and 2025.

Source: MIF

Important reshuffles within both the ten top- and bottom-ranked countries

The top ten countries by *Overall Governance* score in 2025 are Seychelles, Mauritius, Cabo Verde, Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, Morocco, Senegal, Ghana and Kenya. Between them, they record an average of 67.4 points, 17.3 points above the continental mean.

Yet this high final performance conceals mixed results when it comes to the trends followed over the decade. Only four of the top ten – Seychelles, Morocco, Senegal and Kenya – have continued to improve over the decade, while six – the majority – have deteriorated. For Cabo Verde and South Africa, the decline has even accelerated over the most recent five years.

Despite these contrasting trajectories, the composition of the top *Overall Governance* performers remains mostly the same, with nine of them keeping their position in the top ten. Morocco is the only newcomer to the top ten, replacing Tunisia after gaining +6.4 points and moving up eight ranks, earning it 7th place in 2025.

Though still in the top 10, South Africa (5th) follows a trend of increasing deterioration over the decade

Morocco replaces Tunisia in the top 10, gaining over 6 points over the decade

Overall Governance: top 10 countries by score (2025)

Rank 2025	Country	Score 2025	Score 10-year change	Rank 10-year change	Trend
1	Seychelles	78.6	+8.3	+2	Slowing Improvement
2	Mauritius	75.0	-1.9	-1	Bouncing Back
3	Cabo Verde	70.3	-0.6	-1	Increasing Deterioration
4	Botswana	67.5	-1.0	-	Bouncing Back
5	South Africa	66.6	-0.4	-	Increasing Deterioration
6	Namibia	64.8	-1.1	-	Bouncing Back
7	Morocco	63.6	+6.4	+8	Slowing Improvement
7	Senegal	63.6	+1.8	+2	Increasing Improvement
9	Ghana	62.8	-1.4	-2	Bouncing Back
10	Kenya	61.0	+0.9	-	Increasing Improvement

Source: MIF

The ten lowest-ranked countries in 2025 reach an average *Overall Governance* score of 31.6 – 18.5 points below the continental average. Libya (46th) and Guinea-Bissau (45th) are new entrants, replacing Angola and Congo Republic. Meanwhile the two worst performers, South Sudan and Somalia, stay stuck at rank 54th and 53rd, respectively. The remaining six countries only moved one rank up or down between each other. All six trends are found between the ten lowest-ranked countries over the decade, from *Increasing Improvement* to *Increasing Deterioration*.

 **Congo Republic and Angola leave the bottom 10 countries, replaced by Libya and Guinea-Bissau**

Overall Governance: bottom 10 countries by score (2025)

Rank 2025	Country	Score 2025	Score 10-year change	Rank 10-year change	Trend
54	South Sudan	20.4	+0.5	-	Increasing Improvement
53	Somalia	26.6	+5.0	-	Slowing Improvement
52	Sudan	27.4	-3.2	-1	Increasing Deterioration
51	Eritrea	27.8	+1.0	+1	Warning Signs
50	Central African Republic	31.3	-0.9	-1	Increasing Deterioration
49	Equatorial Guinea	33.1	+1.8	+1	Increasing Improvement
48	DR Congo	34.0	-0.3	-1	Bouncing Back
47	Chad	36.9	+3.6	+1	Slowing Improvement
46	Libya	38.8	-1.2	-3	Bouncing Back
45	Guinea-Bissau	39.4	-2.2	-5	Increasing Deterioration

Source: MIF

Overall Governance progress is driven by gains in economic opportunity and human development, outweighing deterioration in security, rights and participation

Beneath the slight progress of *Overall Governance* over the decade, the four underlying dimensions have followed strongly diverging trajectories. While in 2016 it started out 1.9 points below the *Overall Governance* score, *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* recorded the strongest improvement over the decade, gaining +3.7 points, with progress accelerating particularly since 2021. It now stands one point above the *Overall Governance* performance. *Human Development* has also consistently improved over the decade, rising by +2.5 points, and remains the best-scoring category across the decade.

In contrast, while starting out relatively close to the average *Overall Governance* score in 2016, *Security & Rule of Law* as well as *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* settle below at the end of the decade. *Security & Rule of Law* started to deteriorate from 2018, ending with a loss of -1.7 points. The decline in *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* occurred from 2020 and has accelerated since 2022, losing -1.0 points over the decade.


Taken together, however, the progress recorded both in economic opportunity and human development have more than offset losses in the other two dimensions, leaving Africa's 2025 *Overall Governance* score slightly higher than in 2016.

Foundations for Economic Opportunity is the most improved, becoming the second-best scoring category from 2022

The decline in *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* occurred from 2020 and has accelerated since 2022

Progress in both economic opportunity and human development have more than offset losses in security, rule of law & participation

Africa: Overall Governance & categories scores (2016-2025)



Category

- Security & Rule of Law
- Participation, Rights & Inclusion
- Foundations for Economic Opportunity
- Human Development
- Overall Governance

Source: MIF

In many countries, economic opportunity and human development improve despite declining security and participation


The numbers of improved and deteriorated countries by governance dimension further illustrate the split trajectories. While most countries have since 2016 deteriorated in both *Security & Rule of Law* and *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* (34 and 31 countries, respectively), even larger majorities (44 and 40 countries, respectively) have improved over the decade in both *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* and *Human Development*.

Thirteen countries display this divergence clearly, improving in both the economic and human development categories despite declines in security and participation: Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Tunisia, Uganda and Tanzania.

Declines in *Overall Governance* are most often driven by a deterioration in security and participation: Of the 23 countries whose *Overall Governance* declined since 2016, 22 deteriorated in *Security & Rule of Law* (except Libya); 17 also deteriorated in *Participation, Rights & Inclusion*.

In 8 of the 10 countries* that underwent a coup in the last decade, *Overall Governance* declined

IIAG categories: number of countries improved or deteriorated per category (2016-2025)



* The ten countries that underwent a coup in the last decade are: Burkina Faso (2022, 2022), Chad (2021), Gabon (2023), Guinea (2021), Guinea-Bissau (2025), Madagascar (2025), Mali (2020, 2021), Niger (2023), Sudan (2021) and Tunisia (2021).

Key

- Improved
- Deteriorated
- No change

Source: MIF

However, of those 23 overall declined countries, 15 still improved – from different initial levels – in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity*: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Eswatini, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Tunisia and Uganda. Twelve still improved in *Human Development*: Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, DR Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Tunisia and Uganda.


This highlights that in many countries (21), economic opportunity and/or human development have continued to improve despite the deterioration of security, rule of law, rights and participation, and across a wide range of country contexts. However, the sustainability of this trend remains to be seen.

***Foundations for Economic Opportunity* improves across contrasting security and rule of law trajectories**

Foundations for Economic Opportunity stands out as the most broadly improved IIAG category: its continental score has risen by +3.7 points since 2016, with 44 of 54 countries improving. Mapping these ten-year changes against *Security & Rule of Law*, where 34 countries have deteriorated, reveals a one-sided pattern: economic opportunity has frequently prevailed where security and rule of law have weakened. Worsening security and rule of law has not necessarily, or at least not yet broadly, prevented progress in economic opportunity.

For almost half (46.9%) of the continent's population, hosted in 25 countries – the largest group in the chart (upper left quadrant) – economic opportunity has improved despite declining *Security & Rule of Law*. A further 20 countries improved or held steady across both dimensions (upper right), while only nine deteriorated in both (lower left). In all countries where *Security & Rule of Law* improved, *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* also improved.

African countries: *Security & Rule of Law* and *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* 10-year changes (2016-2025)



6 of the 10 'coup countries' (Chad, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Tunisia) have improved in both economic opportunity and human development

25 countries (46.9% of Africa's population) improved in economic opportunity despite deteriorating security and rule of law

- Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Mauritania, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
- Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania.
- Cabo Verde, Comoros, DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan.

There is, however, a difference in magnitude of improvement between the two groups: In the 25 countries where *Security & Rule of Law* deteriorated and *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* improved (upper left quadrant), the latter increased by an average of +4.4 points over the decade. By comparison, in the 20 countries where both categories progressed (upper right quadrant), *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* increased by an average of +5.2 points. This suggests that while *Security & Rule of Law* is not a necessary condition for economic progress, such progress tends to be larger where it is also improving.



Economic progress is stronger in countries where *Security & Rule of Law* also improved


At sub-category level, *Infrastructure* leads improvements while *Participation* declines the most

The 16 sub-categories that make up the IIAG's four governance dimensions follow broadly the same split between improvements and deteriorations, with a majority of ten sub-categories recording progress.



10 of the IIAG's 16 sub-categories record progress over the decade

Africa: sub-categories 10-year changes & trends (2016-2025)



All eight sub-categories within *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* — led by *Infrastructure* — and within *Human Development* — led by *Sustainable Environment* — have improved their continental average since 2016. *Infrastructure* records by far the largest gain (+7.7), followed by *Sustainable Environment* (+4.0) and *Rural Economy* (+3.7).

Contrary to the average decline of the *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* category, two of its sub-categories break this pattern and record progress over the decade: *Anti-Corruption* (+0.5) and *Women's Equality* (+4.9). *Women's Equality* is the second most improved out of the IIAG's 16 sub-categories.

On the other hand, six of the eight sub-categories in *Security & Rule of Law* and *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* have declined over the decade, five of them at a rate of *Increasing Deterioration*. *Participation* (-5.0) leads as the most declined sub-category, followed by *Security & Safety* (-4.3).

Infrastructure indicators lead progress while participation, rights and accountability measures give cause for concern

At African average level, the strongest gains are concentrated in *Infrastructure*. Four of its six indicators feature among the top ten most improved in the overall IIAG: *Mobile Communications* (+16.8), *Internet* (+10.2), *Shipping & Postal Network* (+8.8) and *Access to Energy* (+7.0), cementing the sub-category's leadership. *Women's Equality*, the second most improved sub-category, also contributes two indicators to the top ten: *Laws on Violence against Women* (+14.8) and *Political Power & Representation of Women* (+6.6).

With *Capacity of the Statistical System* (+10.6) and *Disclosure of Public Records* (+8.9), progress is also commendable in data robustness and transparency, both key pillars of sound governance.

Infrastructure records by far the largest progress of all 16 IIAG sub-categories (+7.7)

Participation leads as the most declined sub-category, losing 5 points over the decade

4 of the IIAG's 10 most improved indicators sit within Infrastructure

Africa: 10 most improved indicators by 10-year change (2016-2025)

Source: MIF

Sub-category	Indicator	Score (2025)	10-year change	Trend
Infrastructure	Mobile Communications	74.2	+16.8	●
Women's Equality	Laws on Violence against Women	80.7	+14.8	●
Public Administration	Capacity of the Statistical System	49.7	+10.6	●
Infrastructure	Internet	33.4	+10.2	●
Accountability & Transparency	Disclosure of Public Records	33.7	+8.9	●
Rural Economy	Rural Economy Support	63.2	+8.8	●
Infrastructure	Shipping & Postal Network	36.4	+8.8	●
Health	Control of Communicable Diseases	77.7	+8.1	●
Infrastructure	Access to Energy	45.4	+7.0	●
Women's Equality	Political Power & Representation of Women	50.4	+6.6	●

Trend

● Increasing Improvement ● Slowing Improvement ● Warning Signs ● Bouncing Back ● Slowing Deterioration ● Increasing Deterioration ● No Change

The picture among the ten most deteriorated indicators is markedly different. Half belong to *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* and four to *Security & Rule of Law*, leaving only one from *Foundations for Economic Opportunity*. The largest losses therefore cluster around institutional accountability, civic space, rights and security.

Notably, five of the 12 most declined (with *Media Freedom*, *Public Perception of Health Provision* and *Public Perception of Social Protection & Lived Poverty* being tied) are public opinion indicators measuring the perception of security, inclusion, public administration, health and lived poverty, pointing to a deterioration in how citizens experience and assess governance.

Africa: 10 most deteriorated indicators by 10-year change (2016-2025)

Source: MIF

Sub-category	Indicator	Score (2025)	10-year change	Trend
Accountability & Transparency	Absence of Undue Influence	28.2	-9.7	●
Participation	Civil Society Space	46.7	-8.5	●
Accountability & Transparency	Institutional Checks & Balances	39.9	-7.5	●
Rights	Freedom of Expression & Belief	55.1	-7.2	●
Security & Safety	Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour	52.4	-6.8	●
Security & Safety	Public Perception of Security & Safety	50.3	-6.8	●
Participation	Freedom of Association & Assembly	29.6	-6.7	●
Public Administration	Public Perception of Easiness to Obtain an Identity Document	49.4	-6.6	●
Inclusion & Equality	Public Perception of Inclusion & Equality	53.7	-6.3	●
Rights*	Media Freedom	51.4	-5.7	●

* Two other indicators also deteriorated by -5.7: *Public Perception of Health Provision* and *Public Perception of Social Protection & Lived Poverty*.

Trend

● Increasing Improvement ● Slowing Improvement ● Warning Signs ● Bouncing Back ● Slowing Deterioration ● Increasing Deterioration ● No Change

Ten countries to watch

12th

Benin: The most improved country over the decade in economic opportunity

In 2025, Benin ranks 12th in *Overall Governance*, having gained +2.6 points over the decade, driven by significant improvements in all *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* and all *Human Development* sub-categories. The country is among the 18 that follow a trajectory of *Increasing Improvement* in *Overall Governance*.

In *Foundations for Economic Opportunity*, Benin is the most improved country (+12.3), led by impressive progress in the *Infrastructure* (+16.7, 21st) and *Public Administration* (+14.6, 9th) sub-categories. In 2025, Benin even ranks 2nd in *Regional Integration* and 3rd in *Budgetary & Financial Management* and *Effective Administration*. The only indicator in this category (out of 23) to decline is *Economic Diversification* (-6.6).

Following the continental pattern, *Overall Governance* progress remains curbed by the deterioration recorded in *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* (-5.7) and, to a lesser extent, *Security & Rule of Law* (-2.9). In the former dimension, the strongest decline is recorded in the *Participation* subcategory (-18.6), though public perception thereof records progress. In the latter dimension, decline is mostly recorded in *Accountability & Transparency* (-8.8) and *Rule of Law & Justice* (-7.1), while *Anti-Corruption* gains +5.9 points, driven by all indicators but *Public Procurement Procedures* (-1.7).

In *Human Development*, while still ranking 22nd, Benin gains +6.9 points. Progress is most substantial in *Sustainable Environment* (+11.2, 15th), followed by *Health* (+6.8, 31st) and *Education* (+6.5, 22nd). Here, most indicators also record progress, with the exception of *Human Resources in Education* (-17.2, 31st), *Education Enrolment* (-6.5, 33rd), *Decent Housing* (-5.3, 41st) and *Food Security* (-5.9, 29th).

All public perception indicators in the sub-categories covering economic opportunity and human development, except the one related to social protection and lived poverty, record progress: easiness to obtain an identity document, economic opportunities, infrastructure, health provision and education provision.

43rd

Burundi: Broad governance improvements to face a test in the 2027 presidential elections

Burundi's *Overall Governance* improves by +2.1 points over the decade, driven by widespread progress in 13 out of the 16 underlying sub-categories, mostly so in *Infrastructure* (+11.7), *Rural Economy* (+11.6) and *Rule of Law & Justice* (+7.7).

Strong progress in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* (+6.5) and, to a lesser extent, in *Human Development* (+1.7) and *Security & Rule of Law* (+1.6) outweighs the deterioration

registered in *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* (-1.6).

While Burundi ranks 43rd in *Overall Governance* and in the mid or low forties for most sub-categories, *Women's Equality* is the country's standout, reaching 4th rank in 2025, including 1st rank in *Access to Public Services for Women*. Other high-ranked indicators are *Absence of Crime* (7th) and *Regional Integration* (8th).

Public perception indicators are not available for Burundi.

However, ahead of the 2027 elections, Burundi sits at or below the 50th rank in *Political Pluralism* (50th) and *Civil Society Space* (52nd), both a trend of accelerating deterioration, but also in *Access to Energy* (53rd), *Equal Civil Liberties*, *Equal Socioeconomic Opportunities*, *Mobile Communications*, *Internet* (all 52nd) and *Child & Maternal Health* (50th).

Over his previous seven-year term, President Évariste Ndayishimiye reinstated the BBC's licence, released human rights activists, lifted a two-year ban on foreign exchange bureaus, and eased import controls, prompting the EU and US to relax sanctions.

48th

DR Congo: In Africa's 4th most populous country, governance stagnates as armed conflict and insecurity intensify

Still ranked 48th in 2025, DR Congo's *Overall Governance* only moves by a marginal -0.3 points over the decade, with both *Security & Rule of Law* (-4.3, 50th) and *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* (-2.8, 50th) declining, preventing any overall progress.

DR Congo is one of the only nine countries to record a deterioration in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* and is the third most declined country in this dimension. Driving this concerning trend are significant losses in *Rural Economy* (-8.6) and *Public Administration* (-3.0). The most deteriorated indicators in economic opportunity are *Rural Market Access* (-40.4), *Internet* (-15.6), *Rural Land & Water Access* (-14.4), *Economic Diversification* (-13.5) and *Civil Registration* (-12.5). Countering this is marked progress in *Rural Representation & Participation* (+33.5) and *Mobile Communications* (+16.5, but still 50th).

Strong deteriorations at sub-category level in *Security & Safety* (-12.8, 50th), *Rule of Law & Justice* (-5.5, 50th), *Rural Economy* (-8.6, 42nd), and *Public Administration* (-3.0, 43rd) mix with significant gains in *Women's Equality* (+6.9, 38th), *Participation* (+5.7, 41st), *Inclusion & Equality* (+4.0, 44th), and *Sustainable Environment* (+3.8, 49th). The country consistently ranks in the low forties or

even fifties across many indicators, with *Education Completion* (11th) and *Education Enrolment* (24th) as notable exceptions.

Due to protracted conflict, *Absence of Armed Conflict* (-27.8) and *Absence of Violence against Civilians* (-24.0) are among the country's most deteriorated indicators.

30th

Ethiopia: A fragile domestic base while vying for regional hegemony

Though Ethiopia's *Overall Governance* score improves by +1.8 over the decade, its trajectory shows *Warning Signs*. This also characterises *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* and, to a lesser extent, *Human Development*, even though these two categories still perform higher in 2025 than in 2016 (+2.7 and +1.8, respectively).

This concerning trend is compounded by a worsening deterioration in *Security & Rule of Law* (-2.4, 30th), driven by a strong decline in the sub-categories *Security & Safety* (-11.8, 44th) and, to a lesser extent, *Rule of Law & Justice* (-4.7, ranking 41st). With the outbreak of war in Tigray, *Absence of Armed Conflict* (-31.7) is Ethiopia's most declined indicator over the decade. Prospects are not positive as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, sworn in for a new five-year term in October 2026, is pressing Ethiopia's claim to a Red Sea port, risking to reignite the historical conflict with Eritrea.

Within *Participation, Rights & Inclusion*, there is a strong deterioration of *Rights* (-10.4, 45th), mostly felt in *Protection against Discrimination* (-22.2, 24th) and *Media Freedom* (-13.0, 50th).

While ranking 30th at *Overall Governance* level, Ethiopia features among the top ten countries for ten indicators, four of them being public perception indicators: *Public Perception of the Rule of Law* (2nd), *Public Perception of Accountability* (3rd), *Public Perception of Education Provision* (5th) and *Public Perception of Health Provision* (9th).

24th

Gabon: Second most improved country over the decade despite the 2023 coup

Gabon is the second most improved country over the decade, gaining +7.0 points in *Overall Governance*, following a trajectory of *Increasing Improvement*. Gabon is also one of the nine countries to achieve improvements in all four categories simultaneously. As a result, Gabon ranks 24th in 2025, up from 36th in 2016.

However, this progress masks declines in the indicators *Absence of Undue Influence* (-32.4), *Deliberative &*

Participatory Governance (-17.3), *Food Security* (-11.4), *Freedom of Expression & Belief* (-11.1), *Promotion of Environmental Sustainability* (-11.1) and *Institutional Checks & Balances* (-9.1).

Gabon is ranking quite below its *Overall Governance* rank (24th) in *Institutional Checks & Balances*, *Absence of Undue Influence* (both 46th) *Regional Integration* (48th), *Budgetary & Financial Management* (45th) and *Equal Political Representation* (43rd). But the country also ranks quite above its average ranking in the following indicators: *Equality in Education* (2nd), *Secure Employment Opportunities* (6th), *Access to Energy* (7th), *Media Freedom*, *Equal Political Power*, *Land & Water Biodiversity Protection* (all 8th), *Access to Banking Services* and *Decent Housing* (both 9th). Gabon also ranks 1st in *Public Perception of Economic Opportunities*.

Eleven of the 14 public perception indicators record progress, to the extent that seven of them – related to economic opportunities, freedom of speech, education, infrastructure, accountability, rule of law and anti-corruption – are among the country's ten most improved indicators.

10th

Kenya: Deteriorating democratic and public perception indicators ahead of the 2027 general elections

Ranking 10th in 2025 and recording *Increasing Improvement*, Kenya's modest gain in *Overall Governance* over the decade (+0.9) is driven by progress in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* (+4.1) as well as, to a lesser extent, in *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* (+1.9) and *Human Development* (+1.7) which outweigh the concerning decline in *Security & Rule of Law* (-4.2).

Results are also mixed at sub-category level, with *Women's Equality* (+9.6) and *Infrastructure* (+9.7) leading the progress and *Security & Safety* (-7.7) and *Anti-Corruption* (-6.7) countering it. Worth monitoring is also the slight decline in *Social Protection & Welfare* (-0.9), mainly driven by a substantial decline in *Food Security* (-21.5).

While Kenya ranks above its *Overall Governance* rank in *Rural Economy* in 2025 (3rd), *Education* (5th) and *Business & Labour Environment* (5th); the country also ranks far below it in *Security & Safety* (41st) and *Anti-Corruption* (27th).

As a result, five of the 14 public perception measures – health provision (-22.8), rule of law (-20.0), infrastructure (-15.5), accountability (-14.6) and easiness to obtain an identity document (-13.1) are among the country's ten most declined indicators over the decade, alongside *Absence of Violence against Civilians* (-20.6) and *Media Freedom* (-12.9).

38th

Nigeria: Ahead of 2027 elections, Africa's most populous country is the second most declined overall, behind Burkina Faso

Ranking 38th in 2025, Nigeria is the only country to deteriorate in all four underlying governance dimensions of the IIAG. Losing -5.2 points, it is the second most declined country in *Overall Governance* over the decade.

Running contrary to the continental trend, Nigeria – currently ranking 3rd for GDP in Africa – is also one of the only nine countries recording a deterioration in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity*, and the most declined in this category (-4.2). This is mainly driven by the deterioration in *Rural Economy* (-12.1) and, to a lesser extent, in *Public Administration* (-3.2). Indeed, *Public Perception of Economic Opportunities* is also one of the country's most deteriorated indicators (-39.6).

Nigeria's most deteriorated governance dimension is *Security & Rule of Law* (-11.2), driven by a loss of -18.3 points in the *Security & Safety* sub-category due to rising armed conflict and violence against civilians.

While deterioration slightly abates over the second half of the decade for *Security & Rule of Law* and even reverts to small progress – *Bouncing Back* – for *Participation, Rights & Inclusion*, the rate of decline is accelerating for *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* and *Human Development*.

Twelve of the 16 IIAG sub-categories record deterioration, by over 10 points for *Security & Safety*, *Rule of Law & Justice*, *Participation*, *Rural Economy* and *Social Protection & Welfare*. Progress is only achieved in *Inclusion & Equality*, *Health*, *Education* and *Sustainable Environment*.

As a result, six public perception measures feature among the country's ten most deteriorated indicators: poverty and social protection, rule of law, anti-corruption, health, economic opportunities and infrastructure – even though non-perception measures on anti-corruption, business environment and infrastructure register gains over the decade.

5th

South Africa: Though still ranking 5th, Africa's largest economy is on a trajectory of increasing deterioration

Over the 2016-2025 decade, South Africa records a marginal loss of -0.4 in *Overall Governance*, mostly driven by a deterioration in *Security & Rule of Law* (-3.8) but also, concerningly, by a slight loss in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* (-0.5).

Contrary to the continental trend, South Africa is one of the

only nine countries to record deterioration in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity*. Within this category, the largest loss is recorded in the *Public Administration* sub-category (-3.7), specifically in the indicator *Civil Registration* (-25.0) indicator. *Public Perception of Infrastructure* (-20.8) and *Public Perception of Economic Opportunities* (-16.1) are the second and third most declined indicators.

Within the economic opportunity dimension, South Africa still ranks 1st in *Tax & Revenue Mobilisation* and *Business & Competition Regulations* and 2nd in *Budgetary & Financial Management*.

But South Africa's biggest challenges lie in *Security & Rule of Law*: *Anti-Corruption* is the country's most declined subcategory (-11.5), driven by a stark loss in *Public Perception of Anti-Corruption* (-20.8), linked to significant declines in public procurement procedures and corruption in both public and private sectors. *Security & Safety* is South Africa's worst-ranked sub-category (42nd out of 54), driven by the concerningly low *Absence of Crime*, where the country ranks 54th.

The largest sub-category achievement is recorded in *Participation* (+9.0, 4th), driven by progress in *Freedom of Association & Assembly* (+25.0) and *Political Pluralism* (+20.8), with the country ranking 1st in both of those indicators.

No progress is recorded in *Human Development* due to a loss of -6.4 points in *Social Protection & Welfare*, countering comparatively smaller gains in *Education* (+3.4), *Sustainable Environment* (+2.4) and *Health* (+0.7).

52nd

Sudan: Increasing deterioration in a country surrounded by seven neighbours

Not unsurprisingly, Sudan records a trajectory of *Increasing Deterioration* over the decade, losing -3.2 points in *Overall Governance*, propelled mostly by heavy losses in *Public Administration* (-21.4), *Security & Safety* (-17.5) and *Social Protection & Welfare* (-13.6).

Sudan becomes the third most deteriorated country in *Overall Governance* over the decade after Burkina Faso and Nigeria. After limited progress between 2018 and 2021, the deterioration is worsening since 2021. Contrary to the continental trend, Sudan is also losing ground in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* (-3.7), one of only nine countries to do so.

Over the second half of the decade (2021-2025), Sudan is the most deteriorated country in *Absence of Armed Conflict* (-27.9), *Absence of Violence against Civilians* (-26.6) and *Absence of Forced Migration* (-32.7) due to continued conflict, most recently exacerbated by two 2021 coups and

the outbreak of war in April 2023.

Only three out of 16 sub-categories still manage to record substantial progress over the decade: *Rural Economy* (+9.7, 33rd), driven by progress in rural representation, participation and market access, *Inclusion & Equality* (+8.8, 46th), driven by progress in access to public services, and *Rights* (+6.8, 46th) driven by progress in freedom of expression and belief.

Most public perception measures decline over the decade, most strongly those related to security and safety as well as infrastructure.

Water & Sanitation, Health Quality, Human Resources in Education and Food Security.

Interestingly, of the 14 public perception indicators, only five – related to political participation, inclusion and equality, public administration, infrastructure and health – record deteriorations. All others, related to security and safety, rule of law and justice, accountability, anti-corruption, freedom of speech, female leadership, economic opportunities, education and social protection improve, despite negative results especially in the democracy-related non-perception measures.



Tunisia: Ahead of the 2027 elections, Tunisia leaves the top ten

Declining by -3.0 points over the decade in *Overall Governance* and following a trajectory of *Increasing Deterioration*, Tunisia leaves the ten top-ranked countries in 2025. Gains achieved in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* (+2.7, 7th) and *Human Development* (+1.3, 6th) do not outweigh the significant losses in *Participation*, *Rights & Inclusion* (-11.1, 21st) and *Security & Rule of Law* (-4.8, 18th).

This concerning trend is driven mostly by severe losses in the *Participation* (-29.4) and *Accountability & Transparency* (-17.3) sub-categories. Meanwhile, all of the eight sub-categories relating to economic opportunity and human development improve, except for *Public Administration* and *Sustainable Environment* (both -2.8).

Negative changes in key measures accelerated after 2021, when President Kais Saied suspended parliament in July 2021 in what was labelled a 'self-coup'. Eleven indicators related to participation, rule of law and justice, accountability and transparency and rights declined by more than 20 points since 2021, causing major concerns ahead of the elections planned for 2027.

Tunisia now ranks below 30th place in the following indicators: *Impartiality of the Judicial System, Equality before the Law, Civic Checks & Balances, Disclosure of Public Records, Anti-Corruption Mechanisms, Political Pluralism, Public Perception of Political Participation, Media Freedom, Protection against Discrimination, Rights & Civil Liberties for Women, Budgetary & Financial Management, Regional Integration, Control of Communicable Diseases, Control of Non-Communicable Diseases, Promotion of Environmental Sustainability and Land & Water Biodiversity Protection.*

But the country is still ranking between 1st and 3rd in 2025 for various indicators mainly linked to daily life: *Capacity of the Statistical System, Economic Diversification, Secure Employment Opportunities, Access to Energy, Access to*

Infrastructure cannot outrun accountability: Why economic progress in Africa must be matched by stronger governance

Nasi Rwigema, Arbor Group & MIF Now Generation Network (NGN)

Africa's *Overall Governance* score went from 49.3 to 50.1 over the decade, a change of about 1.6%. The headline number barely moved, but where you lived mattered a lot. Just over half of Africans now live in a country where governance got worse.

I have watched both versions of this story up close. For several years I developed utility-scale solar power plants in South Africa. The country had built one of the best clean energy programmes in the world. Government ran competitive bid rounds, private developers carried the construction risk, and the price of power fell round after round.

Then the rounds stopped. Financiers left, manufacturers closed their local offices and many of my peers shut their companies. What disappeared was the confidence that the rules would hold.

That is why one finding in this report stays with me. *Infrastructure* gained +7.7 points, nearly ten times the continent's overall improvement. Four of the ten most improved indicators sit there. I'm proud of that progress, and I know how fragile it is when it rests on weak accountability.

Participation, meanwhile, lost -5.0 points. Set against the overall change, that is more than six times as large, and it is the biggest fall in the Index. Almost half of Africans (46.9%) live in the 25 countries where the economy improved while security and rule of law got worse. The report says it remains to be seen whether that lasts. From what I have seen, I doubt it. Capital follows confidence, and confidence follows rules.

Participation can sound abstract, so here is the practical version: Years ago, I sat in a public meeting in rural Kenya, presenting a wind power facility to a community with no grid power. We assumed they would be thrilled. They threatened to veto it. Someone stood up and asked whether we had spoken to anyone in the community first. We had to admit we hadn't.

Asking people first is how projects get built and stay built. On one of the power plants I led in South Africa, the local community got preferential access to jobs, new schools and a stake in a trust that shared the benefits. It worked because they had a say.

The opposite also holds. When I stepped in to lead an at-risk hydropower project in Uganda, it was behind schedule and over budget, and local people were blocking the access roads in protest. The turnaround began with listening to every stakeholder. Within six months we were back on schedule and on budget.

The report shows citizens feeling the same gap. Five of the twelve most deteriorated indicators are public opinion measures, on how safe people feel and how well the state serves them. The countries sliding fastest are, in most cases, ones that have also seen a coup. When people lose a legitimate way to be heard, someone else offers a faster one.

So why should you care about this Index and the Foundation that authors it? It measures governance honestly, then puts that measurement in the hands

of people who will have to act on it. I see the Index as a tool for governing. It tells a young civil servant, an investor or a founder where the ground is solid and where it is not.

Today, I am a co-president of the Now Generation Network and a Council Member of the Foundation. The Now Generation Network is where my generation turns the Index into work. I oversee our mentorship programme because good governance gets built by people who have been coached to deliver. Our members also feed local voices into the research behind this Index, which matters because data is only as good as the people who help gather it. Many of us will hold public and private office within the next decade, and we should practise now.

So, I have two asks for the next ten years.

First, give participation the treatment infrastructure gets. Roads get a budget line, an owner, a deadline and a scorecard. Consultation, open budgets and civic space deserve the same. A country that can roll out 4G to a whole population can run local consultation and publish its budgets. The IIAG already supplies the measure.

Second, young Africans should arrive with plans. A costed proposal with a named owner and a first year gets read. A list of grievances usually gets filed. Governments can help by making proposals easy to submit, and we can help by making them worth reading.



Security & Safety


African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	69.7
10-year change (2016-2025)	-4.3
5-year change (2021-2025)	-0.7
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Slowing Deterioration 

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Libya
Change 2016-2025	+8.3
Score/Rank (2025)	62.8/43rd
Largest Deterioration	Burkina Faso
Change 2016-2025	-26.1
Score/Rank (2025)	54.2/47th

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Absence of Armed Conflict	88.4	-3.9	
Absence of Violence against Civilians	74.5	-4.8	
Absence of Forced Migration	83.9	-1.9	
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour	52.4	-6.8	
Absence of Crime	62.9	-2.9	
Public Perception of Security & Safety	50.3	-6.8	

Security & Safety sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF




The strong deterioration in *Security & Safety* slows substantially since 2022

Security & Safety is the second most declined of the IIAG's 16 sub-categories at continental average, just behind *Participation*, dropping by -4.3 points between 2016 and 2025. However, the deterioration has slowed substantially over the last four years. Africa's *Security & Safety* performance declined by -4.4 points between 2016 and 2022 and hit its lowest score of 69.6 in 2022. From then on, the continental average has stabilised.

Forty-three countries experienced a deterioration over the decade, meaning that 85.2% of African citizens now live in a country where *Security & Safety* has worsened since 2016. The recent stabilisation shows at country level too: since 2022, only 26 countries have experienced a decline, and 27 have improved, while one remained unchanged.

Most countries (19), host to almost half of the continent's population (44.9%) experience a *Slowing Deterioration of Security & Safety*. This trend can be observed in five of the six underlying indicators as well.

Security & Safety: share of Africa's population by trend (2016-2025)



For 45% of Africa's citizens, the deterioration of *Security & Safety* is slowing over the decade


Since 2022, the continental *Security & Safety* level has stabilised, and 27 countries improved

All regions in Africa recorded a deterioration in *Security & Safety* over the past decade, except for Northern Africa, which improved by +1.9. Half the countries in this region improved (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia) while the other half (Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco) deteriorated. Yet, Algeria and Morocco still feature within the ten best-performing countries in this sub-category.

Libya recorded the largest improvement (+8.3) of all 54 countries in this sub-category. This was mainly driven by Libya's progress in key conflict-related measures such as *Absence of Non-State Conflict* (+34.7), *Absence of Violent Events in Non-State Conflict* (+29.1) and *Absence of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)* (+15.0). A key factor in reducing armed conflict in Libya is the October 2020 ceasefire between the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army.

Northern Africa is the only region to improve in *Security & Safety* over the decade

Libya: *Absence of Non-State Conflict, Absence of Violent Events in State-Based Conflict and Absence of IDPs* scores (2016) & 10-year changes (2016-2025)




Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Sudan and Cameroon record the sharpest deterioration in *Security & Safety*

The most significant deterioration over the decade was recorded in Burkina Faso, suffering declines in all six underlying *Security & Safety* indicators. Its overall score deteriorated by -26.1, a 32.5% decline over the ten-year period.

This severe downturn was primarily driven by the rapid expansion of non-state armed groups and escalating internal conflict. Attacks by militant groups severely compromised regional security, resulting in mass civilian displacement, severe humanitarian crises, and acute political instability marked by two military coups in 2022.

Burkina Faso: *Security & Safety* indicators scores (2016 & 2025)





Rule of Law & Justice


African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	45.4
10-year change (2016-2025)	-2.2
5-year change (2021-2025)	-1.6
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Increasing Deterioration

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Somalia
Change 2016-2025	+14.5
Score/Rank (2025)	28.6/46th
Largest Deterioration	Ghana
Change 2016-2025	-15.3
Score/Rank (2025)	60.0/13th

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Executive Compliance with Rule of Law	52.0	-4.6	
Impartiality of the Judicial System	45.2	-5.2	
Judicial Processes	45.0	-1.3	
Equality before the Law	42.6	-2.4	
Law Enforcement	38.7	+2.2	
Property Rights	54.8	-1.2	
Public Perception of Rule of Law	41.8	-3.9	

Rule of Law & Justice sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF



For over 80% of Africa's population, *Rule of Law & Justice* is worse in 2025 than in 2016

Africa's *Rule of Law & Justice* score has declined by -2.2 points, with deterioration recorded in 36 countries, home to 81.4% of the continent's citizens. Only 17 countries improved of which seven record *Increasing Improvement*: Chad, Eritrea, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya and Mali – albeit for most of them the improvement is happening from a low level.

Top performers in *Rule of Law & Justice* in 2025 are Seychelles (83.2), Cabo Verde (76.1) and Mauritius (75.3) while Somalia (+14.5), Gambia (+11.7) and Morocco (+9.8) improved the most over the decade.

Fully broad-based deterioration is relatively rare. Only Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa recorded losses across every constituent indicator of this sub-category. Together, these countries account for 29.1% of the continent's population.

However, among the 36 countries whose *Rule of Law & Justice* score declined, 30 still improved in at least one underlying indicator. The reverse is also true: 16 of the 17 countries that improved overall also deteriorated in at least one indicator (except Burundi).


Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa record losses across every constituent indicator of *Rule of Law & Justice*

19 countries follow a trend of increasing deterioration in *Rule of Law & Justice*

At country level, changes in *Rule of Law & Justice* mask large opposing movements between indicators

Selected African countries: *Rule of Law & Justice* and most improved & deteriorated indicators 10-year changes (2016-2025)

Source: MIF



Minor changes at the aggregate sub-category level can mask the true scale of within-country divergence, which is often substantial. In 40 countries, the gap between the best and the worst ten-year indicator change exceeds 20 points; in the 11 countries shown above it even exceeds 40 points. Gambia records the widest spread: *Public Perception of the Rule of Law* declined by -17.9 points while *Impartiality of the Judicial System* improved by +59.7, a difference of 77.6 points.

Law Enforcement is the only indicator to register progress over the decade, namely in 'coup countries'

Law Enforcement is the only improved *Rule of Law & Justice* indicator at continental level (+2.2), even recording *Increasing Improvement*, although from a very low base.

An interesting pattern can be observed in five of the 'coup countries' - Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali and Niger. Military takeovers over the last decade led to large deteriorations in *Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law*, which captures, among other aspects, whether changes in political power are determined by the military.


At the same time, all five countries improved in *Law Enforcement*, which measures the reliability and effectiveness of the police as well as the sanctioning of police misconduct. This diverging pattern is also observed in 12 other countries, which improve in *Law Enforcement* while deteriorating in executive compliance.

These diverging developments underline that improvements in enforcement capacity can occur alongside weakening constitutional checks and executive compliance.

Law Enforcement is the only improved rule of law indicator at continental average level

17 countries, among them six 'coup countries', improve in Law Enforcement while deteriorating in Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law

Selected African countries: Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law & Law Enforcement 10-year changes (2016-2025)



'Coups countries': military takeovers and consolidation of power in ten African countries over the decade

The ten 'coup countries' are: Burkina Faso (2022, 2022), Chad (constitutional coup, 2021), Gabon (2023), Guinea (2021), Guinea-Bissau (2025), Madagascar (2025), Mali (2020, 2021), Niger (2023), Sudan (2021) and Tunisia ('self-coup', 2021).

The African Union does not include Chad and Tunisia in the group of 'coup countries'.

***Impartiality of the Judicial System* is the most deteriorated Rule of Law & Justice indicator**

Covering court independence, judicial autonomy and appointments free from political influence, *Impartiality of the Judicial System* is key to the respect of the rule of law. Concerningly, this is the most deteriorated indicator within *Rule of Law & Justice*. It declined in 38 countries and lost -5.2 points at continental level. Twenty countries even recorded *Increasing Deterioration* since 2021.

Trajectories of some of the most improved and deteriorated countries show how institutional reforms and political intervention are reflected in these scores:

- Morocco, the second most improved country (+31.5), is a prime example of a gradual reform success story. The country's sustained improvement coincides with the implementation of major judicial reforms stemming from the 2011 constitution. This includes the transfer of responsibility for judicial appointments from the Ministry of Justice to a new Supreme Council of the Judiciary in 2017, and the removal of the office of the prosecutor from the Ministry of Justice, fostering judicial independence.¹
- Lesotho (+30.3) rebounded after a period of judicial upheaval in 2018 when the Court of Appeals failed to sit for two sessions, and Prime Minister Thomas Thabane removed Chief Justice Nthomeng Majara.² The situation normalised from 2021 onwards and virtually no instances of authorities failing to respect court orders were reported.³ Seven additional new High Court Justices were sworn in in 2022, bringing the total to 15.⁴
- In Nigeria, the second most deteriorated country (-35.7), the deterioration between 2016 and 2019 followed a period of mounting tensions over judicial independence, beginning with security-service raids and arrests of senior judges in 2016 and culminating in the suspension of Chief Justice Walter Onnoghen by President Muhammadu Buhari shortly before the 2019 election.⁵



**20 countries
record increasing
deterioration in
*Impartiality of the
Judicial System***




**Morocco is the
second most
improved country in
*Impartiality of the
Judicial System* (+31.5)**

- In Zimbabwe, the third most deteriorated country (-30.3), a 2017 constitutional amendment changed the appointment procedure for Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and High Court Judge President, giving the President Emerson Mnangagwa substantially greater discretion over those appointments.⁶ Another amendment proposed in 2019 and enacted in 2021 expanded this presidential influence even further.⁷

Nigeria's and Zimbabwe's judicial independence decline over the decade

Selected African countries: *Impartiality of the Judicial System* score (2016-2025)



A different story of rule of law: How community justice is closing Africa's justice gap

Zainab Malik & Dr Martin Gramatikov, Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiIL)

The global narrative dominating media headlines and policy spaces on the rule of Law is one of rapid and systemic decline. In the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's IAG, *Security & Rule of Law* fell by -1.7 and *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* fell by -1.0, with the decline accelerating since 2022. The 2025 WJP Global Rule of Law Index showed that, for the eighth year in a row, rule of law declined in more countries than it improved. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, rising executive overreach, shrinking civic space, and severe court backlogs have pushed the regional rule of law score down to an average of 0.45. Countries in Africa see economic improvements, but these do not translate into rule of law gains. There is a big difference between justice institutions and delivery. Afrobarometer surveys show that fewer than half of Africans feel confident that courts can deliver justice. Many find them too expensive, and fear unequal treatment.

Amid this concerning trend, community-based justice offers a promising pathway.¹ Our argument, based on data about people's experiences of justice, is that with smart designs and committed investment, community justice mechanisms can help Sub-Saharan Africa leapfrog in access to justice, much as mobile money allowed several African countries to bypass traditional banking.


Much like how mobile money took over traditional banking across the continent, justice today stands at a similar inflexion point. In the early 2000s, traditional financial models predicted it would take decades to build brick-and-mortar bank branches for unbanked populations. The emergence of *M-Pesa* proved them wrong. By combining basic mobile technology, local agent networks, and flexible regulatory frameworks, M-Pesa and similar solutions let millions transact quickly and securely without waiting decades for traditional banking infrastructure.

Can community justice be the mobile money of the justice sector and help the continent leapfrog the access-to-justice gap? Evidence and experience suggest that justice systems in Sub-Saharan Africa can benefit from following this path: traditional, informal, and customary justice infrastructure can bridge much of the justice gap in Africa today without waiting in vain for expensive formal justice architecture to catch up.

The evidence is starting to emerge. HiIL's Justice Needs and Satisfaction Surveysⁱⁱ consistently show that for everyday justice challenges – land, family, petty crime, neighbours – are turning to people within their communities: traditional and religious leaders, community paralegals, and village elders.

Figure 1 demonstrates that approximately half of those who encountered a justice issue sought guidance from informal sources, such as friends, relatives, and community or religious leaders. The data indicates that while formal institutions play an important role, their reach remains limited. Most people seek advice and information from trusted sources within their immediate communities.


Figure 1: Information and advice seeking



Community justice mechanisms do far more than help people navigate system options; people actively trust them to resolve disputes directly. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, between one third and two thirds of all legal issues are brought before community elders, village chiefs, sheikhs, pastors, and other community leaders who volunteer their time and social capital to resolve disputes and foster reconciliation. In South Sudan, over 60% of serious disputes are resolved through informal justice, while in Niger and Uganda, these providers address 42% and 40% of cases, respectively. While some individuals use a mix of formal and informal pathways, relatively few rely solely on formal institutions like courts or police. This clearly shows that without accessible community-based options, a significantly larger share of legal problems would remain unresolved.

Three key arguments support investing in informal justice as a mechanism to leapfrog access to justice and strengthen the rule of law across Sub-Saharan Africa. First, the scale of utilisation is immense: tens, if not hundreds, of millions of people across the continent rely daily on informal justice mechanisms to resolve critical issues, including land disputes, family matters, inheritance, domestic violence, debt, and petty crime.

Figure 2: Dispute resolution



Second, people who use these local setups often rate the outcome higher than formal courts because the process feels fairer, more direct, and focused on putting things right rather than just handing down punishments. Approximately 57% of disputes submitted to informal mechanisms are fully or partially resolved, compared to 53% for formal pathways. Only hybrid models combining formal and informal processes yield slightly higher success, further highlighting the vital role of community-based systems. In Ethiopia, where 43% of legal disputes are handled by village elders – *shimagales*, people are generally more satisfied with justice processes led by village elders, finding them to be fairer in the process, accessible, swift, and trusted.

Finally, community justice costs a tiny fraction of formal legal institutions. For example, research by ODIⁱⁱⁱ indicates that village mediation in Malawi costs approximately \$18 USD per case, while community mediation through Rwanda's Abunzi committees operates at an estimated \$52 USD per case. Although more data and research are needed, these findings present a compelling case for the core value and potential of informal justice.

To realise the full potential of customary justice, several structural challenges must be addressed. Community justice systems are not an absolute panacea. They need guardrails of people-centricity and must work for people without biases. Historical power imbalances, patriarchal structures, and localised practices can lead to unfair outcomes for women, youth, and minority groups when left unchecked. Transforming these mechanisms requires embedding continuous outcome monitoring, maintaining continuous procedural adaptation, and enforcing strict human rights safeguards to guarantee non-discrimination and fundamental

equity without destroying their accessible and restorative nature. Community justice also requires innovative policy frameworks, serious public funding from municipal and state budgets, and continuous evolution alongside the rapid socio-economic and technological shifts everyone encounters.

Translating these insights into effective governance requires four strategic policy actions:

- 1. Design seamless, hybrid justice pathways:** Policy frameworks must integrate formal and informal mechanisms into seamless justice pathways that work for people. Establishing clear referral mechanisms between the various formal and informal justice actors enables people to navigate between justice pathways seamlessly.
- 2. Measure outcomes at the community level:** Judicial metrics must shift focus from capital city court dockets to real-world dispute resolution across local communities. Kenya's Alternative Justice Systems (AJS) Measurement Framework offers a scalable model, measuring community justice mechanisms by their resolution, fairness, relational benefits, speed, and empowerment as experienced by the users.
- 3. Reallocate sustainable funding to community justice:** Governments, international donors, and philanthropic organisations must align investment priorities with actual justice utilisation patterns. Reallocating funding toward frontline community justice workers, paralegal networks, local reconciliation hubs, and similar initiatives promises significantly higher social returns than investing exclusively in central court facilities.
- 4. Promote appropriate technology and AI integration:** Modern technology can enhance customary justice without introducing heavy administrative burdens. Deploying voice-to-text tools for oral customary proceedings, mobile case registries, and AI-assisted legal guidance helps community forums document precedents, preserve institutional memory, and monitor human rights compliance cleanly and efficiently.

ⁱIn this piece, we use 'community justice' to mean the wide range of informal, traditional, customary, and religious practices through which community-based institutions and mechanisms help people resolve their disagreements.

ⁱⁱ Accessible via <https://hiil.org/> and <https://dashboard.hiil.org/>.

ⁱⁱⁱ Manuel, M., & Manuel, C. (2023). "Small is beautiful, but scale is necessary": frontline justice services in lower-income countries with the potential to scale up. In *Taking people-centred justice to scale: investing in what works to deliver SDG 16.3 in lower-income countries*. Overseas Development Institute.



Accountability & Transparency


African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	36.8
10-year change (2016-2025)	-0.8
5-year change (2021-2025)	-0.7
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Increasing Deterioration

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Seychelles
Change 2016-2025	+16.1
Score/Rank (2025)	72.0/1st
Largest Deterioration	Tunisia
Change 2016-2025	-17.3
Score/Rank (2025)	34.7/30th

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
<i>Institutional Checks & Balances</i>	39.9	-7.5	
<i>Absence of Undue Influence</i>	28.2	-9.7	
<i>Civic Checks & Balances</i>	48.8	-1.5	
<i>Disclosure of Public Records</i>	33.7	+8.9	
<i>Accessibility of Public Records</i>	31.0	+4.5	
<i>Public Perception of Accountability</i>	47.2	+0.8	

Accountability & Transparency sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF



A marginal decline for *Accountability & Transparency*, but on a trend of increasing deterioration over the decade

Of all six IIAG sub-categories that have deteriorated over the decade, *Accountability & Transparency* has declined the least, losing only -0.8 points since 2016 at continental level. Countries are almost split: 26 improved while a slight majority of 28 countries, hosting 56.8% of Africa's citizens, declined. Of the 26 countries that improved, 11 of them record *Increasing Improvement*, making it the dominant trend by number of countries.

The top performing countries in 2025 are Seychelles (72.0), Mauritius (68.9) and South Africa (67.6) while Seychelles is also the most improved country (+16.1), followed by Gambia (+14.9) and Morocco (+11.5). On the other end, countries reaching the lowest score in 2025 are Eritrea (3.2), Equatorial Guinea (9.8) and Djibouti (12.4), while Tunisia (-17.3), Niger (-15.9) and Burkina Faso (-12.7) have seen the largest declines over the decade.

Declines in *Accountability & Transparency* are mostly driven by the 'coup countries'

Tunisia recorded the largest decline on the continent in *Accountability & Transparency* (-17.3), alongside countries which recently experienced a military coup (Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali) and the Central African Republic. In three of the underlying indicators (*Institutional Checks & Balances*, *Absence of Undue Influence*, *Civic Checks & Balances*), Tunisia recorded the largest or second-largest declines.


The Central African Republic also deteriorated heavily across this sub-category (-10.9) and across both *Institutional Checks & Balances* (-23.7) and *Civic Checks & Balances* (-27.2). In these two key indicators of accountability, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic Mali, Niger and Tunisia have experienced the largest recent declines since 2021.

In Tunisia, President Kais Saied suspended parliament in 2021 and introduced sweeping changes that consolidated presidential power, including replacing the Supreme Judicial Council, dismissing dozens of judges, and pushing through a new constitution. The 2024 election saw reports of opposition candidates being targeted and limits placed on judicial authority over disputes.⁸

11 countries record increasing improvement in *Accountability & Transparency* over the decade

Sahelian coup countries, Tunisia and Central African Republic record the largest declines in institutional and civic checks & balances

Selected African countries: *Institutional* and *Civic Checks & Balances* 10-year changes (2016-2025)



Source: MIF

In the Central African Republic, after the Constitutional Court blocked his reform process in 2022, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra removed the chief justice by decree.⁹ A new 2023 constitution abolished presidential term limits, and President Touadéra won a third term in December 2025 amid opposition boycotts.¹⁰ A 2024 law protecting human rights defenders offers some optimism that conditions will improve, though its impact remains to be seen.¹¹

Improvements in disclosure and accessibility of public records pushed forward by digitisation efforts

Disclosure of Public Records and *Accessibility of Public Records* are the most improved indicators within *Accountability & Transparency* at African average level. Together, they assess government transparency and accessibility, including the publication of budgets, asset declarations, laws and judicial information, and quality of government online services.


Algeria, Cameroon, and Côte d'Ivoire stand out among the improvers within the past five years. Algeria recorded the continent's largest five-year improvement in *Disclosure of Public Records* (+21.7), followed by Côte d'Ivoire (+19.5) and Cameroon (+15.6).

Recent digitisation efforts across the three countries are likely contributing to this improvement. In Cameroon, Law No. 2024/001 overhauled the national archives framework, recognising electronic and digitised records and creating a fund dedicated to financing the development and digitisation of public records.¹²

Under the Digital Algeria 2030 strategy, Algeria has moved towards an integrated data-driven model, under which the High Commission for Digitalization announced more than 500 projects for 2025-2026, 75% linked to improving public services.¹³

In Côte d'Ivoire, the Commission for Access to Public Interest Information and Public Documents launched a digitalisation programme and the country's 2024-2026 Open Government Partnership action plan includes efforts to publish laws and decrees online.¹⁴

Selected African countries: *Disclosure of Public Records* score (2021-2025)



Algeria, Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire improve most in public records disclosure over the last 5 years due to recent digitisation efforts

The rule of law in Africa

Erin Campbell, World Justice Project (WJP)

Throughout the past decade, countries in every region of the world have endured an ongoing rule of law recession: results from the 2026 *World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index®* show that rule of law has declined in more countries than improved for the ninth consecutive year.ⁱ Conflicts are escalating, economic pressures are mounting, and the rules that have long supported international cooperation are increasingly contested. At the same time, people are losing avenues to hold their governments accountable.

The data show that authoritarianism is no longer an emerging threat – it has become entrenched in many parts of the world. More than 86% of the countries measured in the WJP Rule of Law Index have experienced a sustained five-year decline in at least one key safeguard against authoritarian rule: either through weakening checks on government power (Factor 1), declining government openness (Factor 3), or rollbacks in fundamental rights (Factor 4). This trend is particularly salient in Africa, where all countries saw a five-year decline in at least one of these safeguards, and over half saw five-year declines in all three.

African countries face not only an increasingly unstable security climate, but also a broad weakening of institutional trust. As civil conflict worsens throughout the continent, core human rights protections have eroded: on average, Africa has seen notable deteriorations in the indicators measuring freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy (-11.8% on average since 2021) and the right to life and security of the person (-8.4% on average) (see Figure 1). In 2026, these two indicators reflect the widest gap between African and global averages, with Africa's average scores trailing 0.20 points behind global benchmarks in both areas. Africa also faces mounting challenges in judicial independence. Since 2021, the continent's average scores in the indicators measuring improper government influence in the civil and criminal justice systems have declined by -7.5% and -9.2%, respectively.

While these issues are not unique to Africa, their consequences are particularly relevant to the continent and its continued socio-economic development. For businesses and investors, respect for the law provides the predictability and confidence needed for investment, job creation, and growth. When rules become unpredictable, risk increases. Our data reinforces this connection: economic prosperity, price stability, and lower credit risk tend to cluster where the rule of law is strong.

Despite these downward trends, examples of positive rule of law developments do exist in the region. In the past year, 14 African countries saw modest improvements in their WJP Rule of Law Index scores (see Figure 2). Liberia saw the greatest improvement in overall score out of the 38 African countries covered by WJP's Index, driven in particular by stronger limits on government powers (Factor 1) and broad improvements in its civil and criminal justice systems (Factors 7 and 8, respectively).

Additionally, out of the 46 countries worldwide that either maintained their scores or improved in the past five years, eight are African (listed in Figure 3). Botswana, for example, has seen rising rule of law scores since 2021 driven by strengthening checks on executive powers (Factor 1), anti-corruption measures (Factor 2), and the efficacy of its civil justice system (Factor 7). Senegal has also experienced a five-year increase in its rule of law score, with the country achieving its greatest improvements in government transparency (Factor 3) and regulatory enforcement (Factor 6).

Improving the rule of law requires sustained engagement across society. Governments have a central responsibility, but businesses, civil society, the legal community, and citizens all have a stake in institutions that are effective, accountable, and fair. It is the World Justice Project's aim to support these efforts by contributing rigorous, up-to-date information on key governance indicators over time. Through publications such as the WJP Rule of Law Index and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance, stakeholders in all sectors are empowered to identify where progress is needed, inform policy and business decisions, and advance the rule of law for all people.

Figure 1: WJP Rule of Law Index average scores and five-year percentage changes (2021-2026)

Indicator	African average		Global average	
	Overall Score (2026)	5-year % change ('21-'26)	Overall Score (2026)	5-year % change ('21-'26)
WJP Rule of Law Index: Overall Score	0.45	-3.4%	0.55	-2.3%
Factors				
Factor 1: Constraints on Government Powers	0.44	-6.5%	0.53	-3.6%
Factor 2: Absence of Corruption	0.39	-0.6%	0.51	-0.7%
Factor 3: Open Government	0.40	-2.6%	0.52	-2.1%
Factor 4: Fundamental Rights	0.45	-5.4%	0.55	-3.7%
Factor 5: Order and Security	0.62	-4.0%	0.72	-1.7%
Factor 6: Regulatory Enforcement	0.44	-2.0%	0.54	-1.4%
Factor 7: Civil Justice	0.47	-2.6%	0.54	-2.9%
Factor 8: Criminal Justice	0.38	-2.0%	0.47	-2.0%
Key indicators				
4.2 Right to life and security	0.37	-8.4%	0.57	-4.8%
4.6 Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy	0.26	-11.8%	0.46	-7.8%
7.4 Civil justice is free of improper government influence	0.39	-7.5%	0.50	-4.7%
8.6 Civil justice is free of improper government influence	0.34	-9.2%	0.45	-6.7%

Figure 2: African Rule of Law improvers (2025-2026)

Country	Overall Score (2026)	1-year % change ('25-'26)
Liberia	0.45	0.9%
Algeria	0.49	0.8%
Zimbabwe	0.40	0.7%
Malawi	0.52	0.6%
Egypt	0.35	0.5%
Ghana	0.55	0.5%
Gambia	0.49	0.3%
Morocco	0.48	0.3%
Rwanda	0.64	0.3%
Gabon	0.40	0.3%
Benin	0.47	0.2%
Senegal	0.56	0.1%
Sierra Leone	0.44	0.1%
Botswana	0.60	0.0%

Figure 3: African Rule of Law improvers (2021-2026)

Country	Overall Score (2026)	5-year % change ('21-'26)
Rwanda	0.64	2.5%
Senegal	0.56	1.4%
Liberia	0.45	1.0%
Botswana	0.60	0.7%
Kenya	0.45	0.7%
Zimbabwe	0.40	0.6%
Algeria	0.49	0.1%
Gambia	0.49	0.0%

¹ The WJP Rule of Law Index is an annual report that presents scores and rankings for 143 countries and jurisdictions based on people's perceptions and experiences with the rule of law in practice. Scores are calculated on a scale from 0 to 1, with 1 representing the highest possible score. For more information on the Index's conceptual framework and methodology, as well as a complete list of the African countries measured in the Index, please visit <https://worldjusticeproject.org/index>.



Anti-Corruption


African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	39.1
10-year change (2016-2025)	+0.5
5-year change (2021-2025)	+1.1
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Increasing Improvement

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Seychelles
Change 2016-2025	+26.3
Score/Rank (2025)	76.6/1st
Largest Deterioration	Comoros
Change 2016-2025	-14.0
Score/Rank (2025)	25.7/41st

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms	32.2	-1.4	
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions	43.6	+1.7	
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector	40.6	0.0	
Public Procurement Procedures	32.5	-0.3	
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector	43.5	+4.7	
Public Perception of Anti-Corruption	49.0	-4.0	

Anti-Corruption sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF




After a strong decline between 2018 and 2020, *Anti-Corruption* across the continent is increasingly improving since 2020

Averaged across all countries, *Anti-Corruption* in Africa has gone up from a score of 38.6 in 2016 to 39.1 in 2025. This small positive ten-year change of +0.5 covers fluctuations over the decade: between 2016 and 2020, *Anti-Corruption* declined by about one point (-0.9) before improving again to a higher score than in 2016.

It also covers diverging trajectories at country level, with deteriorations recorded in 28 countries, home to 58.8% of African citizens, versus improvements in 26 countries hosting 41.2% of the population. Leading the most improved countries are Seychelles (+26.3), Angola (+17.6) and Chad (+13.7) while Comoros (-14.0), Liberia (-12.2) and South Africa (-11.5) have declined the most.

Anti-Corruption performance is slightly higher in 2025 than in 2016, through a bumpy decade

Africa: *Anti-Corruption* score (2016-2025)



Seychelles and Angola lead *Anti-Corruption* progress over the decade though Seychelles is showing warning signs

The largest *Anti-Corruption* improvements over the decade were made by Seychelles (+26.3) and Angola (+17.6). Seychelles is also the top-ranked country in this sub-category (tied with Rwanda) while Angola ranks in the mid-field in 29th place.

Despite still being first ranked, Seychelles' progress peaked in 2022 and has since started going down again, losing -2.6 points since 2022, leading the country to enter the *Warning Signs* trend category. This worrying recent trend is driven by a decline of -16.6 points in *Anti-Corruption Mechanisms* since 2022.


Seychelles is both the top-ranked and most improved country with considerable gains since its 2016 *Anti-Corruption Act*

Seychelles established the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACCS) as a legally independent body under the 2016 Anti-Corruption Act and subsequently strengthened its investigative and arrest powers in 2019.¹⁵ In 2021, the ACCS further signed information sharing agreements with the revenue authority and central bank.¹⁶

In Angola, anti-corruption and governance reforms gathered considerable momentum after President João Lourenço took office in 2017. One of the most tangible changes was asset recovery: a 2018 law established a framework for voluntary repatriation of assets held abroad and created the National Asset Recovery Service within the Attorney General's Office, with powers to identify, locate and seize illicit assets.¹⁷

Since 2018, Angola has an operational National Asset Recovery Service

Anti-Corruption: top 5 most improved countries' scores, 10-year changes, ranks and trends (2025)




Anti-Corruption Mechanisms and other corruption outcomes do not always move in parallel

When comparing the sub-category's underlying measures, *Anti-Corruption Mechanisms* and other indicators do not necessarily move in parallel. At continental level, *Anti-Corruption Mechanisms* declined by -1.4 since 2016 while the average of the four outcome indicators (*Absence of Corruption in State Institutions*, *Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector*, *Public Procurement Procedures* and *Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector*) improved by +1.5 since 2016.

This divergence is visible in 25 countries. In 15 of them, *Anti-Corruption Mechanisms* deteriorated while outcome indicators improved on average; in another ten, mechanisms strengthened while outcome indicators deteriorated. Benin is a particularly stark example: *Anti-Corruption Mechanisms* declined by -27.7 points while corruption measures for state institutions (+15.5), the public sector (+13.7) and the private sector (+23.2) all improved. Similar patterns can be observed in Burundi and Tanzania.

Formal anti-corruption mechanisms are indeed only one part of tackling corruption. Their effectiveness ultimately depends on how rules are applied, and on the incentives, norms and everyday behaviour of political leaders, public officials, businesses and citizens. Better practices can emerge even where formal mechanisms weaken, while stronger institutions do not automatically translate into cleaner practices across the public and private sectors.

Selected African countries: *Anti-Corruption* indicators 10-year changes (2016-2025)



More than 70% of Africa's population live in a country where violence has doubled over the last decade

Dr Andrea Carboni, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED)

Africa has experienced a paradoxical trajectory over the past decade. The 2026 IAG illustrates how foundational gains in human development, infrastructure, and digital connectivity across several African countries have run in parallel with a deterioration of governance, democratic institutions, and security.

Security indicators have worsened on multiple dimensions, with far-reaching implications for human safety and regional stability. Across Africa, political violence and violence targeting civilians more than tripled between 2016 and 2025. ACLED estimates that 71% of Africa's population lives in a country where violence has doubled from 2016 to 2025. In 2025, over 380 million people – or 26% of the continent's population – resided within five kilometres of a violent event. They were 290 million – or 20% – in 2020.

The security breakdown is most acute in the central Sahel and Lake Chad Basin region, where a series of transnational armed insurgencies has gained ground across borders, accelerating domestic political crises and heightening regional tensions.

Eleven coup attempts, including eight successful takeovers, took place just in the last decade across the region, as incumbent governments were ousted under the pretext of failing to rein in armed groups. In fact, the recurrence of unconstitutional changes of government in the wake of security crises underscores how deteriorations in security and governance indicators are closely connected.

Armed groups linked to the Islamic State and al-Qaeda have grown in several parts of the continent. These groups are escalating violence, targeting civilians, and directly challenging state capacity at unprecedented levels. Their actions have occasionally threatened national capitals with millions of residents in Western and Eastern Africa.

Armed with advanced technology like drones, portable satellite internet systems, and artificial intelligence, they hold territory, run transnational smuggling routes, and embed themselves into global militant networks. Beyond military force, their ability to extort resources from local populations and attract new recruits has transformed once-localised insurgencies into resilient, transnational threats to global security.

Although these trends conceal significant differences among African countries, Africa's security landscape remains fragile. Years-long civil wars rage unabated, while the traditional tools of diplomacy and peacekeeping often prove powerless. Domestic security crises increasingly travel across borders, sustained by criminal-militant networks that outrun fragmented policy responses. Extremist groups in Africa are profiting from strengthened ties with transnational criminal organisations, enabling them to exploit governance vulnerabilities and illicit economies. In turn, some of the world's most powerful drug cartels are moving their operations on the African continent where they find more permissive environments for their operations.

This convergence between militant and criminal opportunities increases the resilience of non-state armed groups, amplifying the security and governance threats faced by African states. Adequate policy responses thus require accepting the connected nature of militant violence in Africa and the increasingly blurred boundaries between political and criminal networks.



Participation

African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	42.0
10-year change (2016-2025)	-5.0
5-year change (2021-2025)	-2.3
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Increasing Deterioration

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Gambia
Change 2016-2025	+29.1
Score/Rank (2025)	58.0/15th
Largest Deterioration	Burkina Faso
Change 2016-2025	-38.0
Score/Rank (2025)	29.3/38th

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)
Freedom of Association & Assembly	29.6	-6.7
Political Pluralism	38.4	-5.3
Civil Society Space	46.7	-8.5
Democratic Elections	38.3	-4.8
Deliberative & Participatory Governance	51.7	-2.0
Public Perception of Political Participation	56.9	-2.8

Participation sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF



With a loss of five points, *Participation* is the most declined sub-category at African average level

Africa's average *Participation* score has declined by -5.0 points over the decade, making it the most declined sub-category of the overall IIAG. The deterioration is felt in 35 countries, home to 67.8% of the continent's population.

Of these 35 countries, 12 experienced *Increasing Deterioration*, meaning the decline has accelerated since 2021 – seven of these are recent 'coup countries'. In 11 countries, however, the decline is slowing down and another 12 are *Bouncing Back*, meaning their scores have started improving since 2021, despite still remaining at a lower level in 2015 than in 2016.

Top performers in 2025 are Seychelles (83.5), Cabo Verde (79.2) and Mauritius (79.1), while Gambia (+29.1), Seychelles (+15.6) and Zambia (+15.5) are the most improved. Seychelles is both the first ranked and second most improved country. On the other end of the table, Eritrea (3.3), Sudan (7.9) and South Sudan (10.4) are the lowest-ranked countries while Burkina Faso (-38.0), Mali (-33.2) and Tunisia (-29.4) have deteriorated the most.

Two routes to deteriorating *Participation*: Burkina Faso and Mali

Burkina Faso recorded the worst deterioration in *Participation* with a ten-year change of -38.0. But the situation was not always so dire: in 2017, the country rose to a score of 73.0, positioning itself at 8th rank out of the 54 countries, riding the aftermath of the 2014 popular revolution and the subsequent first free civilian elections in decades. However, from 2022 onwards, following two military coups, each subsequent year increasingly deteriorated. Burkina Faso has dropped significantly within each constituent indicator of the *Participation* sub-category, scoring below the African average in all six.

With a similar score but a different path, Mali declined almost as much as Burkina Faso with a ten-year change of -33.2. Mali's decline started much earlier, between 2017-2018, with Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta's elections, three years before the 2020 coup.

Although the deterioration is drastic for both countries, Burkina Faso's faster and bigger decline tells a story of democracy being pushed off by coups, while Mali's slower decline shows how deterioration can also start within a democracy, paving the way to an unavoidable coup.



Participation is the IIAG's most declined sub-category, losing 5 points over the decade as 35 countries register deterioration




Going from its first free election in decades (2015) to two military coups (2022), Burkina Faso is the most declined country in *Participation*



Mali's *Participation* decline started under President Keïta's mandate

Burkina Faso & Mali: *Participation* score (2016-2025)




A rare success story: Zambia is the largest recent improver in *Participation*

Following a successful transition of power in 2021, Zambia is the most improved country in *Participation* between 2021 and 2025, gaining +19.9 points and reaching the fourth highest score in *Public Perception of Political Participation* (73.8) after Tanzania (85.3), Mauritius (75.5) and Benin (74.9) in 2025.

Zambia's improvement follows the August 2021 election, in which opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema took power. The peaceful government transition helped restore public confidence, leading to improvements in all underlying *Participation* indicators.

Zambia: *Participation* indicators scores (2021 & 2025)




Absence of Civil Society Repression: contrary to Africa's average decline, a few countries make standout gains

A key underlying component of *Civil Society Space* is measuring the extent to which governments attempt to repress civil society organization. Despite an average continental decline of *Absence of Civil Society Repression* (-5.2), four countries progressed sharply between 2016 and 2025:

- Gambia's score improved by +58.4 points, moving from 39th place to 2nd. The start of the improvement lines up with Yahya Jammeh's departure in 2017, ending 22 years of authoritarian rule and opening up space for civil society.
- Angola improved by +32.8, from 37th to 21st place since President João Lourenço took over in 2017.
- Zambia (+28.0, rank 29th to 10th) shows a similar pattern on a smaller scale, improving with President Hakainde Hichilema's 2021 elections win, which reversed the period under Edgar Lungu marked by restrictions on NGOs and opposition gatherings.
- DR Congo's improvement (+26.3, rank 45th to 29th) happened in line with the country's first peaceful transfer of power from Joseph Kabila to President Felix Tshisekedi.

Angola, DR Congo, Gambia and Zambia have become less repressive for CSOs, mostly following transitions of power

Selected African countries: *Absence of Civil Society Repression* rank (2016-2025)



Public Perceptions of Political Participation before and after transition elections

Public Perception of Political Participation declined less than other Participation indicators across the continent

All underlying *Participation* indicators have deteriorated over the decade at African average level, led by *Civil Society Space* (-8.5) which is on a trend of *Increasing Deterioration*. *Freedom of Association & Assembly* (-6.7), *Political Pluralism* (-5.3) and *Democratic Elections* (-4.8) all also declined sharply, but deterioration is slowing down over the second part of the decade.

However, the decline in *Public Perception of Political Participation* appears less stark (-2.8). Twenty-three countries deteriorated versus 13 which improved (public perception is only available for 36 countries).


Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal and Zambia held executive elections in the past five years and saw the opposition take power.

However, when looking across all six indicators for these eight countries, the change of executive power did not meaningfully translate into an increase in *Participation* scores. Only one indicator, *Democratic Elections*, improved for all eight countries, rising by an average of +8.6 between 2020 and 2025. At the same time, *Public Perception of Political Participation* declined in six of the eight countries from the year before their respective elections to 2025.

At continental level, public perception has declined less starkly than other *Participation* indicators

In six countries that had change-of-power elections since 2020, *Public Perception of Political Participation* declines after the election

Selected African countries: *Public Perception of Political Participation* score (year before elections & 2025)



Insecurity and Africa's democratic experiment

Dr Joseph Asunka, Afrobarometer

Introduction

Insecurity is a major concern for citizens across Africa, with important implications for their views on democracy. While popular support for democracy as the preferred system of government remains resilient, experiences of insecurity, fear of political violence, and fear of reprisal for speaking up against corruption are correlated with dissatisfaction with how democracy works as well as support for military alternatives.

A climate of insecurity and fear

Across 38 countries that Afrobarometer surveyed in 2024/2025, nearly half (47%) of Africans say a family member felt unsafe in their home or neighbourhood at least once in the past year. For almost one third (31%), this happened several times or often.

Fear of political violence is less widespread but still significant. About one in five citizens (19%) feared becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence "somewhat" or "a lot" during their last national election campaign. Elections are meant to give citizens a voice, but for a sizeable minority, they are instead a source of anxiety.

The most pervasive fear concerns accountability: More than seven in ten respondents (72%) say that ordinary people risk retaliation if they report corruption; only one in four (26%) think whistle-blowers are safe from negative consequences.

Commitment to democracy wavers with insecurity

While support for democracy across the continent remains remarkably stable – about two thirds (64%) of citizens say democracy is preferable to any other kind of government – its foundations are threatened by insecurity. Among those who repeatedly felt unsafe in their home or neighbourhood, 63% prefer democracy, compared with 66% of those who never did. A similar gap in democratic support separates those who feared electoral violence somewhat/a lot and those who didn't (63% vs. 65%).

Moreover, insecurity and fear tend to nudge citizens toward authoritarian alternatives. Approval of military rule is four percentage points higher among those who repeatedly felt unsafe (32%) than among those who never did (28%). It is slightly higher among those who feared political violence than those who didn't (31% vs. 29%).

The pattern is stronger for conditional military intervention. A majority of all groups say the armed forces may legitimately take control when elected leaders abuse power. That view is held by 59% of those who repeatedly felt unsafe, against 53% of those who never did, and by 58% of those who feared political violence somewhat/a lot, vs. 55% of those who did not.

These results point to a population of "conditional democrats": Most Africans value democracy but also see the military as a possible corrective when elected leaders fail. Insecurity deepens this sentiment. Citizens who feel

unprotected by civilian authorities may turn to an institution they associate with order and discipline.

Satisfaction with democracy is the casualty

The widest gaps concern how citizens judge democracy in practice. Only 31% of those who repeatedly felt unsafe are satisfied with the way democracy works, compared with 43% of those who never felt unsafe, a 12-point gap. Among those who feared political violence, satisfaction is 30%, vs. 40% among those who did not.


Even more striking is a 19-point gap in satisfaction with democracy between those who believe corruption can be reported without fear (52%) and those who fear retaliation for speaking out (33%). Because this fear is shared by almost three quarters of respondents, it is a major drag on overall democratic satisfaction.

Conclusion

Africans continue to want democracy, but insecurity and fear in their neighbourhoods, at election time, and in holding power to account leave many disappointed with the democracy they receive. That disappointment has not turned into rejection of democracy. It does, however, coincide with somewhat greater tolerance for military solutions. The 2026 IIAG report shows that over the past decade, security and safety, along with accountability and transparency (notably institutional checks and balances), have been among the most deteriorated governance indicators – trends raise serious concerns about the future of Africa's democratic experiment.

These are bivariate patterns pooled across countries, so they show association rather than cause. Still, the message for policymakers is clear: Protecting citizens from crime, securing peaceful elections, and shielding those who expose corruption are central to sustaining public faith in democracy. Where the state cannot keep people safe, democracy's legitimacy rests on its ideals alone, and those may not be enough indefinitely.

Figure 1: Feeling unsafe in home/neighbourhood & democratic attitudes | 38 countries | 2024/2025





Rights


African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	47.5
10-year change (2016-2025)	-2.4
5-year change (2021-2025)	-1.4
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Increasing Deterioration 

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Gabon
Change 2016-2025	+15.9
Score/Rank (2025)	55.7/19th
Largest Deterioration	Burkina Faso
Change 2016-2025	-20.0
Score/Rank (2025)	41.7/30th

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Personal Liberties	43.7	-2.7	
Freedom of Expression & Belief	55.1	-7.2	
Media Freedom	51.4	-5.7	
Digital Freedom	53.3	-4.7	
Protection against Discrimination	26.9	+5.5	
Public Perception of Freedom of Speech	65.6	+1.7	

Rights sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF



With a continental decline of over two points, *Rights* is Africa's third most deteriorated sub-category out of 16

The majority of African countries (36) recorded a decline in their *Rights* score over the decade, bringing the African average to a loss of -2.4 points. For 79.1% of Africa's citizens, the state of civil rights and liberties is worse in 2025 than in 2016. For 20 of those countries, the deterioration is even increasing. This decline is led by Burkina Faso (-20.0), Algeria (-14.8), Mali and Tunisia (tied at -12.9), while Eritrea (6.7), Egypt (17.1) and Equatorial Guinea (17.8) score the lowest in 2025.

However, some countries recorded significant performance increases: Gabon, Gambia (tied at +15.9) and Zambia (+9.5) have made large gains in the *Rights* sub-category, while Cabo Verde (85.9), South Africa (82.4) and Seychelles (81.0) occupy the top three ranks in 2025.


Media and digital freedoms decline at continental average, but public perception appears unaffected

At continental average level, *Media Freedom* (-5.7) and *Digital Freedom* (-4.7) are the second and third most declined indicators in the *Rights* sub-category. This deterioration is recorded in 40 and countries each.

In *Media Freedom*, three underlying sub-indicators drive the deterioration, while *Media Safety* – measuring the absence of abuse and harassment of journalists – improved slightly. In *Digital Freedom*, the sub-indicator *Freedom of Expression in the Digital Space* – which measures online censorship and the risk of arrest for online political content – is the main driver of deterioration, losing -17.2 points over the decade. While bodily harm against journalists might have reduced, media and online censorship is still a commonly used tool to silence political dissent.

However, while media and digital freedoms have seen clear declines across the continent, *Public Perception of Freedom of Speech* has not only held steady but even improved between 2017 and 2021.

Africa: *Media Freedom*, *Digital Freedom* and *Public Perception of Freedom of Speech* scores (2016-2025)



For almost 80% of Africa's citizens living in 36 countries, *Rights* decline over the decade

Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique and Tunisia are among the most deteriorated countries, all at a worsening pace

Freedom of Expression in the Digital Space (-17.2) drives the deterioration in *Digital Freedom*

Burkina Faso vs Gambia: moving into opposite ends of the Rights spectrum

Gambia (with +15.9 points the most improved country over the decade, ranking 13th in 2025) and Burkina Faso (with -20.0 the most deteriorated country over the decade, ranking 30th in 2025) sit at opposite ends of nearly every single one of the indicators that make up the *Rights* sub-category.


Gambia improved in *Personal Liberties* (+20.1), *Freedom of Expression & Belief* (+18.6), *Media Freedom* (+16.4), *Digital Freedom* (+43.3) and *Public Perception of Freedom of Speech* (+8.3), with *Protection against Discrimination* as the only indicator to see a decline (-11.1). Burkina Faso, on the other hand, declined in five of them – *Personal Liberties* (-12.6), *Freedom of Expression and Belief* (-50.8), *Media Freedom* (-36.2), *Digital Freedom* (-14.4) and *Public Perception of Freedom of Speech* (-5.9) – while *Protection against Discrimination* saw no change over the ten years.



Gambia improves in
5 of 6 *Rights* indicators
while Burkina Faso
deteriorates in the same

Burkina Faso & Gambia: *Rights* indicators 10-year changes (2016-2025)

Source: MIF



Their starting positions in the decade make their trajectories especially striking. Burkina Faso was ranked first in the *Freedom of Expression* sub-indicator in 2016, the best score on the continent, and fell to 39th place by 2025. Gambia moved in the opposite direction on the same indicator, from 47th to 18th place.

Gambia's improvement follows Yahya Jammeh's departure into exile in January 2017, ending 22 years of authoritarian rule. Burkina Faso's deteriorations reflect a positive beginning with the country's successful popular uprising against 27 years of authoritarian rule in 2014 followed by democratic elections in 2015 and 2020; then a low of two military coups in 2022 and the junta's subsequent restrictions on media coverage and public criticism.



Inclusion & Equality


African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	45.9
10-year change (2016-2025)	-1.4
5-year change (2021-2025)	-1.7
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Increasing Deterioration

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Gambia
Change 2016-2025	+14.2
Score/Rank (2025)	65.2/6th
Largest Deterioration	Niger
Change 2016-2025	-15.6
Score/Rank (2025)	41.3/32nd

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Equal Political Power	41.3	+0.4	
Equal Political Representation	41.5	-2.0	
Equal Civil Liberties	54.9	-2.3	
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity	49.6	+0.2	
Equal Access to Public Services	41.0	-0.1	
Public Perception of Inclusion & Equality	53.7	-6.3	

Inclusion & Equality sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF



Losing -1.4 points at the continental average level, *Inclusion & Equality* follows a trajectory of increasing deterioration over the decade

Despite a majority of countries (31) deteriorating in *Inclusion & Equality* over the decade, this majority does not extend to the share of population affected: for 60.4% of Africa's citizens, the situation regarding inclusion and equality is better in 2025 than in 2016, as opposed to 39.6% for which it declined.

Niger (-15.6), Burundi (-14.6) and Mauritius (-13.2) recorded the largest declines over the decade, while South Sudan (12.4), Equatorial Guinea (18.2) and Congo Republic (21.7) are the lowest-ranked countries in 2025. At the top of the table, Gambia (+14.2), Sudan (+8.8) and Seychelles (+6.8) are the most improved over the decade, and Seychelles (81.1), Ghana (68.9) and Mauritius (66.4) are the top-ranked countries in 2025. Seychelles stands out as both the third most improved and top-ranked country, while Mauritius, though the third most deteriorated country, still retains its rank in the top three performers.

For 60% of Africa's citizens, *Inclusion & Equality* is better in 2025 than in 2016


Niger, Burundi, Mauritius, Tunisia and Uganda are among the most deteriorated countries, all at a worsening pace

Public Acceptance of Different Ethnic Groups sees the most widespread decline over the decade

Public Acceptance of Different Ethnic Groups, a sub-indicator of *Public Perception of Inclusion & Equality*, is the most widely declined measure within *Inclusion & Equality*. The continental average fell from 74.8 in 2016 to 61.3 in 2025, a deterioration of -13.5 points.

51.2% of Africa's population live in a country with declining *Public Acceptance of Different Ethnic Groups*

African countries*: *Public Acceptance of Different Ethnic Groups* 10-year change (2016-2025) & rank (2025)



The steepest deteriorations here happened in Liberia (-63.5) and Lesotho (-63.0), followed by Uganda (-43.1) and Madagascar (-33.6). Countries still often described as socially cohesive are also affected: Ghana declined by -20.2 points, Senegal by -18.6 and Botswana by -24.4. Ethiopia's decline in *Public Acceptance of Different Ethnic Groups* begins in 2021, marked with the start of the war in Tigray. Nigeria is an exception with an improvement of +16.1, running against the country's reputation for ethnic and religious tensions.

Representation and socioeconomic integration of youth is progressing, but age polarisation remains an issue in many countries

Promotion of Socioeconomic Integration of Youth, which assesses government policy on young people's access to jobs and economic opportunities, recorded an increase of +7.8, with 22 countries improving, seven declining and no change in 25. The improvement in this sub-indicator is led by Comoros, Mozambique, Seychelles and Tanzania, which all gained 50 points over the decade. The best-performing country at a score of 100.0 in 2025 is Seychelles, which has held this score since 2018. Senegal also reached a score of 100.0 in 2023 but declined again by -25.0 until 2025.

The *Representation of Youth in Parliament* increased by +5.9 points on average, with 27 countries improving, 11 declining and 11 registering no change (of the 49 countries for which data is available).


The largest gains in youth parliamentary representation came through elections and transitions. Guinea's score increased from 5.9 to 66.7 (+60.8) across its 2020 elections and the transitional council established after the 2021 coup. Senegal's score increased from 18.2 to 59.7 (+41.5), Tanzania's from 17.2 to 51.7 (+34.5), and Ethiopia reached the maximum score of 100.0 following its 2021 election, the only country to do so.

At the bottom of youth representation in parliament are Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon and Niger with scores below 10.0. While Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon have declined since 2016 (-11.6 and 7.3, respectively), Benin improved from a base of 0.0 to 8.2, and Niger stayed virtually the same (+0.1).

Comoros, Mozambique, Seychelles and Tanzania lead progress in *Promotion of Socioeconomic Integration of Youth* (+50.0)

Lowest ranked in *Representation of Youth in Parliament* in 2025 are Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon and Niger

Selected African countries: *Representation of Youth in Parliament* score (2016 & 2025)





Women's Equality


African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	58.8
10-year change (2016-2025)	+4.9
5-year change (2021-2025)	+0.7
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Slowing Improvement 

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Gabon
Change 2016-2025	+17.3
Score/Rank (2025)	72.8/9th
Largest Deterioration	Niger
Change 2016-2025	-8.8
Score/Rank (2025)	36.3/49th

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Political Power & Representation of Women	50.4	+6.6	
Rights & Civil Liberties for Women	71.6	+2.0	
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women	48.4	-0.2	
Access to Public Services for Women	44.3	+0.6	
Laws on Violence against Women	80.7	+14.8	
Public Perception of Female Leadership	60.3	+4.8	

Women's Equality sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF



Women's Equality is the second most improved sub-category, with 42 countries registering progress


Women's Equality is the second most improved sub-category in the 2026 IIAG. The African average rose by +4.9 across 42 countries representing 63.9% of the continent's population. However, in ten of the 12 countries in which *Women's Equality* has deteriorated, the decline has accelerated since 2021: Central African Republic, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Cabo Verde (81.7), Mauritius (80.9) and Ghana (80.0) are the top performers in 2025 while Gabon (+17.3), Chad and Djibouti (tied at +16.1) have improved the most over the decade. On the other end of the scale, Somalia (15.5), Sudan (17.6) and Libya (28.6) score the lowest in 2025 while Niger (-8.8), Rwanda (-4.4) and Central African Republic (-2.8) have declined the most over the decade.

Laws on Violence against Women is the second most improved of the IIAG's 96 indicators

Improving by +14.8 points over the decade, *Laws on Violence against Women* is the second most improved indicator of the overall IIAG. Within this indicator, no country deteriorated over the decade, while 22 improved and 32 registered no change. Of those 32, 23 stayed at high scores of 80.0 or 100.0, while Mauritania and Sudan stagnated at the lowest possible score of 0.0 over the whole decade. In 2025, 42 African countries score between 80.0 to 100.0, driven by progress in legislation.

African countries: *Laws on Violence against Women* score (2025)



***Women's Equality* is the second most improved sub-category in the 2026 IIAG (+4.9)**

Lack of outcome indicators on violence against women

Laws on Violence against Women is one of the IIAG's few input-based indicators due to the lack of internationally comparable datasets that measure the extent of violence against women directly. Based on the World Bank's Women, Business and the Law (WBL) dataset, this indicator assesses legislation on sexual harassment in employment, criminal penalties or civil remedies for sexual harassment in employment, legal provisions that require a married woman to obey her husband, legislation specifically addressing domestic violence and accessibility of divorce judgments.

Score range

- 80.0-100.0
- 40.0-60.0
- 0.0-20.0
- No data

Source: MIF


However, improvements in legislative frameworks are not enough and more effort is required in enforcement and implementation. South Africa, for example, scoring 100.0 in *Laws on Violence against Women* across the whole decade, holds the most progressive laws against violence against women globally.¹ However, the country also has an alarmingly high rate of cases of violence against women, leading to the declaration of gender-based violence as a national disaster in 2025.²

Slow convergence between countries over the past decade in *Rights & Civil Liberties for Women*

Between 2016-2025, the *Rights & Civil Liberties for Women* improved marginally by +2.0 across 31 African countries representing 62.1% of the population. Scores converged between 2016 and 2025, leading to a gradual reduction of the gap between the top- and bottom-ranked countries. In 2016, the gap between the highest-scoring country (Rwanda, 95.8) and the lowest-scoring country (Somalia, 24.2) was 71.6 points. In 2025, this gap (between Zambia at 95.8 and Somalia at 28.0) is reduced to 67.8 points.

South Africa and Rwanda, both of which score above 80.0 points in 2025, registered respective declines of -5.9 and -10.3 over the decade. In addition, at least six out of the ten lowest-scoring countries in 2025 (Eritrea, Libya, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan) are experiencing insecurity due to armed conflicts. Women are among the most vulnerable groups during armed conflict, having a catastrophic impact on their rights to safety, health and education.³

African countries: *Rights & Civil Liberties for Women* score (2016-2025)



Zambia replaced Rwanda as the top-ranked country for women's rights & civil liberties between 2016-2025

Rights & Civil Liberties for Women deteriorate in Rwanda and South Africa


Slowing progress in *Political Power & Representation of Women* over the decade

Political Power & Representation of Women improved in 39 African countries, hosting 76.8% of the continent's population, over the decade. However, this indicator registered an overall trend of *Slowing Improvement* due to minimal growth since 2022. While the continent continues making strides in women's representation in executive positions, there has been a decline in their representation at the local government level.⁴

A closer look into recent regional performance shows that while all regions made long-term progress over the decade, Eastern and Northern Africa registered recent declines over the last five years of -1.8 and -5.7, respectively, showing *Warning Signs*. Rwanda, which stills holds the highest percentage of women in parliamentary seats worldwide at 63.8% as of 2026,⁵ recorded the largest five-year decline in Eastern Africa of -10.5.

Central and Eastern Africa show *Warning Signs* for women's political power & representation

Political Power & Representation of Women: 5-year change (2016-2025)



Namibia holds the highest *Political Power & Representation of Women* score of 88.3 in 2025 and is the most improved over the past five years (+23.8). In 2025, the country rose to become Africa's most gender-equal country, closing 81.1% of its institutional gender gap.⁶

A similar positive trend is observed in Gambia, the most improved country over the decade with +33.8 points. Despite the comparatively low representation of women in leadership,⁷ Gambia has made significant efforts over the past decade rising from rank 50 in 2016 to rank 27 in 2025.

Development gains, democratic deficits: A BTI perspective on African governance

*Sabine Donner, Sebastian Plate & Dr Hauke Hartmann, Transformation
Index BTI Bertelsmann Stiftung*

Findings of the IIAG confirm diverging trends for African countries: while conditions for economic development and human well-being continue to improve in most countries, security, equality, political rights and rule of law are further declining. In other words, much of the governance progress achieved in recent years was focused on improving the foundations for economic opportunity and welfare and less on building an inclusive, secure and participatory society. This explains why many of the governments highlighted as top governance improvers are in fact autocratic regimes.

IIAG results comprehensively display gains and deficiencies in governance performance and offer a telling picture on the transformation path a government pursues. The data clearly illustrates, for example, that socioeconomic achievements and development successes in Morocco – one of the IIAG's governance top performers in both ranking and progress – were achieved while political rights, participation and rule of law deteriorated further. However, positive development trends always provide a tempting opportunity for autocratic regimes to ignore the potential gains of democratic governance and claim that a firm hand and autocratic guidance was necessary to bring society to the next and more developed level. Undoubtedly, development successes, especially in the short term, are possible under autocratic rule. But that rigid top-down management and a repressive framework are necessary to facilitate these gains remains completely unproven. Quite to the contrary, sustainable development gains stand on firmer ground when based on democratic governance qualities such as the ability to accept criticism and monitoring in the management process, transparency in the use of resources and responsiveness in dialogue both domestically and internationally.

To display the potential gains in development, it might be helpful to add the perspective of the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) to the IIAG's comprehensive assessment.

The Governance gap between democracies and autocracies

While the IIAG's multidimensional assessment shows where governance generates change for citizens, the BTI Governance Index complements this data by adding a perspective of how political leaders steer reform, manage internal authority as well as examine how those in power are promoting dialogue internationally. The BTI covers 50 of the 54 countries included in the IIAG – excluding only Cabo Verde, Comoros, São Tomé and Príncipe and the Seychelles.

Between 2016 and 2026, the BTI confirms the IIAG's diagnosis of deterioration of political participation and rule of law. In 2016, half of all African countries were democracies, while today, only a quarter of African states are governed democratically.

In the same timeframe, governance as conceptualized by the BTI worsened in two thirds of all African countries. This trend

is not only caused by autocratisation, but also by democratic backsliding and less responsible governance in countries such as Mauritius, Namibia or South Africa. In turn, there are some autocratic regimes displaying real governance improvements, such as Angola, Côte d'Ivoire or Morocco.

Today, the BTI 2026 ranking on governance lists Botswana with an excellent performance with 8.00 points. Seven countries, including e.g. Senegal, but also Benin and Côte d'Ivoire, provide a sound performance while 12 countries, a split between six democracies and six autocracies, perform fairly. As a democracy, Sierra Leone is the only country with a flawed performance, scoring below 5.00 points. In total, of the 37 autocracies, 29 either demonstrate a flawed (21) or a failed (8) performance. The average governance performance of African democracies is 6.26 points and the average performance for autocracies is 4.04 points.

The BTI indicates that the difference between democracies and autocracies extends beyond political rights. In fact, there is not a single governance aspect in which autocracies come even close to demonstrating a comparable performance in relation to democracies. Across the African countries in the sample, democracies score higher on every aspect of governance, particularly regarding elements of domestic dialogue such as conflict management and inclusion. The widest gaps concern consensus-building (3.33 points) and international cooperation (2.42), but they also extend to steering capability (1.79) and using public resources effectively (1.34). In the BTI's assessment, autocratic rule offers no general advantage in managing change. In fact, such large gaps are also detectable for social safety nets (1.37), equal opportunity (1.78) or education (1.56), just to mention a few.

This does not mean that autocratic governments cannot make progress in aspects such as administration and service delivery, socioeconomic inclusion, equal opportunity, education policy or market quality, which the BTI assesses under its Status Index. Such gains matter, and the IIAG helps show where citizens experience them alongside continuing deficits in rights, security or inclusion. However, sound management like Benin's Government Action Plan, Rwanda's education and health improvements or the Green Morocco Plan are the exception rather than the rule. Most of the time, autocratic governance results in increasing exploitation and less inclusive societies.

To detect strengths and weaknesses of African governance, the IIAG provides a comparative, multidimensional approach focusing on governmental output and societal outcome. It offers a guiding compass in which field a government achieved successes and in which it failed. Adding the detailed country reports of the BTI to such assessment might be helpful for those readers interested in the capacity and willingness of a government to prioritize and implement, to act responsibly with resources, to seek dialogue and compromise and to cooperate internationally.



Public Administration


African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	53.9
10-year change (2016-2025)	+2.0
5-year change (2021-2025)	+2.1
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Increasing Improvement

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Somalia
Change 2016-2025	+19.3
Score/Rank (2025)	30.8/50th
Largest Deterioration	Sudan
Change 2016-2025	-21.4
Score/Rank (2025)	18.8/53rd

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Civil Registration	64.8	+4.6	
Capacity of the Statistical System	49.7	+10.6	
Effective Administration	47.7	+0.5	
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation	50.0	-1.5	
Budgetary & Financial Management	63.1	+0.8	
Public Perception of Easiness to Obtain an Identity Document	49.4	-6.6	

Public Administration sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF



At continental level, *Public Administration* gains two points, making it the fifth most improved sub-category since 2016

For 47.5% of the continent's population, living in 34 countries, the performance of *Public Administration* is better in 2025 than in 2016, while 20 countries recorded a deterioration. Of the countries that improved over the decade, 22 registered *Increasing Improvement*, meaning the pace of progress has accelerated over the last five years.

The top-ranked countries by 2025 score in this sub-category are Seychelles (80.0), Mauritius (78.4) and Botswana (78.1), while the most improved countries are Somalia (+19.3), Seychelles (+15.6) and Benin (+14.6). Seychelles is both among the top three improved and ranked countries.

The most deteriorated countries are Sudan (-21.4), Mali (-14.7) and Eritrea (-11.9) while South Sudan (18.5), Sudan (18.8) and Eritrea (20.9) are ranked lowest by 2025 score. Both Sudan and Eritrea are among the lowest ranked and most deteriorated.



Sudan (53rd), Mali (42nd) and Eritrea (52nd) are the most deteriorated countries in *Public Administration* over the decade

Progress in *Public Administration* is mostly driven by a leap in *Capacity of the Statistical System*, gaining ten points over the decade

Forty-seven countries, host to 92.9% of Africa's population, improved in *Capacity of the Statistical System* over the decade as data coverage is gradually improving and becoming more open and more secure. This indicator is the third most improved in the overall IIAG, gaining +10.6 points over the decade, and a major driver of the progress recorded by *Public Administration*.

Census programmes, statistical-office modernisation, greater demand for administrative data and the post-COVID-19 rebuilding of statistical capacity are key factors in explaining this near-universal progress.

This progress echoes the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's constant advocacy to strengthen data coverage and accessibility in Africa as a key pillar of public governance and sovereignty.




For 92.9% of Africa's population, *Capacity of the Statistical System* is better in 2025 than in 2016



Without data, we are driving blind – policies are misdirected and progress on the road to development is stunted. We must act urgently to close the data gap in Africa if we genuinely want to leave no one behind.

Mo Ibrahim

African countries: Capacity of the Statistical System
10-year change (2016-2025)



Top 5 countries	10-year change
Burkina Faso	+35.4
Gambia	+30.6
Somalia	+28.5
Morocco	+28.2
Côte d'Ivoire	+26.6

Despite an average progress of almost five points, *Civil Registration* is still lacking in several countries

Over the 2016-2025 decade, 24 countries have improved in *Civil Registration* due to the expansion of digital ID and civil registration systems, efforts to achieve universal legal identity and the integration of ID with public services. But 12 countries, host to 37.9% of the continent's population, are still deteriorating in these core government functions: Botswana, DR Congo, Eritrea, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Togo and Zambia.


Sudan, Mali, Guinea and Eritrea all declined by over 30 points. While all but Eritrea started the decade with a score above the African average of 60.2, all four end the decade with a score considerably lower than the 2025 Africa average of 64.8. In Sudan, *Public Administration* is also the most declined sub-category, driven by a substantial -62.5-point decline in *Civil Registration*.

This signals widespread issues in capturing critical birth and death registration information as the indicator assesses the extent to which birth and death certificates are available within 30 days and free of charge.

For 37.9% of Africa's population, *Civil Registration* performance remains worse in 2025 than in 2016

Four countries – Eritrea, Guinea, Mali and Sudan – decline by over 30 points in *Civil Registration*

Selected African countries & Africa: *Civil Registration* score (2016-2025)



Noticeably, the substantial progress in *Civil Registration* at continental level (+4.6) is not felt as satisfactory enough for Africa's citizens: *Public Perception of Easiness to Obtain an Identity Document* strongly deteriorates over the decade (-6.6), far apart from the progress registered in non-perception indicators. At country level, this mismatch is most apparent in Cameroon, Ghana and São Tomé and Príncipe – in all three countries, ten-year changes of *Civil Registration* and *Public Perception of Easiness to Obtain an Identity Document* diverge by around or over 50 points.

At African average level, there is a strong mismatch between the progress of *Civil Registration* and the public perception thereof

Tax & Revenue Mobilisation: continental performance is worse in 2025 than in 2016, masking huge differences between countries

At the continental level, *Tax & Revenue Mobilisation* declined by -1.5 points over the decade. However limited, this average deterioration raises concern as this indicator is a key to driving better domestic resource mobilisation – especially given Africa's comparatively low tax-to-GDP ratio (approximately 15% compared to the OECD average of 34.1% in 2024¹).


Top-ranked countries in this indicator are South Africa (92.4), Côte d'Ivoire (83.3) and Namibia (80.0), while the three most improved countries since 2016 are Egypt (+15.8), Côte d'Ivoire (+13.9) and Somalia (+13.9). Côte d'Ivoire stands out as both the second best ranked and the second most improved.

The 3 most improved countries in *Tax & Revenue Mobilisation* are Egypt, Côte d'Ivoire and Somalia

The average continental decline masks a significant gap in performance between countries in their ability to collect tax and mobilise revenue: between South Africa at the top with an impressive score of 92.4 and Libya at the bottom with just 2.8, the range between both is 89.6 points.

Concerningly, deteriorations at the bottom of the table are larger than the improvements at the top: Eritrea declined by -22.2 points since 2016, making it the most declined country within this indicator. Mali, Djibouti, Sudan and Ethiopia all declined by over -15.5 points.

Tax & Revenue Mobilisation: top 5 most deteriorated countries scores (2016 & 2025)



Source: MIF

From borrowed evidence to African evidence: a decade of tax research in practice

Dr Awa Diouf & Prof. Giulia Mascagni, International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD)

Over the past decade, the evidence available to African tax policymakers has changed substantially. In the early 2010s, reform often relied on studies conducted in the context of high-income countries, while administrative data from African revenue authorities was mostly paper-based and rarely analysed. Today, African governments can increasingly base reform on evidence from their own context, thanks to the increased availability of administrative data from tax returns and a substantial expansion of tax research.ⁱ This evidence shows what works, what does not, and how to sustain revenue gains over time, offering a clear roadmap for reform.ⁱⁱ This clarity matters more than ever today, as aid declines and debt servicing costs rise – making tax essential in governments' efforts to expand fiscal space.ⁱⁱⁱ

Progress has taken three forms. First, cross-country data has improved and widened in coverage, notably through the Government Revenue Dataset launched by ICTD in 2014, subsequently hosted by UNU-WIDER, and recently transferred to the IMF as the WoRLD database. Second, administrative tax data has become increasingly available and usable for research. Just over a decade ago, no country on the African continent had used this data for research, and collaborations with independent researchers on that basis were rare. Today, ICTD alone has signed memoranda of understanding with over a dozen African revenue authorities and doing research based on local, administrative data has become the norm – especially for policy analysis and evaluation. Some tax administrations now host secure data labs open to researchers, such as in Uganda and Zambia. Third, building research capacity is increasingly recognised as a priority for tax administrations. Research units within revenue authorities have expanded and in many countries they play an increasingly strategic role in informing policy^{iv}. And expanding research capacity is not limited to revenue authorities: ICTD's Research on Tax and Development course has trained 245 participants from revenue authorities, ministries, academia, and civil society since 2015.^v

Importantly, evidence alone does not change the system, it needs to be embedded into the decision-making processes of institutions that design and implement tax policies. Revenue authorities have often been receptive to research insights, which are often generated in collaboration with researchers. This facilitated the translation of research into better tax policy and administration. Three lessons stand out.

What does not work. Policies that seem sensible in principle can be counterproductive in practice. A clear example comes from mass formalisation drives. Their main aim is to expand the tax net and unlock broader benefits from the formalisation of small businesses. However, research has shown that these approaches raise little revenue, while diluting the quality of taxpayer registers. They also deteriorate equity and fuel citizens' distrust, which in turn narrows the political space for further reform.^{vi} In Rwanda, ICTD research informed a major clean-up of the taxpayer register, which resulted in 117,500 accounts – mostly owned by micro, non-operational firms – deregistered or deactivated over 2024 and 2025.^{vii} In Uganda, smaller firms can face compliance costs worth 20 per cent of their turnover, against less than one per cent for the largest firms.^{viii} In Ghana, administering a presumptive tax stamp for small businesses cost roughly nine times the revenue it generated.^x Targeting registration efforts more carefully to higher income segments of the informal sector, as opposed to mass approaches to it, ensures these costs are not born unnecessarily by citizens and the tax administration.

What works. Importantly, research also points to reforms with greater revenue potential, including in areas that once seemed politically intractable. Taxing the wealthy more effectively is a case in point. In Uganda, a study requested by the revenue authority contributed to the establishment of a dedicated unit for high-net-worth individuals.^x Filing among wealthy individuals rose from about 13% to at least 78%, and the unit collected over US\$5.5 million in its first year – although these gains have been hard to sustain over time.^{xi} In Freetown, property tax reform tripled revenue collection and brought major improvements in the equitable distribution of tax payments.^{xii} Through these cases, research has shown that it is possible to improve the revenue-generation performance of taxes that bear mostly on the wealthy, by improving enforcement of existing tax tools rather than introducing new ones. Tax expenditures are another example where research helped advance the debate. Worldwide, governments forgo an estimated 23% of their tax revenue through tax expenditures, yet many lack a full picture of their benefits.^{xiii} Tax expenditures typically lack transparency, and it is very hard to reform what you cannot see. That's why the Coalition on Tax Expenditure Reform, co-founded by ICTD, developed voluntary minimum reporting standards as a first step to analyse tax expenditures and inform reform.^{xiv} Done well, reforms on tax expenditures and taxes on the wealthy can raise revenue while also improving fairness.

How to sustain revenue gains over time. Lasting gains depend on being bold about the basics, starting with effective tax administration.^{xv} Reforms that yield immediate revenue gains need to be supported by strong implementation capacity within tax administrations, if those gains are to be sustained over time. For example, digitalisation and digital public infrastructure presents transformational opportunities for improving tax administration. However, ongoing ICTD research on AI adoption shows that success depends on administrative basics, including data quality, integration with legacy systems, staff skills, and clear communication about what new tools can and cannot do.^{xvi} The increasing availability of data and research has emboldened Revenue authorities to use rigorous evidence to guide reforms as they are implemented. In Senegal, the Direction Générale des Impôts et des Domaines (DGID) requested ICTD's technical assistance to implement VAT on digital services supplied by foreign operators. ICTD benchmarked African and international practice and reviewed the draft implementing order.^{xvii} According to the DGID, the reform raised FCFA 1 billion in its first five months.^{xviii}

Evidence on African tax systems has made major progress over the past decade, and the roadmap for reform is now clear. Leveraging evidence for better tax systems has already delivered real change. Yet, much remains to be done. Countries interested in reform need context-specific studies to adapt this roadmap to their own circumstances, and new areas such as artificial intelligence in tax administration require fresh evidence. This will help keep reform aligned not only with revenue objectives, but also with broader policy imperatives such as equity and growth. It requires continued investment in data, African research capacity, and long-term partnerships between researchers and revenue authorities, alongside continued improvement in tax indicators in comparative tools such as the IIAG.

ⁱ ICTD (2026) *Taxing Smarter: Advancing Reform Through Research and Partnership*, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, DOI: 10.19088/ICTD.2026.022.

ⁱⁱ Gallien, M.; Hearson, M.; Mascagni, G.; Occhiali, G.; Ogembo, D. and van den Boogaard, V. (2025) *The Tax Era of Development: Taxing Smarter for Equity, Growth, and Resilience*, ICTD Policy Brief 18, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, DOI: 10.19088/ICTD.2025.039.

ⁱⁱⁱ ICTD (2026).

^{iv} Lees, A. and Mascagni, G. with Yimam, S.; Gebretsadik, G. and Ndajiwo M. (2024) *Research Within Tax Administration: from Monitoring Revenue to Influencing Policy*, ICTD Working Paper 204, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, DOI: 10.19088/ICTD.2024.066

^v ICTD (2026).

^{vi} ICTD (2026).

^{vii} Gallien, M. et al. (2025).

^{viii} ICTD (2026).

^{ix} Gallien, M. and Kombat, A. (2025) *Thinking Beyond Revenue: Estimating the Cost Effectiveness of Ghana's Presumptive Tax Stamp*, ICTD Working Paper 233, DOI: 10.19088/ICTD.2025.069.

^x McCluskey, R. and Nalukwago Isingoma, M. (2017) *ICTD Partnerships with African Revenue Authorities: Collaborating for Impactful Research*, ICTD Summary Brief 8, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

^{xi} Kangave, J.; Nakato, S.; Waiswa, R.; Nalukwago, M.I. and Lumala Zzimbe, P. (2018) *Taxing High Net Worth Individuals: Lessons from the Uganda Revenue Authority's Experience*, ICTD Summary Brief 14, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

^{xii} ICTD (2026).

^{xiii} Readhead, A.; Redonda, A.; von Haldenwang, C.; Occhiali, G.; Mascagni, G. and Parekh, H. (2026) 'Why Tax Expenditure Reporting Is a Missing Link in Financing for Development', ICTD Blog, 24 April.

^{xiv} ICTD (2026) and Readhead, A. et al. (2026).

^{xv} ICTD (2026).

^{xvi} Diouf, A. et al. (forthcoming) *Institutionalising Artificial Intelligence in Tax Administration: The Case of the Zambia Revenue Authority*.

^{xvii} Diouf, A. and Niesten, H. (2025) *Tracking and Taxing Cross-Border Digital Transactions: The Case of VAT in Senegal*, ICTD African Tax Administration Paper 42, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, DOI: 10.19088/ICTD.2025.043.

^{xviii} Le Soleil, 'TVA de 18 % à partir du 1er juin : Google se conforme à la législation fiscale sénégalaise', lesoleil.sn. May 2025.



Business & Labour Environment


African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	45.7
10-year change (2016-2025)	+1.3
5-year change (2021-2025)	+0.6
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Increasing Improvement

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Benin
Change 2016-2025	+12.8
Score/Rank (2025)	55.0/15th
Largest Deterioration	Mauritania
Change 2016-2025	-6.8
Score/Rank (2025)	37.9/40th

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Regional Integration	42.3	+2.6	
Economic Diversification	61.1	-1.0	
Business & Competition Regulations	53.4	+3.0	
Access to Banking Services	28.8	+5.2	
Labour Relations	45.9	-2.7	
Secure Employment Opportunities	52.0	+3.0	
Public Perception of Economic Opportunities	36.2	-0.8	

Business & Labour Environment sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF



***Business & Labour Environment* registers a modest improvement across the majority of countries and over half the continent's population**


With an average +1.3 improvement across the continent over the decade, *Business & Labour Environment* makes modest but important progress, stretching across 31 countries and 51.5% of Africa's population. For 15 countries, the pace of progress has even accelerated since 2021, classified as *Increasing Improvement*. Conversely, 23 countries, hosting 48.5% of Africa's population, register a deterioration.

The most improved countries over the decade are Benin (+12.8), Comoros (+9.0) and Gabon (+8.3) while Mauritius (75.2), South Africa (66.4) and Namibia (64.8) reach the highest scores in 2025. On the other end of the table are South Sudan (13.7), Somalia (18.1) and Sudan (25.3) as the lowest ranked, while Mauritania (-6.8), Burkina Faso (-6.6) and Uganda (-6.2) decline the most.

Mobile money and banking service access are key drivers of improvement in *Business & Labour Environment*

Access to Mobile Money Accounts is the most improved measure within *Business & Labour Environment* (+19.7), driving the progress in *Access to Banking Services*. Several countries improved by more than 40 points over the decade: Congo Republic (+52.0), Zambia (+47.5), Cameroon (+45.8), Ghana (+45.1) and Senegal (+40.3). Improving by +16.7 points over the decade, Kenya in 2024 became the first country to score 100.0 points in this sub-indicator, mostly through the success and widespread adoption of M-Pesa.

Selected African countries: *Access to Mobile Money Accounts* score (2016-2025)



In *Business & Labour Environment*, Benin is the most improved country over the decade, and Mauritania the most deteriorated


Five countries improve by more than 40 points in *Access to Mobile Money Accounts*: Cameroon, Congo Republic, Ghana, Senegal and Zambia

Source: MIF

A key priority for the continent, *Regional Integration* progresses unevenly

Thirty-four countries improved in *Regional Integration*, while 20 deteriorated. Rwanda, Benin, Gambia, Mauritius and Botswana occupy the top five ranks in 2025, driven primarily by their visa-free travel arrangements for African citizens. This is a key element in intra-continental mobility as highlighted in the recent MIF Report *Africa on the move: Boosting mobility and connectivity*². On the other side, Libya, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, South Sudan and Somalia are the worst-performing countries in 2025, driven by restrictive travel requirements and poor regional trade integration.

African countries: *Regional Integration* 10-year change (2016-2025)



Rwanda, Benin and Gambia lead in regional travel integration due to visa-free entry for African nationals

Top 5 countries	10-year change
● Ethiopia	+38.5
● Benin	+29.7
● Gambia	+26.3
● Ghana	+21.5
● Eritrea	+19.8

However, previous strong performers in this area have significantly deteriorated over the decade. For example, Uganda, which was the highest-scoring country in 2016 (71.4), ranks only 23rd in 2025, falling by 22 ranks. This was driven by deterioration in both *Regional Travel Integration* (-46.7) and *Government Development of Regional Integration* (-17.6). Similarly, Mauritania which ranked 20th in 2016, fell 25 places to 45th in 2025, driven by tightening borders and increasing isolationism.

As highlighted in *Africa on the move*, regional integration is key to ensure Africa can effectively leverage its domestic resources. The implementation of the AfCFTA continues to drive the progress in *Regional Integration* through customs digitalisation, one-stop border posts, the development of regional corridors and the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers.

Tightening borders and increasing isolationism in Mauritania and Uganda

Challenges in *Labour Relations* jeopardise the overall positive trajectory of *Business & Labour Environment*


Progress in *Business & Labour Environment* is dragged down by *Freedom of Trade Unions* which is the most declined measure in the sub-category: -9.7 points over the decade.

Fundamental Rights at Work also registered a concerning performance, declining by -2.6 over the decade at the African average level. Only four countries (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea and Ghana) recorded improvements while 35 countries recorded no change, and nine deteriorated. Of these 35 countries registering no change between 2016 and 2025, only Malawi scores 100.0 points in 2025. Six countries score of 75.0 but the rest stagnated at 50.0 or less in 2025.

While countries like South Africa already have relatively sophisticated existing collective bargaining institutions and others like Kenya have implemented recent labour law reforms, many others continue to stagnate, remaining at the same score in 2025 as in 2016.

Only four countries – Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea and Ghana – record improvements in the *Fundamental Rights at Work* sub-indicator

Africa: *Freedom of Trade Unions*, *Cooperation in Labour-Employer Relations* and *Fundamental Rights at Work* scores (2016-2025)



Building better governance statistics in Africa: From measurement to evidence

José Eduardo Garcia, Praia Group on Governance Statistics

Good governance cannot be strengthened without reliable evidence on how institutions perform, how people experience public services and justice, and whether citizens can participate meaningfully in public life. Yet across Africa, important gaps remain in the availability, quality and comparability of governance statistics. Strengthening governance therefore also requires strengthening the statistical systems that measure it.

Governance is multidimensional, encompassing institutional performance, participation and inclusion, access to justice, transparency, responsiveness, corruption, trust, safety and security, among other areas. Some dimensions can be measured through administrative records, while others require capturing people's experiences and perceptions. Producing statistics that bring these different sources and dimensions together in a coherent and comparable way remains a significant challenge for official statistics.

The Praia Group on Governance Statistics, established in 2015 under the United Nations Statistical Commission and hosted by the National Statistics Institute of Cabo Verde, was created to help address this challenge. Bringing together national statistical offices and international and regional partners, the Group works to strengthen the capacity of national statistical systems to produce relevant, reliable and policy-oriented governance statistics.

The Group does not produce governance data itself. Its role is to help national statistical offices develop the methodological foundations and practical tools needed to integrate governance statistics into official statistical systems. Its framework covers eight dimensions — non-discrimination and equality, participation in public and political affairs, openness and transparency, access to and quality of justice, responsiveness, absence of corruption, trust, and safety and security — with human rights cutting across these dimensions.

Over the past decade, the Praia Group has translated this framework into practical tools. The Handbook on Governance Statistics provided a methodological foundation, while the CSA* 2.0 supported national statistical offices in assessing and strengthening the measurement of governance through household surveys. More recently, the Group developed statistical instruments on non-discrimination and equality and participation in public and political affairs, alongside guidance on the use of administrative data. These instruments aim to help countries move from conceptual frameworks towards concrete statistical production.

The challenges, however, go beyond methodology. Governance concepts can be complex to define and measure consistently across countries; administrative data are often fragmented; household surveys can be costly to conduct regularly; and statistical offices may face constraints in

expertise, financing, technology and access to data held by other institutions. These factors can affect both the regularity of production and the comparability of results.

There is also an important distinction between having governance data and having governance statistics that can inform decisions. Statistics need sound methodologies, appropriate quality assurance, accessibility, timeliness and sufficient disaggregation to show differences in people's experiences across population groups and territories. These are essential conditions for governance statistics to support accountability and evidence-based policymaking.

The Praia Group's third mandate for 2026–2031, endorsed by the United Nations Statistical Commission in 2026, provides an opportunity to build on this work. A central priority will be to move further from methodological development towards national adoption, adaptation and implementation. Methodological tools have their greatest value when they are used to generate sustainable national statistics that reflect countries' institutional and statistical realities.

Supporting countries in adapting the instruments, strengthening cooperation between national statistical offices and data-producing institutions, and promoting the regular production and dissemination of governance statistics will therefore be central to the Group's work in the coming years.

Africa has a growing range of initiatives aimed at understanding and improving governance. Strengthening the statistical foundations that underpin these efforts is equally important. Nationally owned, internationally informed and methodologically robust governance statistics can provide a clearer picture of how institutions function and how governance is experienced by people across the continent. Among these African initiatives, the GPS-SHaSA program is the most comprehensive. After decisive steps forwards, this program lost momentum in the recent period. Developed hand-in-hand with the Praia Group from the start, the collaboration should be strengthened.

The ambition is therefore not simply to produce more governance data, but to build stronger national statistical systems capable of measuring governance as part of regular official statistics. By bringing countries and partners together, developing practical statistical solutions and supporting their implementation, the Praia Group seeks to help transform methodological progress into sustained national practice.

Better governance requires better evidence. Strengthening Africa's capacity to produce that evidence is an essential part of understanding, monitoring and improving governance across the continent.

*CSA - Classification of Statistical Activities



Infrastructure


African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	43.4
10-year change (2016-2025)	+7.7
5-year change (2021-2025)	+6.0
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Increasing Improvement

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Eritrea
Change 2016-2025	+18.7
Score/Rank (2025)	27.4/49th
Largest Deterioration	Gambia
Change 2016-2025	-3.2
Score/Rank (2025)	35.7/36th

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Transport Network	27.9	+1.2	
Access to Energy	45.4	+7.0	
Mobile Communications	74.2	+16.8	
Internet	33.4	+10.2	
Shipping & Postal Network	36.4	+8.8	
Public Perception of Infrastructure	45.7	-1.0	

Infrastructure sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF




Infrastructure is the most improved sub-category in the 2026 IIAG, with 52 countries recording progress

Gaining +7.7 points over the decade, *Infrastructure* is by far the most improved sub-category of the IIAG. Fifty-two of 54 countries registered an improvement, meaning that 84.5% of Africa's population live in a country where *Infrastructure* performance is better in 2025 than in 2016.

Forty-five countries, hosting 68.7% of the continent's population, even register *Increasing Improvement*.

Middle- and low-ranked countries — Eritrea (+18.7), Benin (+16.7) and Burkina Faso (+16.0) — lead in improvements, while Egypt (82.1), Mauritius (+81.5) and Morocco (79.6) occupy the top three ranks in 2025. Lowest-ranked countries, on the other hand, are South Sudan (9.6), Central African Republic (13.4) and DR Congo (21.7). Only in Gambia and Nigeria, the continent's most populous country, has performance deteriorated.

Africa: *Infrastructure* score (2016-2025)



Over the last decade, Africa has implemented numerous key infrastructure initiatives such as the AU's PIDA and Agenda 2063's First Ten-Year Implementation Plan, but also the World Bank-driven Mission 300, the EU's Global Gateway and China's Belt & Road Initiative, as well as consistent efforts at country level to roll out 4G and 5G connectivity.

Four *Infrastructure* indicators — *Mobile Communications*, *Internet*, *Shipping & Postal Network* and *Access to Energy* — feature among the 2026 IIAG's ten most improved indicators over the decade. However, despite the striking progress, *Public Perception of Infrastructure*, which measures how satisfied citizens are with their government's maintenance of roads, bridges and the electricity supply, declined by -1.0 points at the African average level — the only *Infrastructure* indicator to decline over the decade.

This is driven by declines over 10 points in 13 countries, but mostly so in Nigeria where *Satisfaction with Road & Bridge Maintenance* deteriorated by -42.9 points and *Satisfaction with Electricity Supply* by -29.0 points.

For 84.5% of the continent's population, living in 52 countries, *Infrastructure* performance is better in 2025 than in 2016

Nigeria and Gambia are the only countries in which *Infrastructure* deteriorates over the decade


At continental level, 4 of the 10 most improved indicators (out of the IIAG's 96) belong to *Infrastructure*

Access to Energy is consistently but unequally improving across the continent

Across Africa, only one country, Equatorial Guinea – one of Sub-Saharan Africa's oil and gas producing countries – recorded a marginal deterioration (-0.6 points) in *Access to Energy*.

While all RECs have improved in *Access to Energy* since 2016, a significant gap of over 30 points remains between Northern Africa (UMA) and the top-ranked Sub-Saharan Regional Economic Community SADC, while IGAD and EAC countries lag far behind.

Regional Economic Communities: *Access to Energy* score (2016) & 10-year change (2016-2025)



For almost all (99.1%) of Africa's population, *Access to Energy* is better in 2025 than in 2016

In Nigeria, *Satisfaction with Electricity Supply* declines by -29.0 points over the decade

■ 2016
■ 10-year change

Source: MIF

Indeed, some countries still remain at a challengingly low level of *Access to Electricity* in 2025. At the bottom of the table, South Sudan scores 1.3 points, Burundi 7.7 and Chad 8.1; and none of these three improved by more than +3.5 points. Several countries remain at a very low score base with little progress made over the decade.

Africa's top ten crude oil producers by barrels/day in 2025 – Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Congo Republic, Gabon, Ghana, Chad and South Sudan³ – show varying levels of *Access to Electricity*: Algeria and Egypt lead with the best possible score of 100.0 in 2025, followed by Gabon (93.8) and Ghana (89.0). Chad and South Sudan, even though among the largest producers in Africa, show concerningly low performance (8.1 and 1.3, respectively), while top producers Nigeria and Angola settle in the middle.

Top 10 African oil producing countries: *Access to Electricity* score (2025), 10-year change (2016-2025) & trend

Country	Score 2025	10-year change	Trend
Nigeria	59.5	+2.0	●
Libya	72.0	+1.0	●
Algeria	100.0	+0.6	●
Angola	49.0	+9.8	●
Egypt	100.0	0.0	●
Congo Republic	49.2	+6.3	●
Gabon	93.8	+6.2	●
Ghana	89.0	+10.6	●
Chad	8.1	+2.9	●
South Sudan	1.3	+0.2	●

Only two of Africa's top oil producers, Algeria and Egypt, reach a score of 100.0 in *Access to Electricity* in 2025

Trend

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Warning Signs
- Bouncing Back
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change

Source: MIF

Mobile Communications*, in which almost every country has improved, leads progress in *Infrastructure

Both the cost and the access to internet and mobile networks have consistently improved almost all over the continent, with 51 out of 54 countries reporting progress over the decade. This is one of the key drivers of consistently solid improvements in *Infrastructure*. Only Gabon (-0.3), Tunisia (-1.0) and Lesotho (-4.5) declined in *Mobile Communications*, the ILAG's most improved indicator overall (+16.8).


98.9% of Africa's citizens have experienced progress in *Mobile Communications* since 2016

Almost all (98.9%) of Africa's population experienced progress in their mobile communications technology thanks to the substantial expansion of mobile internet and broadband over the last decade. More than 160 million Africans gained broadband access between 2019 and 2022, while average broadband download speeds increased from 2.68 Mbps in 2019 to 8.31 Mbps in 2022.⁴

Coming from a very low base, several countries made particularly impressive progress: Eritrea, the most improved country, gained +50.5 points, followed by Chad (+42.4) and Eswatini (+37.8).

Coming from a low base, Eritrea improved by over 50 points in *Mobile Communications* since 2016

African countries: *Mobile Communications* 10-year change (2016-2025)





Rural Economy


African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	61.2
10-year change (2016-2025)	+3.7
5-year change (2021-2025)	+2.4
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Increasing Improvement 

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Angola
Change 2016-2025	+21.6
Score/Rank (2025)	75.7/9th
Largest Deterioration	Comoros
Change 2016-2025	-23.0
Score/Rank (2025)	33.9/41st

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Rural Land & Water Access	63.9	+3.3	
Rural Market Access	54.6	-1.6	
Rural Economy Support	63.2	+8.8	
Rural Representation & Participation	67.1	+6.4	

Rural Economy sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF




Rural Economy improves for over two thirds of African countries with data available

Rural Economy is the fourth most improved of the IIAG's 16 sub-categories, gaining +3.7 points over the 2016-2025 decade. The sub-category gradually improved across the decade for 34 African countries, host to almost two thirds (65.2%) of the continent's population.

Angola is the most improved country over the decade, gaining a significant +21.6 points. Angola has strengthened its agriculture sector over the decade, leading to agriculture overtaking oil and accounting for nearly a quarter (20%) of the country's GDP.⁵

The three lowest-scoring countries in this dimension in 2025 – South Sudan (12.4), Somalia (18.6) and Eritrea (20.5) – are all experiencing insecurity due to armed conflicts, highlighting the way conflict threatens economic development in rural areas.

African countries: *Rural Economy* 10-year change (2016-2025)



Data gaps in *Rural Economy*

Rural Economy records the second highest data missingness (19.8%) of all 16 IIAG sub-categories, even after imputation. This is because *Rural Economy* relies solely on one dataset, the Rural Sector Performance Assessment (RSPA), provided by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). RSPA data is only available for three years (2018, 2021 and 2024) and for 46 African countries (RSPA does not cover Algeria, Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa).

While data on the rural sector in Africa is sparse, MIF considers agriculture and the development and representation of the rural economy a key pillar of public governance, especially given the number of people employed in the rural sector across the continent. Thus, the IIAG includes the RSPA despite the lack of full data coverage.

● Improved
● Declined
● No data

Source: MIF


Improved *Rural Economy Support* is largely driven by financial services

Progress in *Rural Economy* was mainly driven by an improvement recorded in *Rural Economy Support* (+8.8 points over the decade). Angola (+35.5) and Zambia (+39.9) registered the largest improvements over the ten- and five-year period, respectively.

Growth in this indicator was driven by improved performance in the sub-indicators *Rural Financial Services* (+12.0) and *Rural Development & Investment* (+9.2). This is linked to the rapid expansion of mobile money and other fintech services which have made it possible for rural populations, often excluded from traditional banking systems, to conduct digital transactions and access other services such as credit, savings and investments.

Kenya is the highest-scoring country throughout the decade in *Rural Financial Services*, reaching a score of 97.5 in 2025, leading fintech growth in Africa with 91% mobile money usage as of 2025, through the M-Pesa service.⁶

Africa: Rural Economy indicators 10-year changes (2016-2025)




Rural Market Access is the only rural indicator to decline, but is bouncing back lately

Rural Market Access is the only indicator in *Rural Economy* to decline over the decade (-1.6) at continental average level, though it has recovered in the past five years by +2.9 points and is on a trend of *Bouncing Back*.

Zambia is the most improved country over the past decade in this indicator, increasing almost four-fold (+45.3) from being the second lowest-scoring country in 2016 to scoring above the continental average by 2024.

Over the decade, Zambia implemented substantial improvements in crop production, as well as increased efforts to develop its value chains focusing on transportation, processing and agricultural trade, which resulted in national economic growth of 7.7% in the first quarter of 2026. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries, all rural-based economic activities made the single largest sector contribution to this growth.⁷

Africa & Zambia: Rural Market Access score (2016-2025)



Zambia is the most improved country over the decade in *Rural Market Access* (+45.3)

Country
 Africa
 Zambia

Source: MIF

Data missingness in the 2026 IIAG

The IIAG's more than 300 underlying variables are subject to strict inclusion criteria

To be included in the IIAG, a variable must be linked to MIF's definition of governance and preferably measure outputs and outcomes of governance. Further considerations around the inclusion of a variable include its methodological soundness, timeliness, accessibility, and the credibility of the data provider.

Given these considerations, to be included in the IIAG, a variable:

- must exist at least on a four-point scale,
- have at least two years' worth of data from the beginning of the time series (2016 in the case of the 2026 IIAG),
- the latest data point must exist within the last three years (2023-2025),
- if a variable only has two data points, they must be distinct, and
- these conditions must be met for at least 33 African countries.


Exceptions to these criteria can be made based on the importance and uniqueness of a variable, as well as on the expected availability of data in the future.

Education and Rural Economy have the highest level of missingness, with 2025 as the weakest data year

After applying the IIAG inclusion criteria, missingness at source sits at 31.9% across all 319 variables for 54 countries over ten years (172,260 total possible data points). This is particularly high in the *Rural Economy* sub-category at 76.2%, because *Rural Economy* indicators rely solely on one source: IFAD's Rural Sector Performance Assessment, which currently only provides data for three years: 2018, 2021 and 2024. Similarly, the *Education* sub-category relies heavily on UNESCO, whose data coverage is especially sparse for education completion indicators (over 85% missingness). This results in an overall missingness of 62.8% for *Education*.

Missingness at source varies over the years with the lowest being 2021 (21.4%) and the highest being 2025 (57.6%). While it is expected that the latest data year is the 'weakest' in terms of availability due to collection and dissemination cycles, consultations with MIF data providers have also revealed that current upheavals and funding cuts in the development and data community have negatively affected institutions' ability to conduct fieldwork and publish on time.

IIAG years: % data missingness at source (2016-2025)



The provision of the political, social, economic, and environmental goods that citizens have the right to expect from their state and that a state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens.

Mo Ibrahim Foundation definition of governance

The difficulty of measuring climate adaptation


In addition to *Rural Economy* and *Education*, *Sustainable Environment* is another IIAG sub-category which is suffering from data missingness – not with regards to its constituent indicators, but regarding the evolving standard for measuring climate protection.

With adaptation as Africa's biggest priority in the climate debate, MIF is cognisant of the need to include this in future iterations of the IIAG alongside existing biodiversity and environment policy indicators. The two-year UAE-Belém work programme, which adopted a set of 59 climate adaptation indicators at COP30 in 2025, is a massive step towards that goal, and can hopefully become part of the IIAG framework in the future.

Imputation reduces missingness by two thirds to 11.6% across every data year

The IIAG's linear interpolation drastically reduces missingness by two thirds, from 31.9% over the whole dataset to only 11.6%. While *Rural Economy* and *Education* still record the highest missingness of all sub-categories, *Rural Economy* reduces from 76.2% at source to only 19.8% after imputation, a decrease of -56.4 percentage points. *Education*'s missingness is halved from 62.8% to 31.6%. Imputation also evens out missingness over the years and results in a constant 11.6% for each year in the time series (2016-2025).

IIAG sub-categories: % data missingness after imputation



Category

● Security & Rule of Law ● Participation, Rights & Inclusion ● Foundations for Economic Opportunity ● Human Development

Source: MIF

Benin and Ghana are the only countries with zero missingness, while conflict countries and small islands lag behind


After imputation, Benin and Ghana are the only countries with no data missingness across all 319 variables and ten years. While individual years are missing for them, there is no case in which either country is completely absent from a dataset over the whole time series.

Data missingness under 5% is achieved by almost half the continent (25 countries), with eight of these even achieving less than 1% missingness: Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Tanzania.

At the other end of the table, ten countries record data missingness of over 25%: Central African Republic, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Seychelles, Somalia and South Sudan. Most of these countries are either in active conflict, which makes data collection on the ground difficult, or are Small Island Developing States (SIDS) which tend to not be included in many datasets. For example, after applying the IIAG inclusion criteria, none of the above ten countries have data for Afrobarometer's public opinion indicators due to the difficulty of deploying surveys on the ground, despite Afrobarometer's impressive expansion of data coverage over the years.

25 countries achieve data missingness of under 5% after imputation

African countries: % data missingness after imputation (2016-2025)



Source: MIF

Countries with lower data missingness tend to have better *Overall Governance* scores

Part of a country's governance performance is a strong public administration, including the provision of reliable, comprehensive data by independent national statistics offices and other agencies. When correlating countries' (without SIDS) 2025 *Overall Governance* scores with their missingness at source for the 2016–2025 dataset, it shows a negative association between both.


In other words, countries with higher *Overall Governance* scores tend to have lower levels of missingness while countries with lower *Overall Governance* scores tend to have less complete data coverage. For example, Benin, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal are among the top ten countries for *Overall Governance* (excluding SIDS) and have among the top ten lowest missingness percentages.

Methodological note on *Overall Governance* and missingness correlation

This correlation analysis uses missingness at source to show the original picture of a country's performance on data provision. Additionally, six African SIDS were removed from the sample because SIDS are often absent from global datasets due to their size.

The correlation results should be treated cautiously due to the modest sample size of 48 countries, and because it is a simple bivariate analysis that does not control for other factors that might influence data availability such as GDP, government expenditure, or conflict status. The relationship should therefore not be interpreted as causal, but descriptive.

African countries (without SIDS*): *Overall Governance* score (2025) & % data missingness at source (2016–2025)





Health

African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	58.5
10-year change (2016-2025)	+2.0
5-year change (2021-2025)	+0.4
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Slowing Improvement

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Tanzania
Change 2016-2025	+9.6
Score/Rank (2025)	68.9/8th
Largest Deterioration	Gambia
Change 2016-2025	-8.2
Score/Rank (2025)	52.3/38th

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Access to Healthcare	45.5	-0.1	
Access to Water & Sanitation	53.4	+5.9	
Control of Communicable Diseases	77.7	+8.1	
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs)	68.3	-2.1	
Child & Maternal Health	70.0	+5.1	
Health Quality	41.6	+0.5	
Public Perception of Health Provision	51.4	-5.7	

Health sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF



Forty countries, hosting 87% of the continent's population, improve their *Health* performance over the decade

Africa achieved substantial progress across several dimensions of the *Health* sub-category, gaining +2.0 points over the decade overall. Forty countries, home to 87.1% of the continent's population, improved their *Health* score, with 20 of those at an accelerated rate since 2021, making *Increasing Improvement* the dominant trend in this sub-category. Improvements are led by Tanzania (+9.6), Morocco (+9.0) and Comoros (+7.2). The best-performing countries in 2025 are Seychelles (81.9), Botswana (75.6) and Cabo Verde (72.1).

The most deteriorated countries over the decade are Gambia (-8.2), São Tomé and Príncipe (-5.9) and Algeria (-5.7), although the latter is still ranked 4th in 2025. On the other end of the table, Sudan (37.5), Central African Republic (40.7) and Chad (42.3) are the lowest-performing countries in 2025.

Tanzania (8th) and Morocco (10th) improve the most in *Health*, by over 9 points

While affordability is progressing, healthcare is not equally accessible to all citizens


Between 2016 and 2021, the underlying indicator *Access to Healthcare* increased by +1.6, to then decline by -1.7 since 2021, ending the decade with a minor -0.1-point loss. This deterioration was driven by one of the two underlying sub-indicators: while *Healthcare Affordability*, which measures households' out-of-pocket payments as a share of current health expenditure, improved by +3.0 at continental level over the decade, *Healthcare Equality*, which measures the extent of equal access to healthcare for all citizens, declined by -3.1.

This is also mirrored in the perception-based sub-indicator *Perceived Ease of Obtaining Medical Care*, which has declined even more starkly over the decade at a -6.3-point loss. Despite healthcare being more accessible from a financial perspective, equal access was still impeded, to the dissatisfaction of Africa's citizens.

Access to Healthcare declines over the decade due to unequal access to healthcare for citizens

The sub-indicator *Perceived Ease of Obtaining Medical Care* loses over 6 points over the decade

Africa: healthcare affordability & access sub-indicators 10-year changes & trends (2016-2025)



A concerning widening gap between control of communicable and non-communicable diseases


Control of Communicable Diseases (including HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, measles, diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus and hepatitis B, mostly addressed through immunisation) is the most improved indicator within *Health*, gaining +8.1 points over the decade at continental average. Forty-eight countries improved their performance, and 23 of them at a rate of *Increasing Improvement*.

In stark contrast, *Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs)*, which includes cardiovascular diseases, cancer, diabetes and chronic respiratory diseases, and can be associated with lifestyle, genetics and climate impact, improved in only 11 countries, with the continental score declining by -2.1 points.

This contrast sits within a wider global change in disease patterns, often described as the ‘epidemiological transition’¹ – i.e. the declining mortality from communicable diseases alongside longer life expectancy and a growing prominence of NCDs, placing additional demands on health systems with limited resources.

Africa's control of communicable and non-communicable diseases moves in opposite directions

Africa: Control of Communicable Diseases and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) scores (2016-2025)



Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) declines by over 2 points over the decade

Category


- Control of Communicable Diseases
- Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs)

Source: MIF

Widespread progress in Access to Water & Sanitation for over 90% of Africa's citizens

Access to Water & Sanitation improved by +5.9 points at continental level. This is driven by progress in all underlying sub-indicators, but mostly in Access to Drinking Water (+8.0). While the progress is slowing, 92.1% of Africa's population live in the 51 countries where Access to Water & Sanitation has improved over the decade.

Access to Water & Sanitation: share of trend by population (2016-2025)



Between 2016 and 2025, Kenya recorded Africa's largest improvement in Access to Water & Sanitation, gaining +18.7 points and moving from 33rd to 19th place. This was driven primarily by substantial progress in Access to Handwashing Facilities (+40.3), alongside improvements in Access to Drinking Water (+10.2).

DR Congo and Central African Republic are the only countries to record slight declines in Access to Water & Sanitation between 2016 and 2025. However, both are classified as *Bouncing Back*, having resumed improvement since the midpoint of the decade, although their 2025 scores remained below their 2016 levels. Eritrea is the only country for which no data is available.

Access to Water & Sanitation has improved in all countries but Central African Republic and DR Congo


Tanzania achieves the biggest Health improvements on the continent, mirrored by citizens' satisfaction

With a gain of +9.6 points over the decade, Tanzania recorded the biggest gains in Health across the continent, improving in six of the seven underlying indicators. The only indicator to see a very minor decline (-0.1) is Access to Healthcare, although the score improved from 2023. Tanzania's broader Health profile exceeds the African average in five out of seven indicators, is on par with one and only underperforms in Access to Water & Sanitation. The impact is clear: in Public Perception of Health Provision, Tanzania gained +19.1 points over the decade and ranks first in 2025.

Access to Handwashing Facilities is a key driver of this progress

The country's progress coincides with investment in primary healthcare, including a \$200 million World Bank credit approved in 2015 for the Strengthening Primary Health Care for Results Program, focusing on mothers, newborns and children. In the 2017/18 financial year, Tanzania also introduced Direct Health Facility Financing, transferring funds directly to public primary healthcare facilities and giving them greater autonomy to plan and budget according to local needs.²

Tanzania & Africa: *Health* indicators scores (2025)





Education

African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	49.8
10-year change (2016-2025)	+2.0
5-year change (2021-2025)	+1.8
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Increasing Improvement

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Djibouti
Change 2016-2025	+15.2
Score/Rank (2025)	69.8/6th
Largest Deterioration	Madagascar
Change 2016-2025	-13.3
Score/Rank (2025)	33.7/43rd

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Equality in Education	47.1	+3.2	
Education Enrolment	36.8	+2.1	
Education Completion	53.1	+2.8	
Human Resources in Education	80.4	-2.3	
Education Quality	43.1	+3.2	
Public Perception of Education Provision	58.3	+1.0	

Education sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF



Education improves steadily over the decade and is better in 2025 for three quarters of Africa's population

In 34 countries, home to 75.5% of the continent's population, *Education* has improved, raising the continental average score by +2.0 points over the decade. Five countries made gains over ten points, far above the average African improvement: Djibouti (+15.2), Gabon (+13.2), Sierra Leone (+13.1), South Sudan (+11.2) and Somalia (+10.6). Top performers in 2025 are Mauritius (81.2), Seychelles (77.7) and Algeria (73.0).

The most deteriorated countries over the decade are Madagascar (-13.3), Guinea-Bissau (-9.9) and Guinea (-5.7) while the lowest performers in 2025 are Central African Republic (11.4), Somalia (11.4) and South Sudan (12.6) – despite the latter two being among the most improved by score over the ten years.


Human Resources in Education deteriorates by over two points over the decade

Five of the six underlying *Education* indicators recorded progress at African average level over the decade, led by *Education Quality* and *Equality in Education* (tied at +3.2). *Human Resources in Education*, which measures the average number of pupils per qualified teacher, as well as the percentage of teachers who received the minimum required training at primary level of education, is the only indicator to decline (-2.3), and increasingly so.

While in 20 countries, *Human Resources in Education* improved over the decade while 19 declined, largely driven by Madagascar which loses a drastic -70.9 points over the decade (data is unavailable for 15 countries). Average losses are larger than average gains, causing the overall continental decline. Among the 19 declined countries, seven are on a trend of *Increasing Deterioration*: Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Eswatini, Liberia, Madagascar and Mauritania.

Human Resources in Education is increasingly deteriorating in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Eswatini, Liberia, Madagascar and Mauritania

Africa: Education indicators 10-year changes & trends (2016-2025)




Botswana becomes the new leader in *Education Quality*

While the composition of the top five countries in *Education Quality* remained the same in 2016 and 2025 – Botswana, Cabo Verde, Kenya, Mauritius and Seychelles – their ranks have reshuffled. Botswana's *Education Quality* score improved by +20.5 points over the decade, compared with +3.2 at the African average, making Botswana the fourth most improved country over the decade.

Botswana overtook Kenya in 2022, Mauritius in 2024 and Seychelles in 2025, reaching 89.9 and rising from 4th rank in 2016 to 1st rank in 2025. Looking at *Education Quality*'s underlying sub-indicators, Botswana's strongest improvement is achieved in *Education Alignment with Market Needs* (+39.4), followed by *Education Policy* (+16.7) and *Expected Years of Learning-Adjusted Schooling* (+5.5).

Selected African countries & Africa: *Education Quality* score (2016-2025)



Botswana overtakes Kenya, Mauritius and Seychelles in *Education Quality* over the decade, driven by progress in *Education Alignment with Market Needs*


Angola achieves the largest gains in education gender parity

The sub-indicator *Gender Parity in Education* measures the ratio of female gross enrolment to male gross enrolment in primary and lower secondary education. Between 2016 and 2025, Angola's *Gender Parity in Education* score improved by +40.0 points, becoming the most improved country on the continent, moving from 41st to 27th rank. The country is thus closing its gap with the African average from a difference of 34.6 to only 2.9 points in 2025.

Angola's efforts to address educational disadvantage include expanding second-chance education under the World Bank-supported Girls Empowerment and Learning for All Project. The programme provides out-of-school people aged 15 and older with literacy, numeracy and life skills.³

Angola achieves by far the largest gains in *Gender Parity in Education* (+40.0)

Angola & Africa: *Gender Parity in Education* score (2016-2025)



Beyond revenue mobilisation: Why procurement integrity matters as aid declines

Dr Alex Nester Jiya, African Institute for Development Policy (AFIDEP)

As Official Development Assistance (ODA) continues declining, the question is how African countries can finance long-term development goals and at the same time meet urgent needs in critical sectors. Recent estimates show that ODA recorded its largest-ever annual decline in 2025, falling by 23.1%, with bilateral aid to Sub-Saharan Africa falling by 25%. This decline is mainly being driven by shifts in priorities of major traditional bilateral donors.

In response, African governments are turning to domestic revenue. However, raising more financial resources solves only part of the problem. Public procurement, which accounts for almost 17% of Africa's GDP and over 50% of African government expenditure, remains highly vulnerable to corruption. Estimates suggest that 10-25% of a public contract's value may be lost to corruption. Thus, stronger procurement systems are essential for safeguarding the mobilised financial resources.


The Africa Integrity Indicators (All), a project being implemented by the African Institute for Development Policy (AFIDEP), collects governance data from across all African countries. The data assesses key social, economic, political, and anti-corruption mechanisms at the national level. Three of the All's 58 indicators assess transparency and integrity in public procurement. Providing the status of procurement systems and oversight, the indicators specifically measure whether major government contracts are openly advertised with clear terms and published evaluation criteria, whether complete procurement records (awards, contracts, execution reports, audits) are archived and publicly accessible, and whether law-breaking companies are barred from future bidding and publicly listed.

Generally, evidence from these three indicators shows that public procurement integrity in Africa has not improved in over a decade. Since 2014, the combined average score for the three procurement indicators, across the 54 African countries assessed, has stagnated between 28 and 34. These scores place the countries in the 'Weak' band and far below 'Moderate' (50)¹. The data further shows that average scores peaked at 33.8 in 2017, dropped to a low of 28.2 in 2021 (during the COVID-19 era), and have since recovered to 32.4 in 2025. In other words, there has been no lasting improvement over the period. The decade-long data shows that only 20% of countries score at or above the 'Moderate' band (50). Looking at the indicators individually, competitive bidding performs best with an average score of 40.2. Performance is much weaker on the debarment

of companies that are found in violation of public procurement laws (28.7) and weakest on citizen access to public procurement records (25.9). Across all the indicators between 2014 and 2025, Rwanda (72.2), Mauritius (65.3), Zambia (64.6) and Burkina Faso (62.5) rank as the four best performers, while Equatorial Guinea (0.00), Sudan (0.69), Eritrea (2.08) and Somalia (2.08) rank lowest.

There is a lot that African countries need to do to protect the mobilised financial resources. Efforts to mobilise more domestic resources may deliver limited gains for long-term development goals and urgent needs as weak procurement processes allow public funds to be lost. As ODA declines, African countries need to combine domestic resource mobilisation with stronger procurement transparency and enforcement. This can be done by digitising procurement processes including establishment of e-procurement platforms, adopting open contracting standards, maintaining debarment registries that are readily available to citizens online or upon request for scrutiny and requiring beneficial ownership disclosures. Oversight mechanisms should also be strengthened. This can be done by promoting the independence and capacity of public procurement authorities, national audit institutions and parliamentary committees. Civil society and the media should also be provided with data that is usable for scrutiny.

Average score of 3 All public procurement indicators (2014-2025)



¹ Each indicator has a set of elaborate criteria that corresponds to each possible score. In general, a 100 translates into 'Very Strong', a 75 into 'Strong', a 50 into 'Moderate', a 25 into 'Weak' and a 0 into 'Very Weak'.



Social Protection & Welfare


African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	52.2
10-year change (2016-2025)	+1.9
5-year change (2021-2025)	+1.0
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Increasing Improvement

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Somalia
Change 2016-2025	+17.2
Score/Rank (2025)	33.5/51st
Largest Deterioration	Sudan
Change 2016-2025	-13.6
Score/Rank (2025)	29.5/53rd

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Social Safety	37.0	+4.4	
Poverty Reduction Policies	48.6	+1.3	
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation	58.9	+3.0	
Decent Housing	63.5	+5.6	
Food Security	62.6	-1.1	
Public Perception of Social Protection & Lived Poverty	41.4	-5.7	

Social Protection & Welfare sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF



Modest gains at continental average over the decade in Social Protection & Welfare, accelerating since 2022

Thirty-eight countries improved their *Social Protection & Welfare* performance over the decade while only 16 declined. This improvement is only felt for 56.0% of the population, to some extent because both the continent's most populous countries, Nigeria and Ethiopia, recorded a deterioration. Seventeen countries progressed at a rate of *Increasing Improvement*.

The continental gain of +1.9 over the decade covers much larger movements at country level: Somalia (+17.2), Djibouti (+11.8) and Mozambique (+9.6) are the most improved, while Sudan (-13.6), Nigeria (-11.7) and Burkina Faso (-8.9) have deteriorated the most. Top performers in 2025 are Seychelles (84.8), Algeria (83.8) and Mauritius (82.7) while South Sudan (19.6), Sudan (29.5) and Central African Republic (32.8) rank last.


Social Protection & Welfare deteriorates over the decade for Africa's two most populous countries - Nigeria and Ethiopia - as well as South Africa, where deterioration worsens

Decent Housing leads continental gains in Social Protection & Welfare while food security and public perception decline

Of the sub-category's six underlying indicators, *Decent Housing* recorded the largest improvement (+5.6), followed by *Social Safety* (+4.4). However, progress in almost all indicators is mitigated by the strong deterioration of *Public Perception of Social Protection & Lived Poverty* which declined by -5.7 points over the decade – albeit *Bouncing Back* over the second half of the decade. Concerningly, *Food Security* has also declined at continental average (-1.1), and at a rate of *Increasing Deterioration*.

Deterioration increases for Food Security (-1.1 over the decade)

Africa: Social Protection & Welfare indicators 10-year changes & trends (2016-2025)




In Somalia, the most improved country within *Social Protection & Welfare*, *Decent Housing* is also the most improved indicator with an impressive gain of +33.7 points over the decade. This progress is consistent with the country's efforts to integrate displaced communities into planned urban development and move beyond temporary shelter towards durable housing solutions, such as UN-Habitat's Youth and Urban Regeneration Somalia project running from 2020-2024.⁴

Côte d'Ivoire and Togo: the only countries to achieve progress in all dimensions of *Social Protection & Welfare*

Côte d'Ivoire and Togo are the only two countries to improve across all six underlying *Social Protection & Welfare* indicators. Between 2016 and 2025, their sub-category scores increased by +9.5 and +8.5 points, respectively, compared with +1.9 for Africa.

Côte d'Ivoire's strongest gains were achieved in *Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation* (+19.5), *Social Safety* (+15.5) and *Poverty Reduction Policies* (+12.9). Togo's largest improvements were achieved in *Public Perception & Lived Poverty* (+11.2) and *Food Security* (+11.0), contrasting with continental declines of -5.7 and -1.1 points for these two indicators, respectively.

Côte d'Ivoire & Togo: *Social Protection & Welfare* indicators 10-year changes (2016-2025)



Côte d'Ivoire's progress coincides with the expansion of social protection programmes, including the World Bank-supported Productive Social Safety Net Project. Approved in 2015, the project began cash payments to an initial 5,000 households targeting poor and vulnerable households, initially in rural areas. It combines regular cash transfers with training and support for income-generating activities, aiming to improve livelihoods and establish a lasting national social safety net system.⁵



Sustainable Environment


African average

Source: MIF

2025 score (out of 100.0)	52.2
10-year change (2016-2025)	+4.0
5-year change (2021-2025)	+0.6
Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change	Slowing Improvement

African countries

10-year change (2016-2025) by number of countries



Trend: 5-year change (2021-2025) compared to 10-year change by number of countries




Largest Improvement	Seychelles
Change 2016-2025	+15.8
Score/Rank (2025)	81.9/1st
Largest Deterioration	Tunisia
Change 2016-2025	-2.8
Score/Rank (2025)	60.1/13th

Underlying indicators	Score (2025)	10-year change (2016-2025)	
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability	54.9	+4.5	
Enforcement of Environmental Policies	53.6	+6.4	
Air Quality	51.7	+5.3	
Sustainable Use of Land & Forests	58.9	+3.7	
Land & Water Biodiversity Protection	43.2	+0.9	

Sustainable Environment sub-category: 2025 rank, 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)

Source: MIF



Sustainable Environment improves for nearly all of Africa's population over the decade

Sustainable Environment is the third most improved sub-category in the IIAG, gaining +4.0 points over the decade. Progress was recorded for 94.9% of the continent's population across 48 countries, led by Seychelles (+15.8), Togo (+14.0) and Côte d'Ivoire (+12.9). Seychelles is not only the most improved country, but also the best scoring in 2025 (81.9), followed by Botswana (74.3) and Algeria (70.4).


On the other end of the table, Madagascar (30.2), South Sudan (30.6) and Somalia (31.7) are the lowest-ranked countries, while Tunisia (-2.8), Ghana (-2.2) and Congo Republic (-1.4) have deteriorated the most, although at a comparatively low magnitude.

Environmental policies and their enforcement drive the progress in *Sustainable Environment*

At continental level, progress was achieved in all of *Sustainable Environment's* five underlying indicators, the only sub-category to achieve this. *Environmental Policies & Regulations* have improved by +8.5 points over the decade. Angola, a major oil producer in Africa, is the most improved country in *Environmental Policies & Regulations* (+33.4), closely followed by Algeria, another major oil producer (+33.3). Algeria has held the highest score of 100.0 since 2023 as it introduced strong regulatory frameworks, extending environmental responsibility to the country's private industrial sector to enable the transition to a circular economy.⁶

The existence of environmental policies alone is not enough: *Enforcement of Environmental Policies* is Africa's most improved indicator within *Sustainable Environment* over the decade by +6.4. Alongside legal frameworks, African countries are also increasingly implementing their environmental commitments.

African regions: *Enforcement of Environmental Policies* 5-year change & trend (2021-2025)



Sustainable Environment improves for almost 95% of Africa's population

Enforcement of Environmental Policies (+6.4) is Africa's most improved environment indicator

Angola is the most improved country in *Environmental Policies & Regulations* (+33.4)

- Trend
- Increasing Improvement
 - Slowing Improvement
 - Warning Signs
 - Bouncing Back
 - Slowing Deterioration
 - Increasing Deterioration

Source: MIF


Despite the overall improvement over the decade at continental level, performance in *Enforcement of Environmental Policies* over the last five years varies: while all other regions are classified as *Increasing Improvement*, Eastern Africa's upwards trajectory reversed from 2021, with a decline of -2.8, pointing to *Warning Signs*.

Within this recent regional decline, Uganda recorded the largest improvement in the sub-indicator *Effectiveness of Environmental Protection Authorities* (+32.0). The National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) in Uganda under its strategic five-year plan aims at achieving 85% compliance to national environmental regulations by 2030.⁷ Rwanda achieved the highest score in *Effectiveness of Environmental Protection Authorities* from 2023, even reaching 99.1 in 2025.

Improvement in Sustainable use of Land & Forests for over two thirds of African countries, mostly in Western Africa

The indicator *Sustainable Use of Land & Forests* improved by +3.7 over the decade across 37 African countries hosting over two thirds (68.2%) of the continent's population. The Western Africa region leads this progress with the biggest increase of +9.9 points. Despite a slowdown over the past five years, it is the only region to achieve a slight improvement of +1.1 points between 2021 and 2025. All other regions declined since the mid-point of the decade and are classified as *Warning Signs*.

African regions: Sustainable Use of Land & Forests 10-year change & trend (2016-2025)



Western Africa's progress in this indicator is driven by Guinea-Bissau (+22.7), Sierra Leone (+21.4) and Togo, the most improved country (+49.1). This makes *Sustainable use of Land and Forests* Togo's best-performing indicator across the IIAG, leading the country to progress from rank 50th in 2016 to rank 5th in 2025. After the loss of about 20% of its primary forest cover since 2001, the government of Togo aims to restore 1.4 million hectares of degraded land by 2030 under the African AFR100 initiative.⁸



While all other regions consistently improve over the decade, Eastern Africa is showing warning signs since 2021



Togo is the most improved country (+49.1) in Sustainable Use of Land & Forests

- Trend**
- Increasing Improvement
 - Slowing Improvement
 - Warning Signs
 - Bouncing Back
 - Slowing Deterioration
 - Increasing Deterioration

Source: MIF

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⁷ NEMA (2026). NEMA Launches Its Strategic Plan 2025/26-2029/30 with Environment Donor Groups. <https://www.nema.go.ug/en/nema-launches-its-strategic-plan-2025-26-2029-30-with-environment-donor-groups/>. Last accessed 9 October 2026.

⁸ Togo First (2026). Togo lost more than 130,000 hectares of vegetation cover since 2001. <https://www.togofirst.com/en/agriculture/1805-18997-togo-lost-more-than-130-000-hectares-of-vegetation-cover-since-2001>. Last accessed 9 October 2026.

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW**SECURITY & SAFETY**

Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	This indicator measures the number of violent events in both state-based and non-state-based conflicts as well as the number of non-state-based armed conflicts within a country.
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	This indicator measures the number of violent events against civilians committed by government forces and non-state actors, as well as the level of political violence and terror in a country.
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	This indicator measures the total stock of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the number of refugees fleeing a country.
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (ENACT/V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which human trafficking activity and forced labour are prevalent in a country.
Absence of Crime (ENACT/WHO)	This indicator assesses the extent of organised crime and the homicide rate in a country.
Public Perception of Security & Safety (AFR)	This indicator assesses the extent to which citizens feel safe walking in their neighbourhood, public trust in the police and military, as well as the extent to which citizens feel the government is doing well at reducing crime.

RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE

Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which the executive respects the constitution, the government complies with decisions by the courts and transitions of power are subject to the law.
Impartiality of the Judicial System (AFIDEP/V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which the judicial system is impartial based on the independence of the courts, the autonomy of judges, and the appointment of judges.
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which justice is accessible and affordable, due process of law and rights of the accused are guaranteed, trials are timely, and justice is enforced effectively.
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which there is equality before the law and civil and criminal justice systems are impartial and free of discrimination.
Law Enforcement (AFIDEP/WEF/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which the police are reliable, subject to effective misconduct investigations and sanctioning, and the criminal investigation and prosecutorial system is functional.
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which private property rights are guaranteed and enjoyed by citizens.
Public Perception of the Rule of Law (AFR)	This indicator assesses the extent to which citizens feel that the head of the executive does not ignore the courts and laws and the extent to which citizens feel that they are treated equally under the law.

ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY

Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which there is a separation of powers, government powers are checked upon and limited by both the legislature and the judiciary, and public office holders are sanctioned for abuse of office.
Absence of Undue Influence (AFIDEP/BS/FH)	This indicator assesses the extent to which the elected government has the effective power to govern, the government and legislature determine policies without undue influence from veto powers, and civil servants' work is not compromised by political interference.
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which effective citizen complaint mechanisms exist, citizens have the right to petition and to civic engagement, and cooperative associations, interest groups and civil society organisations (CSOs) are consulted in policymaking.
Disclosure of Public Records (AFIDEP/IBP/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which budget information is made publicly available in a timely manner, public officials and civil servants disclose their assets, and laws and judicial information are publicised.
Accessibility of Public Records (AFIDEP/UNDESA/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which records and information of interest to the public are accessible and citizens have the right to request that information, as well as the scope and quality of online services provided by the government.
Public Perception of Accountability (AFR)	This indicator assesses the extent to which citizens feel that the head of the executive does not ignore parliament and that officials who commit crimes are punished.

ANTI-CORRUPTION

Anti-Corruption Mechanism (AFIDEP/BS)	This indicator assesses the extent to which there is an anti-corruption policy in place contributing to the containment of corruption, there is a functioning and independent anti-corruption body, and corruption allegations are investigated.
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which corruption is absent in the judiciary, the legislature, and the executive.
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which public sector employees (including the police and military) do not engage in corruption and administrative processes are free from bribery.

Public Procurement Procedures (AFIDEP/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which there are competitive bidding procedures for public procurement, government procurement is free from corruption, and companies found guilty of violating the law are excluded from participating in future bidding.
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	This indicator assesses the extent to which individuals/companies do not engage in corrupt activities to conduct business.
Public Perception of Anti-Corruption (AFR)	This indicator assesses the extent to which citizens feel that the head of the executive, members of parliament, government officials, and the police are not involved in corruption, as well as citizens' satisfaction with how the government is doing at fighting government corruption.

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION

PARTICIPATION

Freedom of Association & Assembly (AFIDEP/FH)	This indicator assesses the extent to which citizens can associate and assemble freely.
Political Pluralism (AFIDEP/V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which political parties are free to operate and have equal access to state-owned media and public financing for campaigns.
Civil Society Space (AFIDEP/V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are free to establish and operate and are free from repression and persecution.
Democratic Elections (AFIDEP/CDD-Ghana/V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which elections are free and fair and the extent to which election monitoring bodies and agencies are independent and have operating capacity, including for reporting.
Deliberative & Participatory Governance (V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which, prior to policy changes, political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments, provide public, reasoned and common good considerations, and hold a wide range of consultation at elite levels.
Public Perception of Political Participation (AFR)	This indicator assesses whether citizens were able to vote in the last national election and to what extent they considered it free and fair, trust the electoral commission, and think that political pluralism is beneficial.

RIGHTS

Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which citizens enjoy freedom of movement, personal social freedoms, and the right to privacy.
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which citizens enjoy freedom of expression, academic freedom, and freedom of religion and belief.
Media Freedom (AFIDEP/RSF/V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which the legislative framework and the political, economic, and sociocultural contexts allow journalists to do their work freely, as well as the extent to which there are abuses against media and against journalists in connection with their work.
Digital Freedom (AFIDEP/DSP&V-DEM/V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent of internet and social media shutdowns, the protection of internet users' privacy, and the extent to which people are free to express themselves online and there is no limited access to online content.
Protection against Discrimination (AFIDEP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which there are official functioning mechanisms to protect citizens against ethnic, religious, and sexual orientation-based discrimination.
Public Perception of Freedom of Speech (AFR)	This indicator assesses the extent to which citizens feel free to say what they think.

INCLUSION & EQUALITY

Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which political power is distributed by socioeconomic position, sexual orientation, social group, and urban-rural location.
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which various segments of the population have political rights and electoral opportunities and to which extent disadvantaged social groups and youth (age 40 years and under) are represented in the legislature.
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which the enjoyment of civil liberties is equal by region, income level, social group, political group, and urban-rural location.
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunities (AFIDEP/V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which state jobs and business opportunities are equally accessible regardless of income level, social group, or urban-rural location, and there are programmes dedicated to the socioeconomic integration of youth.
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which access to basic public services is distributed equally by socioeconomic position, social group, political group and urban-rural location.
Public Perception of Inclusion & Equality (AFR)	This indicator assesses the extent to which citizens feel their ethnic group is treated fairly by the government and would dislike having people of a different ethnic group, different religion, or homosexuals as neighbours.

WOMEN'S EQUALITY

Political Power & Representation of Women (AFIDEP/IPU&UNWomen/V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which political power is distributed by gender and measures the proportion of women in the executive, in the legislature, and the highest branch of the judiciary.
Rights & Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM/WB)	This indicator assesses the extent to which women enjoy the same level of civil liberties and property rights as men and are free to participate in civil society organisations, as well as the extent to which women's civil society organisations are free to operate.
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (AFIDEP/V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which state jobs and business opportunities are equally accessible regardless of gender and women receive equal pay, benefits and treatment to men in the workplace.
Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	This indicator assesses the extent to which access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, are distributed equally according to gender.
Laws on Violence against Women (WB)	This indicator assesses the extent to which there are laws and regulations on violence against women by assessing whether there is legislation on sexual harassment in employment, whether there are criminal penalties or civil remedies for sexual harassment in employment, whether the law is free of legal provisions that require a married woman to obey her husband, whether there is legislation specifically addressing domestic violence, and whether a woman can obtain a judgment of divorce in the same way as a man.
Public Perception of Female Leadership (AFR)	This indicator assesses the extent to which citizens believe women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men.

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Civil Registration (AFIDEP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which birth and death certificates are available within 30 days and free of charge.
Capacity of the Statistical System (AFIDEP/ODW/V-DEM/WB)	This indicator assesses the capacity of a country's statistical system, the extent of statistical data coverage and openness, the independence of national statistics offices (NSOs), and the government's cyber security capacity.
Effective Administration (AfDB/AFIDEP/V-DEM/WB)	This indicator assesses the extent to which there is an effective and professional public administration.
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/UNU-WIDER/WB)	This indicator measures a country's taxation capacity and assesses the efficiency of its revenue mobilisation.
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	This indicator assesses the extent to which there is a comprehensive and credible budget linked to policy priorities, effective financial management systems, and timely and accurate accounting and fiscal reporting.
Public Perception of Easiness to Obtain and Identity Document (AFR)	This indicator assesses citizens' perceptions of how easy it is to obtain the identity documents they need.

BUSINESS & LABOUR ENVIRONMENT

Regional Integration (AfDB/AfDB&AUC/UNCTAD)	This indicator assesses the extent of government's development of regional integration, the extent of a country's intra-African trade, and its visa openness towards other African countries.
Economic Diversification (OEC/UNCTAD)	This indicator assesses the extent to which there is a diversification of exports and the extent of a country's economic complexity.
Business & Competition Regulations (AfDB/BS/WB)	This indicator assesses the extent to which a country's regulatory environment helps private businesses and the extent to which safeguards are enforced to protect competition.
Access to Banking Services (IMF/WB)	This indicator measures the extent to which the population has access to bank branches, ATMs, and financial institution accounts as well as the usage of mobile money services.
Labour Relations (AFIDEP/ITUC/WEF)	This indicator assesses the extent to which labour-employer relations are generally cooperative, workers are free to organise into trade unions, and countries comply with collective labour rights.
Secure Employment Opportunities (ILO/WB)	This indicator measures the extent to which employed persons are not living in poverty and are not in vulnerable employment.
Public Perception of Economic Opportunities (AFR)	This indicator assesses the extent to which citizens feel the government is doing well at creating jobs and their perception of the country's present economic condition.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Transport Network (AfDB/WEF)	This indicator assesses the quality, coverage and efficiency of a country's transport network including road, rail and air infrastructure.
Access to Energy (WB/WHO)	This indicator measures the extent to which a country's population has access to electricity and clean cooking fuels.

Mobile Communications (ITU)	This indicator measures the extent to which mobile phones and mobile internet are accessible and affordable.
Internet (Cable/ITU/WB)	This indicator measures broadband internet pricing, internet speed and internet security.
Shipping & Postal Network (UNCTAD/UPU)	This indicator assesses a country's integration level into global shipping liner networks as well as its performance in postal development.
Public Perception of Infrastructure (AFR)	This indicator assesses the extent to which citizens are satisfied with how the government is doing at maintaining roads and bridges and at providing a reliable supply of electricity.

RURAL ECONOMY

Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	This indicator assesses the extent to which rural people have access to land and water.
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	This indicator assesses the extent to which existing agricultural input markets and produce markets are reliably providing value for money to smallholders for inputs and the highest proportion of the retail price for produce.
Rural Economy Support (IFAD)	This indicator assesses the extent to which government strategies foster rural development and investment as well as the extent to which policy and legal frameworks create an enabling environment for the provision of rural financial services and provide access to public or private extension services for smallholder farmers.
Rural Representation & Participation (IFAD)	This indicator assesses the extent to which rural people can organise into autonomous groups and have representation and power in policy-making processes.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

HEALTH

Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	This indicator estimates how much households spend on health directly out-of-pocket and assesses the extent to which basic high-quality healthcare is guaranteed to all.
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO&UNICEF)	This indicator measures the availability of drinking water and handwashing facilities, as well as the use of improved sanitation facilities.
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	This indicator measures the absence of malaria and tuberculosis deaths as well as the extent to which the HIV-positive population receive antiretroviral treatment, and children receive vaccines against measles, diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, and hepatitis B.
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) (IHME)	This indicator measures the years of healthy life lost (DALYs) due to metabolic risks and the death rate due to non-communicable diseases.
Child & Maternal Health (UNDESA/UNICEF&WHO&WB/UN IGME/UN MMEIG)	This indicator measures the prevalence of child mortality and stunting among children under 5 years of age, as well as the annual number of maternal deaths and the proportion of women of reproductive age using modern contraceptive methods.
Health Quality (WHO)	This indicator measures a country's compliance with 3 out of 15 WHO International Health Regulations, namely human resources, health services provision and health emergency management.
Public Perception of Health Provision (AFR)	This indicator assesses the extent to which citizens are satisfied with how the government is doing at improving basic health services and water and sanitation services, and how easy it is to obtain the medical care they need.

EDUCATION

Equality in Education (UNESCO/V-DEM)	This indicator measures the gender parity ratio in primary and lower secondary education and assesses the extent to which high-quality basic education is guaranteed to all citizens.
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	This indicator measures the percentage of students enrolled from pre-primary to tertiary education over the corresponding eligible official school-age population for each level of education.
Education Completion (UNESCO)	This indicator measures the completion rate at primary and secondary education levels.
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	This indicator measures the average number of pupils per qualified teacher at primary level of education and the percentage of teachers in primary education who have received the minimum standard of training required for teaching.
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	This indicator assesses the extent to which there are solid educational institutions and education policy is successful in delivering high-quality education and supports research and development, as well as the extent to which the education system meets the needs of a competitive economy and the number of expected years of learning-adjusted years of schooling.
Public Perception of Education Provision (AFR)	This indicator assesses the extent to which citizens are satisfied with how the government is doing at addressing educational needs and how easy it is to obtain the public school services they need.

SOCIAL PROTECTION & WELFARE

Social Safety (AFIDEP/BS)	This indicator assesses the extent to which social safety nets exist to compensate for social risks of the market economy, including social safety nets for the elderly, those with an illness or health conditions, and the unemployed.
Poverty Reduction Policies (AFIDEP/BS/WB)	This indicator assesses the extent to which socioeconomic factors are not a barrier to participation in society, while also assessing the social protection, labour and welfare policies that guarantee a minimum level of welfare and ensure access to quality health and education services.
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/FFP/WB/WID)	This indicator assesses the extent to which there is equity of public resource use and income equality as well the extent to which there is no structural economic inequality.
Decent Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	This indicator measures the share of the urban population living in slum households, as well as the affordability of the cheapest newly built urban housing constructed by formal developers.
Food Security (FAO)	This indicator measures the prevalence of undernourishment, the adequacy and variability of food supply, and the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity.
Public Perception of Social Protection & Lived Poverty (AFR)	This indicator assesses citizens' food, water, and cooking fuel deprivation, their perception of their present living conditions, and their satisfaction with how the government is doing at improving the living standards of the poor.

SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT

Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	This indicator assesses the extent to which economic policy considers environmental concerns and government environmental policies foster sustainability and pollution management.
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	This indicator assesses the extent to which environmental laws and regulations are enforced effectively.
Air Quality (HEI&IHME)	This indicator measures the ratio of disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) due to pollution both outside and inside the household.
Sustainable Use of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	This indicator measures the extent to which land, soil and forests are used sustainably.
Land & Water Biodiversity Protection (ENACT/WB/Yale&Columbia)	This indicator measures the extent to which terrestrial biomes and marine areas are protected as well as the extent to which flora and fauna are not illegally exploited.

Most IIAG source acronyms follow the organisations' official abbreviations, e.g. FAO or IMF. For some organisations where no official abbreviation exists, e.g. Bertelsmann Stiftung, MIF has developed its own acronyms to identify and annotate indicator and source names in various IIAG datasets and documentation.

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data	UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
AfDB	African Development Bank		
AFIDEP	African Institute for Development Policy	UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
AFR	Afrobarometer		
AUC	African Union Commission	UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
BS	Bertelsmann Stiftung	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Cable	Cable		
CAHF	Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa	UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
CDD-Ghana	Ghana Center for Democratic Development	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Columbia	Center for Integrated Earth System Information, Columbia University	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
DSP	Digital Society Project	UN IGME	United Nations Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimates
ENACT	ENACT Africa		
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	UN MMEIG	United Nations Maternal Mortality Estimation Inter-agency Group
FFP	Fund for Peace	UNU-WIDER	United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research
FH	Freedom House	UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
HEI	Health Effects Institute		
IBP	International Budget Partnership	UPU	Universal Postal Union
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre	V-DEM	Varieties of Democracy Institute
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development	WB	World Bank
IHME	Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation	WEF	World Economic Forum
ILO	International Labour Organization	WHO	World Health Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund	WID	World Inequality Database
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union	WJP	World Justice Project
ITU	International Telecommunication Union	WRI	World Resources Institute
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation	Yale	Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy
ODW	Open Data Watch		
OEC	Observatory for Economic Complexity		
PTS	Political Terror Scale		
RSF	Reporters sans frontières		
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program		

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