Global Africa

Africa in the world and the world in Africa
“The world is changing around us. All of the previous assumptions, and let us face it, the previous order, are being broken. Challenges such as climate change or COVID-19 know of no borders and call for shared solutions, there are different powers rising and ever-evolving geo-strategic balances. So where exactly is Africa’s place here, with its ever-growing youth, key natural resources, diverse geography and history? Time is gone to underestimate Africa, talk down to Africa or give instructions to Africa. Do not take Africa for granted.”

Mo Ibrahim, Founder and Chair of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF)
Since its inception in 2006, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF) has been at the forefront of changing perceptions about the African continent. The 2023 Forum Report “Global Africa” does just that, mapping Africa’s huge potential and assets in today’s world and shedding a light on the ever-expanding variety of partners that are engaged on the continent. The report also assesses Africa’s representativeness in the current multilateral architecture, which is still beyond inadequate – a central point in the 2023 Ibrahim Governance Weekend (IGW) high-level discussions, which took place in Nairobi (28-30 April). This was our first ever in-person event since COVID-19 hit the continent, and it was truly a unique convening of the greatest African minds to chart together the path to our continent’s bright future.

The world is changing around us. All of the previous assumptions, and let us face it, the previous order, are being broken. Challenges such as climate change or COVID-19 know of no borders and call for shared solutions, there are different powers rising and ever-evolving geo-strategic balances. So where exactly is Africa’s place here, with its ever-growing youth, key natural resources, diverse geography and history? Time is gone to underestimate Africa, talk down to Africa or give instructions to Africa. Do not take Africa for granted. It is great news that momentum is now building behind the case for a reform of the multilateral financial system. In particular, there is the issue of a permanent G20 seat for the African Union (AU), which I have been personally advocating for years in various forums, including with an article for the centennial edition of Foreign Affairs magazine. The G20’s fundamental virtue is its ability to be representative: broader than the G7, but still small enough to fit around one table. It comprises twenty governments – 19 major states plus the European Union (EU) – defined by their “systemic importance to the global economy”. Quite what “systemic” means is open to interpretation. That ambiguity helps to explain why Africa, home to almost one in five people in the world (and rising), is unfairly represented in just one of the G20 seats: that of South Africa. By comparison, Europe, home to under one in ten people globally, holds five seats: Germany, France, the UK, Italy, and the EU.

Proposed last year by President Macky Sall, who was AU Chairperson at the time, the idea of an AU seat at the G20 has now been endorsed by the French, US and German governments, as well as those of other key economies such as Brazil, China and Indonesia. The G7 summit in May 2023 was a historical development, as for the first time the AU was invited as an observer. The G7 conclusions also echoed the general sentiment for a reinforced representation of Africa in international forums. But words still need to translate into action. Knowing this, in June India also threw its support behind the AU with a letter sent by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to all G20 leaders proposing full, permanent membership for the AU at the upcoming summit hosted by India.

More recently, at the Paris Summit for a New Global Financing Pact (22-23 June 2023) it was great to witness African heads of state and government speaking with one common and assertive voice, advocating for a more equal multilateral system – with the backing of, among others, President Macron and the UN Secretary-General António Guterres. I also welcome that the European Council stated its backing on 30 June 2023 – supporting the AU consensus on how it should represent itself on the G20 should be common sense for an organisation like the EU, whose only close international counterpart is the AU itself.

Now the question is whether an agreement can emerge in time for the G20 summit taking place in New Delhi on 9-10 September to go down in history as the first G21 summit, with the AU as a full, permanent member. The clock is ticking.
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Key takeaways from the 2023 Ibrahim Forum

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Chapter 01.
Key takeaways from the 2023 Ibrahim Forum
The first session will focus on Africa’s weight in the world, highlighting the continent’s assets and potential, without downplaying challenges to overcome.

**Moderator:** Natasha Kimani, Africa No Filter, MIF Now Generation Network  
**Panellists:**  
Donald Kaberuka, Managing Partner at Southbridge Group, former President of the African Development Bank (AfDB)  
H.E. Ibrahim A. Mayaki, AU Special Envoy for Food Systems, former Prime Minister of Niger, former CEO of AUDA-NEPAD  
H.E. Yemi Osinbajo*, Vice-President of Nigeria  
Hafou Touré, Technical Advisor, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Promotion of SMEs of Côte d’Ivoire, MIF Now Generation Network

The second session will focus on the multiplicity of state actors engaging with the continent, their main areas of interest and various modes of engagement.

**Moderator:** Jendayi Frazer, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, MIF Board member  
**Panellists:**  
Koen Doens, Director-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) at the European Commission  
Comfort Ero, President and CEO of the International Crisis Group  
Jin-Yong Cai, former CEO of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), MIF Board member  
Andrew Mitchell, UK Minister of State for Development and Africa  
Amr Moussa, Chair of Interpeace, former Secretary General of the Arab League

The third session will focus on the multiplicity of non-state actors engaging with the continent, their main areas of interest and various modes of engagement.

**Moderator:** Mo Ibrahim, Founder and Chair of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation  
**Panellists:**  
Zein Abdalla, Chair of the Mastercard Foundation  
William Asiko, Managing Director of the Africa Region Office at the Rockefeller Foundation  
Gayle Smith, CEO of ONE Campaign  
Alexander Soros, Chair of the Board of the Open Society Foundations  
Mark Suzman, CEO of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation

*As of 29 May 2023, H.E. Yemi Osinbajo is not Vice-President of Nigeria.*
The fourth session will focus on Africa’s place within the global governance architecture and the need and ways towards amending the current model.

**Moderator:** Vera Songwe, Chairperson of the Liquidity and Sustainability Facility, former Executive Secretary of UNECA

**Panellists:**
- Masood Ahmed, President of the Center for Global Development
- Bertrand Badré, Managing Partner and Founder of Blue like an Orange Sustainable Capital, former CFO of the World Bank Group
- Amadou Hott, Special Envoy of the President of the AfDB for the Alliance of Green Infrastructure in Africa, former Finance Minister of Senegal
- Mark Malloch-Brown, President of the Open Society Foundations, former Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations
- Michael Mbate, Strategic Research Analyst at the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa, MIF Now Generation Network

**16:30-17:30 | Mo in conversation with... H.E. William Ruto, President of Kenya**

**17:30 | Closing remarks**
**TAKEAWAY 1:**
“Africa”: get the narrative right

- Move away from the mainstream narrative that depicts Africa as a basket case to be sorted out, and highlight the continent’s assets and potential.
- Current crises, from climate change to pandemics, terrorism and wars, are global and shared. They call for global solutions. Africa can be part of the solutions.
- Move away from a simplistic narrative: Africa is a diverse continent, host to diverse countries, geographies and histories.

> The idea that for every problem in the world, Africa is the automatic victim is almost an assumed truth.  
*Donald Kaberuka, Managing Partner at Southbridge Group, former President of the African Development Bank (AfDB)*

> Behind every narrative, there is a strategy. So we need to unpack and decode that strategy.  
*H.E. Ibrahim A. Mayaki, AU Special Envoy for Food Systems, former Prime Minister of Niger, former CEO of AUDA-NEPAD*

> We are here to tell a different story... If the news were to be believed, the only thing that comes from Africa is poverty, corruption, and war. But data tell us different.  
*Natasha Kimani, Africa No Filter, MIF Now Generation Network*

> We should start from the premise of placing a different vision before our young people. Get them to see a narrative of Africa that is positive, give them a sense that there is a future that is directed at progress, that takes into account the realities of today.  
*H.E. Yemi Osinbajo*, Vice-President of Nigeria
I don’t think we should always discuss Africa as simply a source of raw materials... I would like us to change the narrative to Africa as an opportunity for the rest of the world to grow their economies.
Donald Kaberuka, Managing Partner at Southbridge Group, former President of the African Development Bank (AfDB)

If the world is going to solve the existential threats it is facing, Africa has to be part of the solution.
Zein Abdalla, Chair of the Mastercard Foundation

It has been shown very convincingly... you can’t do the green transition without Africa.
Koen Doens, Director-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) at the European Commission

We are telling the globe that we have ideas on how to sort out this problem (climate change) and we want Africa to be part of the answer. We are not going to accept to continue to be labelled as victims.
H.E. William Ruto, President of Kenya

How do we improve the narrative for the African citizen, so that we are not just trying to look good to Europe and to China and to Russia... but we look good to the common man and woman in the African context.
2023 IGW Audience

TAKEAWAY 2: “Partnership”: give it its full meaning

- Partnership is not about “help” or “care”: it must be a relationship of equals based on shared interests and win-win deals.
- Partnership cannot be limited to “friend or foe”: Africa cannot be a battleground in the “new cold war”. Multiple, diverse coalitions are needed to address the issues at hand.
- Partnership goes further than state-to-state relationships and must engage the private sector, CSOs and NGOs and youth.
- Partnership calls for accountability: monitoring the implementation of commitments and use of resources and delivery of results is key.

Help isn’t the right word. I think interest is the right word... identify mutual interests.
Jendayi Frazer, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, MIF Board member

Europe has the opportunity to build a real partnership with Africa, both around human resources, natural resources and shared markets, rather than continuing with this sort of hand-to-mouth philanthropy.
Mark Malloch-Brown, President of the Open Society Foundations, former Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations

*As of 29 May 2023, H.E. Yemi Osinbajo is not Vice-President of Nigeria.
Most of the partnerships coming from abroad have insisted on and worked for preserving their own interests... therefore Africa did not benefit to the extent that a balanced relationship would have given us the chance to.

Amr Moussa, Chair of Interpeace, former Secretary General of the Arab League

In many issues in the world, we are treated as junior partners. There is a meeting in Brussels, a meeting in Washington, a meeting somewhere about Africa. Have you ever seen a meeting in Africa about India?

Donald Kaberuka, Managing Partner at Southbridge Group, former President of the African Development Bank (AfDB)

The Chinese believe in non-interference because they do not believe they know better than Africans how they will solve their problems.

Jin-Yong Cai, former CEO of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), MIF Board member

States compete let’s just say it. There is competition whether we like it or not...The nature of that competition is what we have to deal with.

Comfort Ero, President and CEO of the International Crisis Group

We have to discuss the repercussions of the emerging Cold War between the West and Russia, and between America and China, the repercussions of which will come to Africa. We have to avoid being the field of this battle.

Amr Moussa, Chair of Interpeace, former Secretary General of the Arab League
There was a debate about is Africa going to choose the United States, the West, the EU, China, Russia? And someone said: Africa is choosing Africa. Gayle Smith, CEO of ONE Campaign

Government is always going to be the principal driver and should be. The private sector is a key innovator, civil society are powerful voices; philanthropy needs to be a catalyst, it needs to be an innovator, it needs to be a risk taker.

Mark Suzman, CEO of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation

African governments can do a lot more to coordinate the activities of non-state actors and to coordinate the resources to work much more efficiently in terms of what the government actually wants.

William Asiko, Managing Director of the Africa Region Office at the Rockefeller Foundation

You cannot simply blame colonial powers that lived 70 years ago for the wounds we inflict on ourselves today... The most important thing is what we have done with the independence we got.

Donald Kaberuka, Managing Partner at Southbridge Group, former President of the African Development Bank (AfDB)

Accountability in the past has been forced down government’s throats through both an austerity model but also a model which grew up in the era of colonialism. We now have to move into a new era, moving the system from a colonial to a cooperative system.

Mark Malloch-Brown, President of the Open Society Foundations, former Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations

Why is it taking so many years for people to meet the pledges they made for climate justice and climate change?

Joyce Banda, Former President of Malawi
External engagement with Africa is becoming an increasingly complex and competitive space. Historically, intense diplomatic and economic competition in Africa is not novel. It is also evident that such competition has not benefited Africa. Will today’s competition be different?

First, the Berlin Conference of 1884 grew out of the intense competition between European countries for territory and resources in Africa. Africa’s colonisation and subjection to the full political and economic control of Europe (except Ethiopia and Liberia) left an enduring legacy of fragmentation with colonial borders adopted as state boundaries and economies oriented to raw material exporting. Africa’s fragmentation into 54 countries, each with their own national and regional interests makes forging an African consensus to shape external actor engagement difficult despite the presence and efforts of the African Union (AU) and its security council. There is not one monolithic view in the regions nor across the continent of what should happen in Africa.

The AU and the regional economic communities must be able to craft enforceable policies and outcomes in order to better advance the continent’s development and climate agendas, and resolve African conflicts. African states will have to transfer more of their sovereign authority and national resources to the continental and regional institutions to achieve greater equity and accountability with external partners in the changing international system. Africa must prepare for an emerging cold war between China and the United States. The AU’s Peace and Security Council can be positioned to wield influence on how this plays out in Africa if given the authority by member states.

Second, the end of WWII and establishment of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary System) set the diplomatic arena and economic order of today’s global system. Still colonised, Africa had no say in the establishment of the institutions, but largely accepts many of the system’s principles, though increasingly not the power distribution governing the institutions. The transformation of this system is most at stake in the new competition. China seeks to shape an international environment favorable to its rise as a global power and purports to represent the global south in a multi-polar world. The United States seeks to perpetuate the western liberal order in which it has acted as the hegemonic guarantor and purports it is a multilateral rules-based system.

African countries can tactically play in this great power strategic competition, but this will not fulfill Africa’s desire to better leverage global institutions to achieve its sustainable socio-economic development goals set out in the AU’s Agenda 2063. To become a dominant power in the global arena, African countries must accelerate regional economic integration under the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) to boost their economic power. The AfCFTA, when fully executed, will be the world’s largest market, and this will be key to develop African economies. Still, this will not fundamentally change the balance of governing power in global institutions.

To become a more dominant actor globally, the real work is in Africa

Jendayi Frazer, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, MIF Board member
The AU gaining a seat at the G20, and the Biden administration opening the door to more African members on the United Nations Security Council, are important steps. African leaders are increasingly delivering common messages at the many summits they attend globally. More importantly, coalitions of key leaders have driven AU reforms and initiatives to build institutional capability and bargaining power, including Macky Sall, Paul Kagame, Cyril Ramaphosa, Uhuru Kenyatta, and his successor William Ruto. Turning aspirations to outcomes requires the continued (and accelerated) hard work by African leaders and citizens to achieve the Pan African vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa. This singularly will raise Africa’s standing and power to shape how external actors engage Africa, and how the international system is re-ordered.

Third, newly independent African countries were heavily courted by the United States, Soviet Union, and Communist China in an ideologically-driven competition between democracy and communism that devolved into proxy wars between the US and USSR outside Europe. The push to expand their spheres of influence especially in Congo, Angola and the Horn of Africa helped fuel insurrections and civil wars with money and arms flowing to the governments, rebels, and liberation movements. In Congo, the combination of civil unrest and insurrection with significant deposits of uranium, sought by the US and USSR for their nuclear arsenals, proved a particularly toxic mix and is instructive today with the race for Africa’s mineral wealth. Countries in conflict with significant natural resources are most susceptible to repeat the negative consequences of the Cold War in Africa—witness Sudan, DR Congo, and Central African Republic today.

Good or even just better governance is a bulwark in managing external competition for the benefit of Africa. Africa can capitalise on more external states wanting to trade and invest with African countries. A true “competition” can create space to drive more favorable terms for Africa; however, while China has rapidly expanded its economic footprint in Africa through the Belt and Road Initiative, Europe and the United States have not followed suit. Western interest is now more intense with the recognition that Africa’s natural resources are vital for a global green transition. Transforming Africa’s commodity-led export model, and strengthening economic governance are critical to grow beyond the region’s 3% of global GDP which perpetuates its weak global negotiating power. The extractive sector is also a source of major corruption and illicit money that is lost for Africa’s development.

In conclusion, today’s engagement with external state actors is framed in partnership terms; however, asymmetric power continues to characterise the bilateral relationships as well as Africa’s position in international organisations, despite the weight of its numbers. Numerous summits and converging narratives will not change the unbalanced relations. To become a more dominant actor globally, the real work is in Africa: the continental institutions must have teeth; market integration must accelerate so intra-African trade drives GDP growth; and good political and economic governance must ensure external state competition is beneficial for Africa.
In February 2022, an important summit between Africa and Europe took place, igniting a renewed sense of purpose and collaboration between the two continents. As we reflect on the progress made in the Africa-Europe relationship since that gathering, there is no doubt that the Brussels summit was meant to mark a turning point in our collective efforts to forge a stronger and more meaningful partnership.

At the heart of this new chapter lies a renewed sense of our interconnectedness. Africa and Europe have acknowledged that our destinies are intertwined, and by working together, we can overcome shared challenges and create opportunities for mutual prosperity.

While progress has undoubtedly been made, over the years and sometimes under the radar, we must acknowledge that challenges lie ahead. It is essential to maintain the momentum generated by the summit, all the more so in a context of international tensions due to geopolitical turbulence and ensure that the commitments made do translate into tangible actions. The road to a stronger Africa-Europe relationship will require sustained efforts, open and sincere dialogue, a solid and reliable evaluation system, and a willingness to overcome hindrances to a truly common future.

Furthermore, the success of this partnership will depend on inclusivity and equity. It is crucial to engage diverse voices, beyond symbolic gestures, including civil society, the private sector, and youth, to ensure that decisions are inclusive, transparent, and representative of the interests and aspirations of all stakeholders. We must equally be ready to drop some of the classic multilateral methods of work and favour results over routine.

The Africa-Europe relationship has the potential to shape the global landscape, if we truly work together, to foster stability and shared prosperity. By strengthening economic ties, investing in human development, and addressing environmental challenges together, Africa and Europe can contribute to a model for international cooperation that transcends borders and paves the way for a more equitable and sustainable world.
I was most grateful for the opportunity to speak in the forum panel on ‘The World in Africa: a growing competition - state actors’. I pointed to the new vision for UK international development work, which I announced on 27 April, to reduce poverty, tackle climate change and reinvigorate progress towards the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). We will develop long-term diverse partnerships to advance development progress and deliver widely-spread prosperity.

Across the African continent UK-funded humanitarian programmes are saving lives. Next year, the UK will spend £1 billion on humanitarian relief globally, including in ways that build future resilience to climate impacts.

The UK is committed to stronger economic partnerships facilitating high-quality investment in Africa. Next April, the British Prime Minister will host the UK-African Investment Summit in London, bringing together UK and African political and business leaders to promote two-way trade and investment creating jobs and growth. Under the UK’s G7 presidency, British International Investment, the UK’s Development Finance Institution, pledged to work with other G7 Development Finance Institutions and multilateral partners to collectively invest at least $80 billion in the African private sector by 2027.

Through our new International Women and Girls Strategy, the UK stands up for women’s and girls’ rights, freedom and potential. This includes preventing sexual violence and helping ensure women can decide when and where to have children through the WISH programme.

Finally, we are determined to put a stop to illicit financial flows. We and our partners know that billions are siphoned out of developing countries each year, often through anonymous shell companies, which criminals and kleptocrats hide behind. We have been playing our part to address this in the UK by introducing open registers of beneficial ownership and we will provide support to strengthen registers of beneficial ownership in Africa.
TAKEAWAY 3: "Multilateralism": the best way to defend its value is to reform its system

- The multilateral system needs modernising: decision making is still based on the post-war era power balances. It needs democratising if it intends to reflect the world today.
- A reformed multilateral system must be responsive to everyone’s needs – financial resources for African countries to address their development needs are not there.
- The global financial architecture must stop penalising Africa with inadequate risk assessments and burdensome interest rates. African countries need finance on fairer terms.
- Global financial mechanisms need to be able to respond to climate disasters and pandemics quickly.

“Societies have become so unequal, so unable to deliver economic security to the families and jobs to the young men and women [coming into the job market], that unless you address that broken social and economic platform you simply do not have the bed on which democracy and human rights can securely and safely grow."

Mark Malloch-Brown, President of the Open Society Foundations,
former Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations

In the end everybody has to wake up to the fact that... the era of globalisation... of markets determining the allocation of wealth around the world, is over.

Mark Malloch-Brown, President of the Open Society Foundations,
former Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations
The current international financial architecture is, to put it bluntly, rigged against those of us in the Global South, because we cannot meaningfully address our development needs using the financial resources from this architecture.

H.E. William Ruto, President of Kenya

Africa gets only one percent of climate investment and the cost of a climate bond today in Africa is 20 times more expensive than it is outside the continent.

Vera Songwe, Chairperson of the Liquidity and Sustainability Facility, former Executive Secretary of UNECA

What the world now has got to do is to come together and have a proper way of handling the debt crisis... the world can save a Californian Bank in three days, but it takes more than two years for Zambia to get a creditor settlement.

Andrew Mitchell, UK Minister of State for Development and Africa

It is very clear that in today’s multipolar world, Africa is shaping up as a pole of that multipolar world.

Koen Doens, Director-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) at the European Commission

**TAKEAWAY 4:**
**Africa’s potential: it still needs to be leveraged**

- Youth: through education and training.
- Natural resources: through development of local value chains.
- Entrepreneurship: through local venture capital and incubating systems.
- Soft power (sport, creative industries, entertainment sector...): through public support, infrastructure and credit.
- African domestic financial resources: through improved taxation capacity, tackling illicit financial flows, and leveraging sovereign wealth and pension funds.

“We’re the largest exporter of cocoa. But when we think about that industry... we’re invited to discussions rather than leading those discussions... and I think the key issue is the fact that we’re not transforming. We’re just exporting raw cocoa.

Hafou Touré, Technical Advisor, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Promotion of SMEs of Côte d’Ivoire, MIF Now Generation Network
This is a time to think through the educational curriculum and to decide how this educational curriculum will be relevant... and create the sorts of opportunities and the skills that will be required for the jobs that will be available.

H.E. Yemi Osinbajo, Vice-President of Nigeria

We need to make sure that our education systems provide the skills and learning outcomes we need for the future.

Donald Kaberuka, Managing Partner at Southbridge Group, former President of the African Development Bank (AfDB)

I think there is this new narrative that young Africans need to be entrepreneurs, and I see that there are pros and cons to that... [but] the enabling environment is just not there.

Hafou Touré, Technical Advisor, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Promotion of SMEs of Côte d’Ivoire, MIF Now Generation Network

There are so many talents that are coming into... the entertainment space, and they need all the support that they can get.

H.E. Yemi Osinbajo, Vice-President of Nigeria

We don’t seem to be taking the creative economy seriously as a game changer, to enabling and being a leverage to ensure that we have socio-economic development.

Natasha Kimani, Africa No Filter, MIF Now Generation Network

Why do our resources remain so under-priced?

2023 IGW Audience
The continent urgently needs access to concessional liquidity

Amadou Hott, Special Envoy of the President of the AfDB for the Alliance of Green Infrastructure in Africa, former Finance Minister of Senegal

This year, the IGW was held in a particular context where the continent is facing many crises. On top of security issues and conflicts, climate change is posing an unprecedented risk to the continent’s future, with its impacts already visible on the ground. The war in Ukraine, combined with the lingering effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, triggered a global inflation and an increase in the interest rates across the globe. Unsustainable debt as well as inflationary and exchange rates pressures are limiting the fiscal space available to African governments to frontload needed investments in many areas. The continent urgently needs access to concessional liquidity.

Rich countries have demonstrated in recent crises their ability to move fast and to mobilize and deploy trillions of dollars in a record time. Africa still does not have any monetary tools to generate liquidity on its own. Due to current IMF quotas rules, the continent received a little portion of the SDRs issued during the Covid-19 pandemic when in fact, it needed them the most.

A quick win to generate liquidity for the continent is that G20 countries deliver on their promise to reallocate USD 100 billion of their SDRs to Africa. The promised reallocation of SDRs from the richest to the poorest countries is still not effective almost 2 years following the successful Paris Summit of June 2021. Big pledges have been made but the amount of available SDRs to the IMF is still small compared to the promise. It is also important that the G20 countries, central banks and the IMF approve the rechanneling of SDRs through the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), especially via the African Development Bank (AfDB). The solution proposed by AfDB enables the rechanneling of SDRs through MDBs while meeting their reserve asset status. Thanks to their AAA ratings, MDBs will be able to leverage 3 to 4 times the amount of SDRs they will receive, and to on-lend at affordable costs to both the public and private sector, which will deliver significant impacts.

In the medium to long term, there is a need for more equity in the rating of African countries and in the transposition of these ratings as risk premiums. The difference in risk premiums between African and non-African states with similar credit ratings can reach sometimes more than 650 basis points. The unequal transposition of the ratings in the estimated risk premiums has a huge impact on African economies. Regarding the ratings themselves, the UNDP revealed that the differences noted in the ratings may be due to data limitations and subjectivity differential and that African nations could access an additional USD 31 billion in new financings if credit ratings were based more closely on economic fundamentals and less on subjective assessments. This is almost the amount that African countries received from the SDRs issuance in 2021 (USD 33 billion) and is close to the net ODA to Africa from member countries of the Development Assistance Committee in 2022 (USD 34 billion). It is critical to adjust these credit ratings to increase FDI flows on the continent as better ratings reduce investors’ risk perception. Over the period during 2011 and 2020, Africa’s share in the world FDI inflows was less than 4% and only reached 5.2% in 2021 depriving the continent from the huge private capital it needs to spur its development.
It is rewarding to be contributing to shaping the growing relationship between the EU and Africa. We had an important Summit in Brussels in February 2022 during which we agreed on a shared vision for our future, based on a partnership of equals and mutual respect. Why? Because our futures are linked. Africans and Europeans are not only neighbours, but also part of a global community.

We are modernising our security partnerships. This new model is based on a combination of different measures in direct support of African peace and stability operations. This is what we have done in Mozambique for example, supporting the efforts made by the South African Development Community and Rwanda, in addition to our work with the Mozambican forces through the EU Training Mission. We committed to ensuring predictable funding for the military components of African-led peace operations, for which EUR 600 million has already been set aside from the European Peace Facility.

We must also address the underlying issues, such as socio-economic development and fighting inequalities, especially in remote areas. For this reason, we are transforming our cooperation model to build greater prosperity. By increasing investments in key sectors based on the African Agenda 2063, notably infrastructure, and through crowding-in private sector. We already have a good number of Team Europe Initiatives underway, focusing for example on energy, transport, like the Strategic corridors, but also on health, bolstering African vaccine production in Senegal, Ghana, South Africa and Rwanda.

The new global realities have to be accounted for, such as the climate crisis, the digital divide and food/water insecurity, which have been exacerbated by Russia’s war against Ukraine. We have stepped up our financial contribution to support the resilience of African health systems. Moreover, the European Investment Bank and EU Member States form the world’s biggest contributor of climate finance.

But we know more has to be done. We have a major opportunity to improve our multilateral system, underpinned by a new financing pact to help the most vulnerable. We need more fairness. As Ellen Johnson Sirleaf put it: “Africans and Europeans must unite, in projects, and in voices.”
TAKEAWAY 5:
"Africa’s voice": it still needs to be articulated in a united and coherent way

- Positions must be articulated: pan-African summits and meetings prior to global events such as COP will allow African governments to establish clear positions based on common priorities.
- Institutional reform is necessary to empower the African Union.
- Economic integration is key to foster political union.

“They say it is the wearer who knows where the shoe pinches, so it is our responsibility to engineer the debate that will put on the table our perspective, our point of view on what kind of global financial architecture that will work not just for us but everybody.

H.E. William Ruto, President of Kenya

When you talk to Europeans, they will say there is no African voice.

Vera Songwe, Chairperson of the Liquidity and Sustainability Facility, former Executive Secretary of UNECA

Let us ensure that we harmonise our policies, and then our voices in the world will be amplified. That voice, we must work for it. We must earn it, by keeping our continent stable, peaceful, integrated.

Donald Kaberuka, Managing Partner at Southbridge Group, former President of the African Development Bank (AfDB)

Integration is never easy. Talk to Europeans. They are still working on it.

Donald Kaberuka, Managing Partner at Southbridge Group, former President of the African Development Bank (AfDB)
We know that we have to act in a manner that makes sure that we secure our interests, because the whole discussion is about interests. What are our interests? How do we protect them? Because everybody protects theirs.

H.E. William Ruto, President of Kenya

The idea that we’re going to wave a magic wand and everybody’s going to line up behind the AU and that the AU itself is going to be a unified body, is false.

Jendayi Frazer, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, MIF Board member

We must take care of our security. 60 years after the formation of the AU, we cannot continue to depend on Europe, the EU, the US, China... to manage our affairs.

H.E. William Ruto, President of Kenya
We have the wrong architecture in the management of the African Union... the Chair of the AU Commission can do very little because we have retained all the powers as Heads of State, and yet you cannot run one country and run the continent of Africa... We seriously need an interrogation of the management of the African Union.

H.E. William Ruto, President of Kenya

It is not intelligent for 54 of us to go and sit before one gentleman from another place... sometimes we are mistreated... we are loaded into buses like school kids... Going forward, if there is going to be a discussion between Africa and any other country, we are going to be represented by the Chair... the outgoing Chair... the Bureau... or the chairs of the RECs.

H.E. William Ruto, President of Kenya

We are having the Climate Action Summit because we want to go to COP 28 with an African consolidated position, speaking with one voice, the whole lot of us, so that people can know we know what we want. And we will not back down.

H.E. William Ruto, President of Kenya

While there need to be reforms at the global level... African countries themselves have a critical and large role to play... let us try to come up with home-grown solutions to some of these challenges. Let us use the international sphere as a complement to what we are doing and not a substitute.

Michael Mbate, Strategic Research Analyst at the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa, MIF Now Generation Network
A Common African Position: global financial architecture reform

Hanan Morsy, Deputy Executive Secretary and Chief Economist at UNECA

The COVID-19 pandemic, the cost-of-living crisis fuelled by the war in Ukraine, the tightening of global financial conditions... Since the beginning of the new decade, Africa has been hit by a series of shocks that has stalled progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), threatening to lead to a lost decade for the continent, rather than one of action.

62 million Africans were pushed into poverty in just one year after the COVID-19 outbreak, with an additional 18 million estimated to have joined their ranks by the end of 2022. Economies have been hit hard and many African countries are burdened with elevated levels of debt and insufficient fiscal space to make essential investments in critical infrastructure projects, education, and healthcare.

To respond to those challenges, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) created the Africa High-level Working Group on Global Financial Architecture (the Group) at the beginning of 2022. This group consists of African Ministers of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development, the African Union (AU), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), the World Bank Group (WBG), and includes the participation of staff and Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

This Group serves as a forum to develop reform proposals for the global financial architecture as well as to unify the African voice on the global stage. Many of the Group’s proposals have been echoed in a resolution passed by African Ministers at UNECA’s Conference of Ministers in Addis Ababa in March 2023. Those proposals were also presented during the Africa Consultative Group meeting with the IMF Managing Director in Washington DC during the 2023 Spring Meetings of the WBG and the IMF. At the heart of those proposals are three key asks, centring on unlocking liquidity, reforming the global debt architecture, and enhancing representation for African countries in global financial institutions.

Firstly, African countries urgently require more liquidity at affordable rates. Urgent action is needed from the international community to step up funding pledges.

There is a shortfall in resources for both the IMF’s and the World Bank’s concessional lending windows — the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) in the case of the IMF and the International Development Association (IDA) in the case of the World Bank Group. In the case of the PRGT, a partial sale of the IMF’s gold reserves is to be considered in the medium term. To enhance the availability of resources, the Group further asks for the rechannelling of IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) — a reserve asset designed in the 1960s to support countries with liquidity challenges — to Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). The Group endorses the corresponding proposal developed by the AfDB and the Inter-American Development Bank which would enable the AfDB to increase its lending
capacity by up to four times the number of rechannelled SDRs. More generally, there is a need for SDRs allocation decisions to be made in a more rule-based analytical manner to reduce the discretionary and political nature of the allocation process. To ensure that SDRs are directed to countries that require them most, the Group advocates for the SDRs allocation formula, which is currently largely based on a country’s economic size and financial position, to also consider countries’ liquidity needs.

Secondly, the Group has highlighted the shortcomings in the global debt architecture and the need for countries in debt distress to have access to a functional debt resolution mechanism.

The Common Framework for Debt Treatments (the Common Framework), created by the G20 in November 2020 to provide a process for debt restructurings, must be overhauled to become more effective, time-bound, and transparent. The initial decisions reached by the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, co-chaired by the IMF, the WBG and India (G20 Presidency) to work on the current shortcomings in debt restructuring processes, are promising but much faster progress is necessary in the coming months. It is important to secure agreements to provide debt service standstill to applicants and extend eligibility to middle-income countries. The Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable’s upcoming workshop will hopefully establish a clear comparability of treatment formula, which would minimise technical disputes in the future. It is also important to make bolder use of the IMF Lending into Arrears Policy (LIA), a policy that can be applied when lending to a country in default on obligations to its commercial creditors and official bilateral creditors, to reduce the leverage of holdout creditors and to provide debtor countries in distress with a line of financing to conduct necessary social expenditures.

Thirdly, the Group has emphasised the vital importance of amplifying the voice of African countries.

At the IMF, the entire African continent - with a population of over 1.4 billion - has a comparable quota share and thereby voting power to Germany - which has a population of 83 million. To address these imbalances, the quota formula needs to be reformed, by creating a new category that considers a country’s vulnerability and not be solely based on members’ relative economic size and financial position. Furthermore, the Group strongly advocates for the African Union to finally obtain a permanent seat in the G20. This would further strengthen Africa’s position on the global stage and allow the continent to fully participate in discussions on G20 initiatives such as the Common Framework.

The Africa High-level Working Group on the Global Financial Architecture’s proposals shows that viable solutions exist to allow the continent to reach its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). African Ministers know what they want and are collectively advocating for change. To pave the way for a prosperous and sustainable future for all, the international community needs to listen and act now.
At a time of major international geopolitical challenges and changes, Africa should not wait to be affected by the expected repercussions. Africa should insist on and work for playing a principal role through the African Union (AU) in the drawing of the future map of the 21st century multilateralism.

International peace and security and the threats related to them require new definitions. Poverty should be underlined as a major threat to international peace, security and stability. In this, Africa should be speaking and lobbying on behalf of the entire Global South. It is to be noted the UN Secretary General has opined that pandemics and climate change should be defined as threats to international peace and security. Poverty is no less important.

I suggest that these issues be on high on the global agenda.
Specific takeaways on the reform of the multilateral financial system

There is a momentum to try and deal with the reform of the multilateral development banks, the World Bank, regional banks. Something will be done over the next 12 months. Once it’s done, there’ll be nothing done for five more years. These things come in cycles.

Masood Ahmed, President of the Center for Global Development

From the beginning, the current international financial architecture is, to put it bluntly, rigged against those of us in the global South. When you need real development resources, you have to go to the global financial market because you want to run your own development the way you know how, and you end up with 10%, 12%, 15% rates. And it becomes impossible to finance any meaningful development.

H.E. William Ruto, President of Kenya

There are such imbalances in the system that it is very difficult for Africa to emerge.

Vera Songwe, Chairperson of the Liquidity and Sustainability Facility, former Executive Secretary of UNECA

Get the IMF to truly respond, not just to the needs now, but to the projection of needs that we see for the next five years. First thing would be to raise its own financing, at least back to its 2020 levels.

Masood Ahmed, President of the Center for Global Development

Get the IMF to take some more risk on its own balance sheet and start lending money at three, four per cent, which would be a better solution than forcing countries to go to the market and borrow at terms that are simply not going to be sustainable.

Masood Ahmed, President of the Center for Global Development

Private sector money will not come... if we don’t change things profoundly. Basel III, Solvency II... There are a number of rules everywhere that block the system. Unless you touch on this, you will not move the needle.

Bertrand Badré, Managing Partner and Founder of Blue like an Orange Sustainable Capital, former CFO of the World Bank Group

Increasing drastically domestic resource mobilisation is key. The more we have domestic resources, the better we are, number one.

Amadou Hott, Special Envoy of the President of the AfDB for the Alliance of Green Infrastructure in Africa, former Finance Minister of Senegal

The one thing we must not do is allow poverty and climate to become competing objectives.

Mark Malloch-Brown, President of the Open Society Foundations, former Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations

Propose de-risking at scale.

Bertrand Badré, Managing Partner and Founder of Blue like an Orange Sustainable Capital, former CFO of the World Bank Group

Hold people accountable for their commitments.

2023 IGW Audience
Chapter 02. Africa in the world: vast potential and key assets, with hurdles to overcome
AFRICA’S DEMOGRAPHY: A KEY ASSET TO LEVERAGE

The world’s population is heading towards an African majority

Africa already represents almost 20% of the world’s population

- In 2023, Africa is the second most populous world region, making up almost 20% of the world’s population with 1.4 billion people.
- It currently sits far behind Asia (4.7 billion).
- Africa’s population is already twice that of Europe’s (743 million).

Africa’s population is already twice that of Europe’s

Africa’s population will be the only one to grow significantly from 2060

While Asia will remain the world’s most populous region in 2100, it will begin to decrease from 2060. North America and Oceania will also continue to grow but Africa’s population is estimated to be the only one to grow significantly.

Global population growth between 2030 and 2100 will be mainly led by Africa.

- Africa’s population will increase by 2.2 billion people (23% more than the growth at a global level).
- North America will increase by 55 million people (only 2.5% of Africa’s growth).
- Oceania will increase by 19 million people (only 0.9% of Africa’s growth).

Across the rest of the world, the population will decrease.

- Asia will decline by 285 million people.
- Europe will decline by 150 million people.
- Latin America and the Caribbean will decline by 50 million people.
Between 2030 and 2100, Africa’s population will increase by 2.2 billion and will be the main driver of global population growth.

Africa is set to make up over one third of the world’s population by 2100 (37.9%), a sharp increase from 2023 (18.0%). Meanwhile, Europe’s share will decrease from 9.3% to 5.7% and North America’s from 4.7% to 4.3%.

**World regions: total share of world population (2023 & 2100)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World region</th>
<th>2023</th>
<th>2100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: MIF based on UNDESA

**Africa is already by far the youngest continent**

**By 2100, Africa’s youth will represent almost half of the world’s youth**

At 18.8, Africa’s median age is by far the youngest in the world, 12.2 years younger than Latin America and the Caribbean, the region with the second lowest median age.

This will remain the case in 2100, when Africa’s median age is set to reach 35 years, against 44-50 in other world regions.

Currently Africa is the region with the second largest share of youth in the world (20.3%), surpassed only by Asia (59.4%).
World regions: median age (2023 & 2100)

Africa
Europe
Latin America and the Caribbean
North America
Asia
Oceania
World

Age (years)
Source: MIF based on UNDESA

World region

Africa
Europe
Latin America and the Caribbean
North America
Asia
Oceania
World

2023
2100

Africa’s share of the global youth population will more than double from 20% in 2023 to 45% in 2100

By 2085, Africa’s youth will overtake Asia’s as the world’s largest
Africa’s youth: tomorrow’s potential global workforce

Africa currently accounts for over 15% of the global workforce, far behind Asia (60.8%). But with over 20% of the world’s youth population, Africa’s share of the global workforce is only going to increase.

By 2050 Africa will account for one quarter of the global labour force and over 40% by 2100

Africa: share of global working age population (2023-2100)

A window of opportunity: Africa’s declining dependency ratio

Africa’s dependency ratio has been declining steadily in recent years.

In 2020, Africa had the highest total dependency ratio, with 88% of the burden coming from children. In Europe, the dependency ratio is largely due to older people.

By 2055 Europe will have the largest dependency ratio, with 78.2 dependants per 100 working age people.

Meanwhile, Africa will potentially have the lightest dependency ratio, with 58.9 dependants per 100 working age people.

Africa’s share of the global working age population will almost triple between 2023 and 2100

By 2055, Africa could have the lowest dependency ratio globally, amounting to 3/4 of Europe’s
A key hurdle: education and training not keeping up with the task

While Africa has the youngest population in the world, the continent’s level of education and training lies far below the global average.

Globally, Afghanistan has the highest share of youth not in employment, education or training (NEET). At 43.9% Somalia has the largest share of NEET youth in Africa. Angola and Madagascar are the only African countries whose share of NEET youth stands below 10%.

As a percentage of GDP between 2011 and 2020, the gap between the highest and lowest spending African countries on education has shrunk by barely 1%.

Africa has the lowest education spending per capita globally, meaning that investment in education is not matching demographic trends on the continent. Furthermore, along with Latin America and the Caribbean, it is one of only two world regions for which spending per capita has actually decreased over the time period.

26.1% of Africa’s youth is non-employed, non-educated, non-trained (NEET)

Somalia (43.9%) has the highest share of NEET youth in Africa
According to the latest available figures in Africa (2010-2020):

- At primary level, completion rates are 62.5% in sub-Saharan Africa compared to 86.4% in the world.
- At lower secondary level, completion rates are 43.8% in sub-Saharan Africa compared to 75.9% in the world.
- At upper secondary level, completion rates are 26.3% in sub-Saharan Africa compared to 56.8% in the world.

43.2% of the world’s out-of-school children and youth live in Africa

103.6 million children and youth are out of school in Africa
A challenging skills mismatch

According to the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), countries in sub-Saharan Africa are severely affected by qualifications and skills mismatches, making it hard for employers to find suitable job applicants.

Most countries experience vertical mismatches where workers do not have the necessary level of education to perform the tasks in their chosen careers. In most cases, graduates do not have the skills required by particular professions.

Most countries also suffer from horizontal mismatches, whereby workers’ occupations are unrelated to their fields of study.

Another limitation lies in the fact that specialisation occurs at tertiary education, a level attained by only a minority of students in sub-Saharan Africa where just 5% of adults have a degree.

• At primary level, the average out-of-school rates are 20.5% in sub-Saharan Africa compared to 9.4% globally.
• At lower secondary level, the average out-of-school rates are 34.0% in sub-Saharan Africa compared to 14.4% globally.
• At upper secondary level, out-of-school rates are 47.5% in sub-Saharan Africa compared to 30.9% globally.

According to the latest available data year (2020), the expected years of schooling in Africa are the lowest out of all world regions (8.5 years), far below Oceania (11.4 years), the second lowest region.

Expected years of schooling in Africa are the lowest out of all world regions: (8.5 years), far below Oceania (11.4 years)

1/2 of African youth aged between 18 and 24 are considering emigrating if their governments don’t take action to improve the quality of their lives - according to the 2022 Africa Youth Survey
The urbanisation boom: no other world region urbanising faster than Africa

No part of the planet is urbanising faster than Africa, not even historically

It took Europe 110 years to move from 15% of the population living in urban areas in 1800 to 40% by 1910.

Africa has achieved this in only 60 years (1950-2010) – almost half the time.

World regions: annual average urbanisation rate (2020-2025)

While existing cities are set to grow, a key feature of the urbanisation dynamic in Africa is that many new cities will form

In Africa, there are more than 1,400 intermediary cities which are home to 210 million people.

Africa has 6,740 small urban agglomerations with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants which are home to 180 million.

The number of agglomerations hosting between 10,000 and 100,000 people has grown from 4,770 in 2000 to 6,740 in 2015.
The fastest growing cities in Africa are intermediary cities

In Africa, the fastest growing cities have fewer than 1 million residents. Of the 20 fastest growing cities globally between 2000 – 2020, six of them are in Africa and none of them are megacities.

35 countries have improved in the IIAG Affordable Housing indicator between 2012 and 2021

The main challenge of Africa’s urbanisation: informality and unplanned cities

- 90% of the new urban development in Africa is currently informal.
- Roughly two thirds of the investments in urban infrastructure needed by 2050 have yet to be made.
AFRICA’S ECONOMY: STILL PUNCHING BELOW ITS WEIGHT

Africa currently accounts for less than 3% of global GDP for 18% of the world’s population

Despite accounting for 18% of the global population and 15% of the global workforce, Africa only accounts for 2.8% of the world’s economic activity.

Africa’s total GDP is smaller than that of the UK, Germany or Japan

Selected regions & countries: GDP and population (2023)

North America’s GDP per capita is 28 times larger than Africa’s

At a per capita level, the contrast is even more stark. Africa’s GDP per capita is 28 times smaller than North America’s, over 15 times smaller than Europe’s, and less than one quarter of Asia & the Pacific’s or Latin America & the Caribbean’s.

Africa will become the world’s fastest growing region by 2025

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Africa’s growth rate should outstrip the global rate in each of the next five years, and by 2025 will be the world’s fastest growing region, outstripping Asia.

In 2023, Africa’s growth rate will be more than six times higher than Europe’s and twice as high as North America’s.
Launched in 2021, AfCFTA is the world’s largest potential market

In January 2021, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was launched, creating a potential unified market of over 1.4 billion consumers.

Selected Free Trade Agreements: total population covered (2023)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Africa</th>
<th>Rank Global</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP growth (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Benin</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MIF based on IMF

Africa accounts for 70% of the world’s Mobile Money Market:
The world’s mobile money market reached $1 trillion in 2021, with the value of Africa’s mobile money transactions reaching $701.4 billion.

Africa still has the lowest intra-regional trade of any world region

Egypt is planning to increase its exports within the continent to $15 billion in the coming years

With a potential market of more than 1.4 billion people, the AfCFTA surpasses the EU single market, USMCA and MERCOSUR combined

The AfCFTA is the largest free trade agreement in the world in country terms (54)
Despite the launch of the AfCFTA, intra-continental trade remains the lowest of any world region - constituting less than 13% of Africa’s total trade, in comparison to 66.9% in Europe, 63.8% in Asia, and 44.4% in the Americas.

Intra-continental trade in Africa remains the lowest of any world region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World regions: intra-regional trade (2021)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MIF based on UNCTAD

Key hurdles: transport and energy

Transport: limited road, rail and air intra-continental networks are a key hindrance to trade

Africa faces a major infrastructure deficit, with transport networks that do not reflect its population or landmass.

Without the relevant infrastructure to facilitate movement within the continent, intra-regional trade will continue to be costly and inaccessible, regardless of tariff reductions.

Africa has over one fifth of the world’s land area but less than 8% of the world’s road and rail

Selected countries & regions: global share (latest data year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Road Network</th>
<th>Rail Network</th>
<th>Air Traffic</th>
<th>Surface Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MIF based on CIA World Factbook, UNDESA, UNSD & World Bank

With an equivalent population, but a territory less than 1/3 of Africa’s, China’s road and rail networks are almost twice as long as Africa’s, and China’s air traffic almost 7 times greater
Energy: 600 million in Africa still with no access to electricity

Energy is a pre-requisite for economic development. But just over half (55.9%) of Africa’s population has access to electricity, as opposed to over 90% for the rest of the world.

While 51 African countries have improved in the IIAG Access to Energy indicator between 2012 and 2021, progress for most countries has started from a low base.

Roughly 600 million people in Africa have no access to electricity, more than the combined population of France, Japan, the US and the UK

Over 950 million in Africa lack access to clean cooking fuels. This is all the more worrying as it is also the only region in which the use of unclean fuels is rising.

In 2019, Japan alone consumed more electricity than all of Africa, with a population less than 1/10 of the size
AFRICA’S NATURAL RESOURCES: VITAL FOR A GLOBAL GREEN TRANSITION

Africa is home to key assets for the global green economy

Africa’s mineral wealth

Africa holds 30% of the world’s mineral reserves, many of which are critical to renewable and low-carbon technologies including solar, electric vehicles, battery storage, green hydrogen and geothermal. According to the World Bank, in order to meet the expected rise in global demand, production of minerals and metals such as lithium, graphite and cobalt will need to increase by nearly 500% by 2050. This cannot be achieved without Africa’s resources.

In 2021, four African countries - Botswana, DR Congo, South Africa and Zimbabwe - account for 46% of the global production of industrial diamonds.

African countries: selected low carbon minerals (2020-2021)

Mali (2021): 840,000 tons of lithium resources

Guinea (2021): world’s largest bauxite reserves

Gabon (2021): world’s 2nd largest producer of manganese

DR Congo (2021): >70% of world’s cobalt production

Namibia (2020): world’s 2nd largest exporter of uranium ore

South Africa (2021): 90% of world’s platinum group metal reserves

Who holds the keys to a global green economy?

70% of the world’s cobalt is extracted from the DR Congo. Most of it is exported to China, which produces 70% of the world’s electric batteries.
The Congo Basin rainforest sinks more carbon than any other tropical forest

- Despite being the world’s second largest rainforest after the Amazon, only the Congo Basin has enough standing forest left to remain a strong net carbon sink.
- Net carbon sequestration in the Congo Basin rainforest is more than in the Amazon and Southeast Asia combined.

Forests: carbon sinks or carbon sources?

Green hydrogen: Africa’s potential

Green hydrogen technology has been hailed as a replacement for fossil fuels in hard-to-abate carbon-intensive sectors such as cement, steel, fertilisers, plastics and transport. Africa is expected to be a preferred location for the green hydrogen economy due to its greater land availability, easy access to water sources and port facilities. Many African countries are already seeking to tap into this potential:

- Namibia is aiming to produce 300,000 tonnes of green hydrogen per year by 2026.
- Mauritania signed two large-scale green hydrogen projects in 2022 with 40 gigawatts of capacity, enough to power the whole country for over a month.

Guinea holds the world’s largest reserves of bauxite, which is critical for the production of solar panels

Amazon River Basin
- GT CO₂ emissions: +1.1
- GT CO₂ removals: -1.2
- GT CO₂ net carbon sinking: -0.1

Congo River Basin
- GT CO₂ emissions: +0.5
- GT CO₂ removals: -1.1
- GT CO₂ net carbon sinking: -0.6

Southeast Asia
- GT CO₂ emissions: +1.6
- GT CO₂ removals: -1.1
- GT CO₂ net carbon sinking: +0.5

Source: Harris et al. 2021
Now the world’s primary tropical carbon sink, the Congo Basin forest offsets more than 40% of Africa’s carbon emissions from fossil fuels.

Africa was only responsible for 2.8% of global fossil fuel emissions between 1750 and 2019.

Even with all GHG emissions included, Africa only emits 3.4 tonnes of CO2 equivalent per person per year, roughly 1/2 of the global rate and less than 1/5 of the per capita emissions of the US.

Africa accounts for only 2% of carbon trading globally, most of which occurs in just 5 countries.

Metrics for measuring emissions

Fossil fuel emissions: CO2 emissions from the use of coal, oil and gas (combustion and industrial processes), the process of gas flaring and the manufacture of cement. Emissions originating from fossil fuels benefit from more accurate estimations, with around 8% uncertainty.

GHG emissions excluding land-use change and forestry (LUCF): GHG emissions excluding LUCF covers both fossil-fuel based emissions and emissions from other sources (e.g., methane, nitrous oxide). Emissions from these gases are harder to estimate. CH4 and F-gases have relatively ‘intermediate’ uncertainties of around 30%, while N2O has a higher uncertainty of around 60%.

GHG emissions including LUCF: This includes fossil fuel-based emissions, other GHG emissions and increased emissions/or emissions sunk from changes in land use and forestry. While being more comprehensive than other measures, the land-use change and forestry sector is more difficult than others to compare globally, as the circumstances in tropical countries have little in common with those in industrialised countries. In addition, uncertainty around CO2 emissions from LUCF is high, at 70%.

Most African countries below carbon budget for 1.5 degrees

The carbon budget refers specifically to the CO2 emissions we are able to emit to stay within 1.5 degrees. By 2030, the global annual average of carbon emissions must be limited to 2.3 tonnes per person. The African average currently stands to only 2.0 tonnes per person.

- In as many as 39 African countries, average CO2 emissions are safely within 1.5, while 26 use less than half of their safe carbon budget, even with LUCF included.
- Unlike other regions, many African countries have the space for some increase in emissions without blowing the global carbon budget. Remembering this is crucial to ensuring a just energy transition and maximising the continent’s potential.

The Africa Carbon Markets Initiative (ACMI)

Voluntary carbon markets (VCMs) are increasingly important in the decarbonisation process, particularly for the private sector, with the potential for VCM expansion to deliver on broader development goals by channelling investment to credible carbon mitigation projects with high social and environmental co-benefits.

ACMI was launched at COP27 in November 2022 and aims to build the foundations for a VCM ecosystem in Africa by 2030. The
ACMI’s steering committee announced 13 action programmes intended to produce 1.5 billion carbon credits annually in Africa, unlocking over $120 billion and supporting over 110 million jobs by 2050.

Demand for African-origin carbon credits has been growing at a compound annual rate of 36%, but from a low base and the market is well below its potential level. Out of total credits issued worldwide between 2016 and 2021, only about 11% stem from African countries, and the bulk of these come from a few large projects.

At the 2023 IGW the Africa-Europe Foundation launched a crosscontinental working group on carbon markets. The group’s first meeting provided an overview of the state of the carbon markets in Europe and Africa, noting that carbon markets have the potential to be the next biggest export from the African continent but highlighting that robust governance frameworks and solid measurement, reporting and verification systems were critical to attract private sector investment.

Africa’s agricultural potential is yet to deliver

Africa hosts 65% of the world’s remaining uncultivated arable land. Yet the continent generates only 10% of global agricultural output.

Africa hosts at least one sixth of global plant species, with many food crops of African origin; species of wheat, barley, millet, sorghum, teff, coffee, cowpea and oil palm.

According to the Africa Food Summit (Dakar, January 2023), Africa has the potential to feed 9 billion people in the world by 2050, far more than the current world population.

With the removal of barriers to agricultural development aided by new investments, Africa’s agricultural output could increase from $280 billion per year to $1 trillion by 2030.

However, Africa still has the highest prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the world (57.9%), with numbers currently soaring. 42 African countries are net food importers.

Africa hosts 65% of the world’s remaining uncultivated arable land

Africa is home to the 2nd largest and longest rivers and aquatic areas in the world (the Nile and the Congo)
### Selected African countries: production of key agricultural commodities (2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Leading African producers</th>
<th>Combined % of world production</th>
<th>Africa’s % of world production</th>
<th>Leading global producer (tonnes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cocoa beans</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire (2,200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cameroonian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee, green</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>Brazil (2,993.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea leaves</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>China (13,768.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malawi</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>China (214,403.9)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>China (136,952)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: MIF based on FAO

### Agriculture: a priority for the African Union

- The Continental Nutrition Accountability Scorecard (2019)
- AfDB 10-year strategy (2013-2022), Agriculture and food security
- 2023: Ibrahim Mayaki nominated AU’s Special Envoy for Food Systems

“**The biggest problem Africa will face in the next 20, 25 years is that we will need to feed one billion more people.**”

H.E. Ibrahim A. Mayaki, AU Special Envoy for Food Systems, former CEO of AUDA-NEPAD
AFRICA’S SOFT POWER: ON THE RISE

Culture and creation: heritage, music, film, literature, architecture, arts

139 UNESCO World Heritage sites in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Heritage sites (4 transboundary)</th>
<th>Transboundary Sites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo Republic</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gambia, Senegal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho, South Africa</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key
- Natural Heritage site
- Cultural Heritage site
- Mixed Heritage Site
- (Natural & Cultural)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sites</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<td>Angola</td>
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<td>Madagascar</td>
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<td>Benin</td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>Mauritania</td>
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<td>Cabo Verde</td>
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<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>Congo Rep.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>DR Congo</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Seychelles</td>
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<td>Eritrea</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>Gabon</td>
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<td>Togo</td>
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<td>Gambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source MIF

DR Congo hosts the most natural heritage sites in Africa (5)

Morocco hosts the most cultural heritage sites in Africa (9), followed by Ethiopia (8)
Music: boosted by digital music streaming platforms

In Africa revenues from digital music streaming platforms are expected to grow to $500 million annually by 2025, up from $100 million in 2017.

- Rapid urbanisation in African countries has increased the consumption of creative goods and services.
- African diaspora are the primary consumers of African entertainment, serving as the introducers of culture and creative outputs from the continent to the global market.

Following successful charting for African music globally due to social media platforms such as Instagram and Tik Tok, many global music companies are entering the African market.

Music streaming service Audiomack reported African artists such as Burna Boy, Rema, Kizz Daniel and Fireboy DML all had over 300 million streams on their platform. In August 2022, eight African artists were in the top ten most streamed artists on Audiomack.

Streaming giants such as Spotify, Apple Music and Boomplay are pivoting to better enter the growing African market.

Partnerships between global companies and African labels: on the rise

In 2019, Warner Music Group announced a global partnership with Nigeria-based record label Chocolate City.

In 2022, Universal Music Group launched the Virgin Music Africa Label for independent African artists and labels, with 15,000 music titles, 50 partner labels and around 100 artists from 25 countries on the continent.

African music genres such as Afrobeats, Afropop, Rhumba and Amapiano have become increasingly popular on the continent and internationally.

### 10 most streamed African artists on Spotify in 2022

1. Burna Boy, Nigeria
2. Wizkid, Nigeria
3. Tems, Nigeria
4. Asake, Nigeria
5. Ayra Starr, Nigeria
6. Zakes Bantwini, South Africa
7. Sha Sha, Zimbabwe
8. Kabza De Small, South Africa
9. Eddy Kenzo, Uganda
10. DJ Snake, Algeria
Film industry: a $20 billion potential?

The top 10 film industries across Africa produce almost 5,000 films a year with the top three being in Nigeria (2,599), Ghana (600) and Kenya (500).

The largest film industry on the continent, Nollywood (the Nigerian industry) has enabled the emergence of a local production and distribution industry with its own economic model. It is also pursuing a digital revolution that was accelerated during COVID-19.

There is still a huge untapped potential on the continent. The industry generates $5 billion in annual revenue out of a potential $20 billion.

Major African prize-winning films between 2011 and 2021

- The Square (Egypt) - Toronto International Film Festival - People’s Choice Documentary Award (2013)
- Timbuktu (Mauritania) - Festival de Cannes, Cesar - Best Feature Film, Best Director, Best Original Screenplay, Best Cinematography, Best Sound, Best Film Editing and Best Original Score (2014)
- Fatwa (Tunisia) - Carthage Film Festival - Golden Tanit (2018)
- Atlantics (Senegal) - Festival de Cannes – Grand Prix (2019)
- My Octopus Teacher (South Africa) - Oscar – Best Documentary Feature (2021)

Literature: Africa is home to numerous award winning authors

10 prized African authors (classic and contemporary)

Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (Nigeria) - Orange Prize, now Women’s Prize for Fiction (2007); National Book Critics Circle Award for Fiction (2014)

Hemley Bourn (Cameroon) - Le Grand prix littéraire d’Afrique noire Awards (2015 and 2019); Prix Kourouma (2020)


Maaza Mengiste (Ethiopia) - Edgar Award (2021)

Laila Lalami (Morocco) - Hurston/Wright Legacy Award (2015)

Djaili Amadou Amal (Cameroon) - Orange Book Prize (2019)

Tsitsi Dangarembga (Zimbabwe) - Booker Prize (2020)

Late Prof. Chinua Achebe (Nigeria) - International Booker Prize (2007)

Ngugi wa Thiongo (Kenya) - International Nonino Prize (2001)

Abdulrazak Gurnah (Tanzania) - Nobel Prize for Literature (2021)
Visual arts: contemporary African art on the rise

A growing demand for contemporary African art is drawing the attention of international art collectors and curators. The Investec’s Cape Town Art Fair hosts African artists, while also hosting 23,000 people and 100 galleries from Africa.

According to ArtTactive, sales of work by African artists surged by 44.1% in 2021, from $50.2 million to $72.4 million. In 2021, the average price for modern and contemporary African art showed an increase of 20.4%, up from 19.7%.

World-renowned African architects

- Kunle Adeyemi (Nigeria)
- Christian Benimana (Rwanda)
- Francis Kéré (Burkina Faso) - Pritzker Prize (2022), designed the 2017 Serpentine Pavilion
- Mariam Kamara (Niger)
- Mokena Makeka (South Africa)
- Mphethi Morojele (Lesotho)
- Tosin Oshinowo (Nigeria)
- Akosua Obeng (Ghana)
- Y Tsai (South Africa)

Titled "The Laboratory of the Future", the 2023 Venice Architecture Biennale was curated by Ghanaian-Scottish architect Lesley Lokko. The Golden Lion for Lifetime Achievement was awarded to Demas Nwoko (Nigeria).

10 world-renowned African artists

- Adel Abdessemed - Algeria
- Aboudia Diarrassouba - Côte d’Ivoire
- Michael Armitage - Kenya
- Njideka Akunyili Crosby - Nigeria
- Samuel Fosso - Cameroon & Nigeria
- Abdoulaye Konaté - Mali
- Julie Mehretu - Ethiopia
- Chéri Samba - DR Congo
- Wangechi Mutu - Kenya
- Barthélémy Toguo - Cameroon

In 2021, sales of work by African artists surged by 44.1%.

In 2021, the African modern and contemporary art market showed a 20.4% increase in prices.
As of 2021, 11 major European football leagues have 514 African players in total. France has the highest number at 107 players, while Austria has the lowest number at nine.

### 10 African Nobel laureates

- Wangari Maathai (Kenya) - Peace (2004)
- Mohamed ElBaradei (Egypt) - Peace (2005)
- Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia) - Peace (2011)
- Leymah Gbowee (Liberia) – Peace (2011)
- Serge Haroche (Morocco and France) - Physics (2012)
- Michael Levitt (South Africa) - Chemistry (2013)
- National Dialogue Quartet (Tunisia) - Peace (2015)
- Denis Mukwege (DR Congo) - Peace (2018)
- Abiy Ahmed (Ethiopia) - Peace (2019)
- Abdulrazak Gurnah - Literature (2021)

### Sports: an array of global sports stars

**African players in European football leagues**

**European football by number of African players employed (2021)**

- France
- Belgium
- Turkey
- Portugal
- England
- Italy
- Germany
- Netherlands
- Spain
- Russia
- Austria

**France** has the highest number of African footballers (107) out the 11 major European leagues.

As of 2021, 11 major European football leagues have 514 African players in total. France has the highest number at 107 players, while Austria has the lowest number at nine.
African football is globalising
The most recent African Cup of Nations 2021 (AFCON) was broadcast in 157 countries around the world, with 65 million viewers in Nigeria alone. Social media is driving the globalisation of African football particularly platforms such as Tik Tok which generated 2.5 billion views with content related to the #afcon2021 hashtag.

Basketball: Africa has a growing presence
The National Basketball Association (NBA) in North America has 13 African-born players in the league, and about 40 with one African-born parent. According to the International Basketball Federation (FIBA) World Rankings, African countries are becoming more competitive basketball nations. The Nigerian Men’s team ranks first in Africa and 23rd in the world. The Mali Youth Men’s team ranks 20th in the world; the Nigerian Women’s team ranks 14th in the world, and the Mali Youth Women’s team ranks 16th in the world.

East African dominance in long-distance running
Eastern African domination in long-distance running began in 1960, with Ethiopia Abebe Bikila’s Rome Olympic Marathon win. He won the gold medal again four years later in Tokyo setting the world record in both races.

Over 100 Africans now play in the American Football League (NFL)
As of March 2023, Victor Osimhen (Nigeria) is the most valuable African football player (€102.1 million), followed by Mohamed Salah (Egypt) and Achraf Hakimi (Morocco).

Eight first division European football clubs owe at least 40% of their squad value to African players, with AC Ajaccio in French Ligue 1 with the highest percentage at 54.4%.

At the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, Morocco became the first African team ever to reach a World Cup semi-final

East African athletes are still dominating the sport and continue to set the fastest times each year. In the last five years Ethiopian and Kenyan athletes have dominated world marathon events.
World: men’s marathon winners (2019-2023)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Athlete Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gadisa Shumie</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Seville Marathon 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliud Kipchoge</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Berlin Marathon 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titus Ekiru</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Milan Marathon 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evans Chebet</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Valencia Marathon 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenenisa Bekele</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Berlin Marathon 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

World: women’s marathon winners (2019-2023)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Athlete Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rosemary Wanjiru</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Tokyo Marathon 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruth Chepngetich</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Chicago Marathon 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joyciline Jepkosgei</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>London Marathon 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peres Jepchirchir</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Valencia Marathon 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigid Kosgei</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Chicago Marathon 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fastest marathon runners over the last 5 years are all from Eastern Africa

Abebe Bikila (Ethiopia) won the Olympic Marathon in Rome (1960) and Tokyo (1964), setting the world record in both races

Kelvin Kiptum (Kenya) broke the London Marathon record in April 2023

Top African footballers according to ESPN (as of 2021):

1. Mohammed Salah (Egypt)
2. Edouard Mendy (Senegal)
3. Riyad Mahrez (Algeria)
4. Sadio Mane (Senegal)
5. Achraf Hakimi (Morocco)
6. Sebastien Haller (Côte d’Ivoire)
7. Franck Kessie (Côte d’Ivoire)
8. Victor Osimhen (Cameroon)
9. Emmanuel Dennis (Nigeria)
10. Kalidou Koulibaly (Senegal)

Source: MIF based on ESPN

Egyptian footballer Mohamed Salah features among the 30 most famous athletes globally.
**SPOTLIGHT**

*Africa’s overarching hurdle: stability and security*

**Three of the top ten global hotspots are in Africa**

According to the International Crisis Group, of the ten conflicts to watch in 2023, three are in Africa - in Ethiopia, DR Congo and the Sahel.

- **Ethiopia** – Implementation of the November 2022 Ethiopia - Tigray Pretoria Peace Agreement is ongoing.
- **Sahel** – Successive coups and increasing terrorism footprint involving Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

**Growing violence against civilians**

There are approximately 25 active militant Islamist groups operating in Africa, up from just 5 in 2010 — an increase of 400%.

Violence against civilians is growing, driven largely by the activity of private military groups and violent extremist organisations.

**Fifteen of the top 20 most fragile states globally are African**

**20 most fragile countries: Fragile States Index Score (2022)**

![Graph showing the 20 most fragile countries based on Fragile States Index Score (2022)].

Source: MIF based on The Fund for Peace

Of the International Crisis Group’s “10 Conflicts to Watch in 2023”, three are in Africa: Ethiopia, DR Congo and the Sahel.

2 official al-Qaeda affiliates and 8 Islamic State provinces operate across Africa.

The 15 most fragile states in Africa are home to 663 million people, equivalent to almost twice the US population in 2022.

The IIAG sub-category Security & Safety is the most declined sub-category between 2012-2021.

Somalia, South Sudan and Central African Republic rank in the top 5 most fragile states in 2022.
Fragility increasing among many African countries

Two out of the five most deteriorated states globally between 2012 and 2022 on Fund For Peace’s ‘Fragile States Index’ are African: Mali and the Central African Republic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2012 Score</th>
<th>2022 Score</th>
<th>Score Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>20.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>108.4</td>
<td>13.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>111.7</td>
<td>6.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>103.8</td>
<td>108.1</td>
<td>4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>108.4</td>
<td>108.4</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>106.0</td>
<td>105.9</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>-1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>107.6</td>
<td>105.7</td>
<td>-1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>-2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>109.4</td>
<td>107.1</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>101.9</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>101.1</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>-3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>111.2</td>
<td>107.3</td>
<td>-3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>114.9</td>
<td>110.5</td>
<td>-4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>104.9</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>-5.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>106.3</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>-8.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MIF based on The Fund for Peace

3/4 of the 20 most fragile countries globally in 2021 are African.
Chapter 03. The world in Africa: shifting trends
Trade partners shift

Asia has become Africa’s primary trading partner

The latest data shows that over three quarters of Africa’s merchandise trade is with Asia and Europe, both in exports and imports.

- The EU remains the largest trading partner of African countries, with the bloc accounting for over a quarter of Africa’s exports (28.2%) and imports (26.7%).
- China is the biggest trading partner at country level, both in terms of exports (16.8%) and imports (19.9%).

African countries: destination of merchandise exports (2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World region</th>
<th>Africa 12.7%</th>
<th>Europe 35.3%</th>
<th>Asia 41.8%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since 2000, the EU’s share of Africa’s export market has dropped by 1/4 and the US’s by 2/3

In 2000, Europe was the destination for almost half of all African exports, while North America accounted for a larger share than Asia. While Europe remains a key trade partner, Africa’s trading relationships have undoubtedly pivoted east this century.

African countries: origin of merchandise imports (2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World region</th>
<th>Africa 12.9%</th>
<th>Europe 32.3%</th>
<th>Asia 45.3%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Africa’s intra-regional trade accounts for less than 13% of the total

Asia now represents almost 42% of Africa’s exports and over 45% of its imports, outgrowing Europe in both cases
Primary commodities still account for more than 3/4 of Africa’s exports, a far higher share than in any other region

Trade models stick

Africa’s commodity-led export model persists

Though Africa’s trading partners have shifted over the last decade, much of the trading model that has been dominant since the colonial era remains in place, exporting resources in a raw or unprocessed state and importing manufactured products from outside the continent.

More than 3/4 of African fuel exports head to Asia (43.4%) and Europe (39.6%)

Fuels, namely fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas constitute the largest share of Africa’s exports.

African countries’ fuel exports equate to almost two and a half times its fuel imports, despite almost 600 million people in Africa lacking access to electricity.

Africa’s export market evolution between 2000 and 2021:
- China’s share has increased five-fold.
- The share of current EU members has dropped by 1/4.
- The US’s share has decreased from 16.5% to 6.2%
- Africa’s exports to India have increased more than 11-fold.
- Africa’s exports to the UAE have increased more than 60-fold.

Coal, oil and gas account for over 1/3 of Africa’s exports

US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)

The AGOA is a US Trade Act, enacted in 2000 and renewed to 2025. The legislation significantly enhances market access to the US for “qualifying” sub-Saharan African countries in products such as apparel and footwear, wine, certain motor vehicle components, some agricultural products, chemicals, steel and others. With the deal expiring in 2025, African countries are pulling together to lobby the US Congress to approve the renewal of the AGOA this year.
In 2021, over one third of Africa’s fuel exports went to the EU (36.1%).
• Italy (27.7%) and Spain (24.3%) accounted for over half of these exports.
• Northern Africa was the origin of almost two thirds (64.6%) of Africa’s fuel exports to the EU.
Almost half (43.4%) of Africa’s fuel exports went to Asia, with China (19.3%) and India (13.1%) being the main recipient countries.
• Exports from Angola to China account for over 10% (10.7%) of the continent’s total fuel exports and over half (55.1%) of all African fuels exported to China.

Four out of Africa’s five biggest oil and gas companies are private firms based in Europe and the US.

Africa: five biggest oil and gas companies (2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sonatrach</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Shell</td>
<td>UK/Netherlands</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chevron</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mobil</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Oil giant Nigeria imports refined petroleum products from Europe for its energy needs
Nigeria has the 11th largest reserves of crude oil in the world, but faces an ever-growing fuel crisis.
• In Nigeria, almost half (44.6%) of the population lack access to electricity and 85% lack access to clean cooking fuels.
The shortage of refining capacity is the main driver of Nigeria’s fuel crisis. It has long made Nigeria dependent on imported petroleum products. The cost of importing refined petroleum products exceeded Nigeria’s exports of refined petroleum by US$43.56 billion in 2020.
• Nigeria exports almost half (45.8%) of its crude oil to Europe and imports over 80% of its refined petroleum from Europe, despite Europe having fewer than half of the reserves.

Towards the 7th Africa Singapore Business Forum
The 7th Africa Singapore Business Forum is scheduled to take place at the end of August 2023 in the city-state. The event is organised every two years by Enterprise Singapore - a government agency that has offices in Accra, Nairobi and Johannesburg.

In 2021, over 1/3 of Africa’s fuel exports went to the EU, and 2/3 to Asia

Only 1 African company - the Algerian firm Sonatrach - is among the 5 largest oil and gas companies on the continent

Nigeria refines 1 barrel of oil for every 4,132 refined in Europe, despite having more than twice the crude oil reserves

Inaugurated in May 2023, the Dangote Oil Refinery, built in the Lekki Free Zone near Lagos, Nigeria, is a $19 billion dollar project that has the capacity to produce about 650,000 barrels of petroleum products a day (more than enough to supply the country’s needs) - a key milestone for upgrading the oil value chain on the African continent.
Between April 2022 and January 2023, 6 European oil and gas companies (BP, Equinor, Eni, Perenco, Shell and Total) have signed gas agreements with at least 8 African countries.

Over half of Africa’s mineral exports go to Asia

Minerals, including metals, precious stones and ores, account for the second biggest share of Africa’s exports.

Africa is a net exporter of minerals, exporting over six times the volume of ores, metals, and precious stones that it imports.

Asia accounts for almost two thirds (60.5%) of exports of ores, metals and precious stones from Africa, while Europe accounts for almost one quarter (23.4%).

China (28.0%) is the largest importer of African minerals, followed by the UAE (14.2%) and Switzerland (9.4%).

Russia’s geological survey agency ASGA has drawn up geological maps detailing all mineral and metal deposits in Africa.

Asia accounts for almost 2/3 of ores, metals and precious stones exports from Africa.

"Energy security": Europe’s scramble for African gas to reduce dependency on Russia

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, several European leaders have signed deals with their African counterparts to develop and export the continent’s vast reserves of natural gas or expressed their intent to do so, u-turning on previously held opposition to fossil fuel development in Africa.

Africa: destination of exports of ores, metals, and precious stones (2021)
African gold heads to the United Arab Emirates

Africa’s exports to the UAE have more than quadrupled in the last 10 years. This is largely accounted for by gold which makes up more than half (52.2%) of Africa’s exports to the Gulf state. The UAE is developing Dubai into a global gold exchange to compete with London and Geneva on the back of African gold.

This has triggered a surge in illicit gold flows from DR Congo. To combat the problem, in January 2023 the DR Congo government launched Primera Gold: a joint venture with a UAE-based company to export gold mined by hand to a refinery in the Gulf.

Benin using industrial zones to change trade pattern.

Through the establishment of the Glo-Djigbé industrial zone, Benin is looking to convert its raw cotton exports into a textiles industry. The initiative aims to create 300,000 jobs by 2030; up to 250,000 jobs are expected in spinning, cotton weaving and garment manufacturing. Discussions over contracts have already been held with brands including SanMar, H&M and Zara.

Congolese people are losing out to China on value chains in batteries that could be taking place domestically, but new initiatives are trying to bring these processes back to the region.

- On 13 December 2022, the US signed an MoU with DR Congo and Zambia to cooperate on fostering African electric vehicle battery supply chains, processing cobalt in the Copper Belt region.
- In April 2022, DR Congo and Zambia established the DR Congo-Zambia Battery Council to oversee cooperation within the electric vehicle battery value chain.

More than 70% of global cobalt is mined from DR Congo

96.7% of Congolese cobalt is exported to China.

Cobalt’s primary use is in batteries. China is the number one global exporter of batteries.

Source: MIF Based on USGS & Atlas of Economic Complexity

Congoese cobalt underpins China’s world leading battery industry

More than 70% of global cobalt is mined from DR Congo

96.7% of Congolese cobalt is exported to China.

Cobalt’s primary use is in batteries. China is the number one global exporter of batteries.

Source: MIF Based on USGS & Atlas of Economic Complexity
### Who owns Africa’s largest mines?

**Africa: largest mines (2022)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>Mine</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Operating Company</th>
<th>Company Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>Kibali</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Kibali Goldmines SA: Barrick (45%), AngloGold Ashanti (45%) and SOKIMO (10%)</td>
<td>Canada/South Africa/DR Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds</td>
<td>Jwaneng</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>De Beers (85%) and The Government of Botswana (15%)</td>
<td>UK/Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>Kansanshi</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Kansanshi Mining: First Quantum Minerals Ltd (80%) and Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines-Investment Holdings (20%)</td>
<td>Canada/Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobalt</td>
<td>Kamoto</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Glencore (75%), Gecamines (20%) and SIMCO (5%)</td>
<td>Switzerland/DR Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauxite</td>
<td>Sangaredi</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée: Government of Guinea (49%) and Halco Mining (51%)</td>
<td>US/Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platinum</td>
<td>Impala Mine</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Impala Platinum Holdings</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For full sources list, please refer to notes/reference list sections at end of report.

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**China & Russia: trading services for resource access**

The Wagner Group has helped secure Russian access to key resources across Africa. In the Central African Republic, it has provided security services and training to the government in exchange for access to gold and diamonds. Similarly, in Sudan and Libya, the Wagner Group has facilitated Russian access to gold and oil mining sites respectively.

China maintains a significant mining presence on the continent, often utilising minerals-for-infrastructure contracts in countries such as DR Congo where Chinese investors own as much as 70% of the copper and cobalt mines.
Africa imports most of its key manufactured goods from outside the continent

**Africa: origin of imported road vehicles (2021)**

- EU: 33.5%
- China: 15.0%
- Japan: 10.1%

Road vehicles in Africa: primarily imported from the EU

**Africa: origin of imported clothing (2021)**

- China: 56.9%
- EU: 7.2%
- Turkey: 7.1%

Clothing in Africa: primarily imported from China

**Africa: origin of imported electronic appliances (2021)**

- China: 37.1%
- EU: 31.7%
- India: 3.5%

Electronic appliances and telecomms equipment: primarily imported from China

**Africa: origin of imported telecomms equipment (2021)**

- China: 54.7%
- UAE: 11.2%
- Hong Kong: 10.8%

Vaccine diplomacy

The COVID-19 pandemic triggered the rise of vaccine diplomacy. Vaccine donations were mostly made via COVAX, the global vaccine-sharing scheme, or bilaterally (this included China’s CanSino/Sinopharm/Sinovac vaccines, Russia’s Sputnik vaccine or India’s Vaccine Maitri initiative).
FINANCING: MULTI-LAYERED CHALLENGES

African rising public debt level still stands below other world regions

In absolute terms, Africa’s public debt is lower than any other world region.

The total debt stock owed by all African governments equates to over $1.8 trillion. Germany alone has a greater debt stock than this at $2.9 trillion.

Even adjusted for GDP, African debt does not stand out as being uniquely high with 49 African countries having lower public debt-to-GDP ratios than the US (122.2%) in 2023.

Yet eight of the nine countries listed by the IMF as being in ‘debt-distress’ in 2023 are African.

World regions: share of total global public debt (2023)

- Africa: 1.2%
- Asia: 1.9%
- Europe: 4.2%
- Latin America and the Caribbean: 1.9%
- Oceania: 3.6%
- North America: 35.8%
- Latin America and the Caribbean: 20.1%
- Africa: 36.8%

Note: Countries lacking data in the IMF April 2023 World Economic Outlook or Fiscal Monitor have been excluded from the analysis – including Libya, Somalia, Zambia in Africa and Anguilla, Afghanistan, Ecuador, Lebanon, Macao, Pakistan, Palau, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Venezuela.

African public debt structure is the main problem

African public debts are mainly held by non-African lenders and in foreign currencies

African countries’ public debts are uniquely burdensome, in part because they are mainly owed to international rather than domestic lenders, making debt harder to refinance or restructure.

- Of the 10 African countries with data on creditor residency, seven owe more than half of public debt to overseas creditors.

Africa accounts for less than 2.0% of global public debt in 2023

Japan (258.2%) and Greece (166.0%) have higher public debt-to-GDP ratios than any African country

Over 70% of public debt in Canada, China, the UK and US is owed to domestic creditors
External lenders prefer to lend to developing countries in their own currency or international ‘hard currencies’ (e.g. US dollar or Euro). Foreign currency debt carries an exchange rate risk. Industrialised countries usually borrow in their own currencies.

- 31 African countries have more than 50% of their public external debt denominated in US dollars.
- In the UK (£), China (CNY), Canada (C$), and the US (US$) over 98% of central government debt is denominated in the local currency.

**Africa: currency of public external debt (2021)**

- 13.1% Other/multiple currencies
- 13.8% US dollar ($)
- 1.6% Euro (€)
- 1.3% Japanese Yen (¥)
- 70.2% SDR

Since 2010, all but 2 African currencies have lost value against the US dollar, increasing the size of dollar denominated debt.

Private sector is now the largest holder of African public external debts

In 2021, more than one third (40.4%) of Africa’s public external debt was owed to the private sector.

The World Bank (16.4%) is Africa’s largest official creditor, while China (9.0%) is the largest bilateral (nation state) creditor.

**Private bondholders hold over 1/4 (27.5%) of Africa’s public external debt, more than any single official creditor**
The UK alone accounts for more than 1/3 of private sector lending to Africa from Paris Club members, more than France, Germany, Japan and the US combined.

The ‘big 3’ rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s and S&P) only have 2 offices in Africa, both in Johannesburg.

In 2021, the average interest rates in sub-Saharan Africa on sovereign bonds (6.0%) were higher than on loans from the World Bank, the AfDB, China or the Paris Club countries.

For Zambia, 10-year bond yields are over 30%.
IMF loans in particular are usually conditional on the implementation of an ‘IMF programme’, often involving austerity measures or trade liberalisation. The measures have been criticised for undermining national sovereignty, hindering development and inflicting hardship on citizens.

3. Chinese lending: non-interference in internal affairs and much needed credit for infrastructure

Though less concessional (more expensive) than other official creditors, Chinese loans have been appealing to African governments because China stresses non-interference as a key principle of its lending to Africa. It has primarily focused on lending for infrastructure projects, much of which has fallen under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), that seeks to connect Asia with Africa and Europe via land and maritime networks.

Chinese lending has been criticised as ‘tied aid’ due to requirements to use Chinese companies, workers and materials and the use of Africa’s natural resources as collateral. China has also faced criticisms for opaque lending terms.
Current debt relief measures not up to the task

Increased debt servicing costs, plus the combination of multiple crises such as climate change, COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have led many African countries to struggle with debt sustainability. The crisis has led to calls for creditors to provide relief measures, but Africa’s myriad of creditors makes this a challenge. Getting all relevant actors around the same table is difficult. Many are reluctant to provide relief when they think payments will continue to be made to other creditors.

The Paris Club is the most flexible on public debt relief, private sector the least

Selected creditors: share of debt forgiveness and reduction on African external debt (2020-2021)

G20 initiatives have been mostly ineffective

The Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI): endorsed in April 2020 by the G20, the DSSI suspended repayments due on bilateral loans made by the G20’s members to some of the world’s poorest countries to create fiscal space to respond to COVID-19.

- This only covered 18.6% of debt service repayments for DSSI-eligible African countries, too little for any meaningful impact.
- Some state-owned but autonomous Chinese lenders did not participate in the DSSI.
- Globally, only one private sector creditor participated.

The DSSI expired at the end of December 2021.

Between 2010 and 2021, external debt servicing payments in Africa have more than quadrupled, growing at over 60 times the pace of average fiscal revenues

Multilateral Development Banks, including the World Bank and IMF, did not participate in the DSSI
The Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the DSSI: In October 2020, the G20 launched the Common Framework (CF) for Debt Treatments beyond the DSSI. The CF obliges all bilateral creditors to inform the IMF how much they are owed by highly indebted countries and to negotiate rescheduling jointly, while obliging the debtor country to take on an IMF programme. However, there has been little progress on debt relief or restructuring.

- Only four countries have applied to the CF – Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana and Zambia, none of which has seen any reduction in debt.
- As of July 2023, Chad and Zambia have reached an agreement with creditors, but this has principally involved debt restructuring, rather than any cancellation.

IMF’s additional Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)

On 2 August 2021, the IMF approved a general allocation of additional Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), worth $650 billion, to boost global liquidity in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis.

On 18 May 2021, the Paris Summit on the Financing of African Economies led to the commitment by the G20 countries to reallocate $100 billion of those additional SDRs to low-income countries.

Almost 2 years after the Paris Summit, donors have only committed to $82 billion so far (which includes $21 billion from the US still waiting for Congress approval). Half that amount has been paid to the IMF.

A first tranche of $20 billion made up of French and British SDRs is ready to be paid in the coming months to the African Development Bank (AfDB). AfDB is planning to use them to leverage additional resources: every $100 million of SDRs could result in as much as $400 million in affordable, long-term loans.

More recently, at another summit in Paris (Summit for a New Global Financial Pact, 22-23 June 2023), a key outcome was a pledge to create a $100 billion climate finance fund comprised of SDRs. Several high-income countries agreed to reallocate some of their SDRs to the fund.

Over 1/2 of servicing payments due in 2021 were made to private creditors. More than 1/4 were owed to private bondholders, the overwhelming majority of which are governed under English or New York law.
Food: Africa’s excessive dependency

Food security in Africa

Africa remains the world region with the highest prevalence of chronic hunger (20%), with a total of 278 million affected by acute hunger in 2021. In addition to an ever-growing population, climate change and the shocks of both COVID-19 and the Ukraine conflict, African countries have little fiscal space for agricultural policies. As a result, the most vulnerable people, namely those living in rural areas, are the most affected and the least capable of dealing with price hikes, already spending up to 60% of their income on food (2015, latest year available).

Africa’s agriculture is not feeding the continent, resulting in imports of over 100 million metric tons of food at the cost of $75 billion annually. Africa has by far the highest cereal import dependency ratio out of all world regions at 29.6% (almost three times as high as Asia’s: 8.3%).

As of 2023, 42 out of 54 African countries are net food importers

Africa is the largest food-based ODA recipient at global level

World regions: Food-based ODA (2021)

Multiple partnerships

EU

May 2022 EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes: Facilitating alternative logistic routes until access to the Black Sea was fully restored.

June 2022 Food security general commitment: Over €2 billion to sub-Saharan Africa and another €1 billion for the Southern Neighbourhood partners.

September 2022 European Development Fund to finance food aid and production: €600 million allocated to food security to ACP countries – €247 + €136 million euros designated for sub-Saharan Africa.

The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – an obstacle for African agriculture?

The EU’s CAP, subsidising European farmers to the tune of €42 billion ($50 billion) annually, is reported to have undercut agricultural production for wheat and milk powder in Western Africa.
Multi-stakeholder initiatives: FARM, AATI, PIATA

The International Food and Agriculture Resilience Mission (FARM)
Established in April 2022, in cooperation with the G7 and the AU, FARM is supported by France, the European Commission (EC), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. FARM’s mission focuses on overcoming export restrictions, supporting the Ukrainian agricultural sector and grain exports, and the launch of the Global Business for Food Security Coalition.

The African Agricultural Transformation Initiative (AATI)
Launched in 2022 and co-funded by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and IFAD, the AATI is hosted by IFAD and builds on McKinsey & Company’s pro bono input. With a budget of $19.6 million until 2025, AATI is focused on the formulation of strategic agricultural initiatives.

China
China’s approach is to transfer know-how to increase agricultural productivity to meet Africa’s food security needs. At the 2021 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China pledged to send 500 agricultural experts for policy consultations and capacity training in Africa. The Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers (ATDCs) are set up to introduce and extend new technology for students and farmers. The 2017 China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation for multi-stakeholder cooperation, joined forces with AGRA and PIATA, to leverage China’s resources for agricultural transformation in Africa. Between 1987 and 2016, Chinese companies acquired over 253 million land hectares across Africa for agricultural investments.

Turkey
In 2017, the first Turkey-Africa Agriculture Ministers Meeting and Agribusiness Forum took place in Istanbul with 40 African Ministers of Agriculture alongside FAO and AU representatives. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) provides agricultural tools, seeds, fertilisers and pesticides to improve local farmers’ capacity.

Japan
Japan is a key global leader in tackling global food security, donating $130 million to the WFP in 2023. The funding will be distributed to the most vulnerable in 37 countries, of which 25 are African. Japan also supports the FAO to enhance food security and nutrition data capacity in Angola, Mali, Senegal and Tanzania, to monitor SDG 2 (“Zero Hunger”).

Brazil
During his first eight years in office (2003-2010), President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva devoted special attention to Africa, by focusing on food security and poverty reduction. Africa remained a key focus for projects by the Instituto Lula, including partnerships with the AU, NEPAD and FAO, with a focus on food security. Africa has also been at the centre of the second Lula presidency, which started in January 2023.

The multi-donor Partnership for Inclusive Agricultural Transformation in Africa (PIATA)
Launched in 2017 with $280 million, PIATA aims to transform Africa’s agricultural systems from subsistence to sustainable business. Partners include the Bill & Melinda Gates and Rockefeller Foundations, the UK, Germany and the US. PIATA was successful in incentivising private sector, public and donor engagement and in reaching farmers. PIATA’s impact on inclusive finance, output markets, and farmer outcomes was mixed.

Between 1987 and 2016, Chinese companies acquired over 252 million hectares of land across Africa for agricultural investments.

The World Bank coordinates the global response to the food crisis heightened by the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war
In May 2022, the World Bank allocated $30 billion for 15 months - with almost half going to Africa - to combat the global hunger emergency. To help coordinate the response, the World Bank, together with the G7, launched the Global Alliance for Food Security (GAFS) that same month, and a Global Food and Nutrition Security Dashboard was developed to track the latest data. As of December 2022, the Bank’s food and nutrition security commitments have passed the $12 billion mark – with almost half going to Africa. The Third Joint Statement from FAO, IMF, World Bank Group, WFP, and WTO on 8 February 2023 called for a prevention of the worsening of the food and nutrition security crisis.
Health: ODA's potential crowding-out effect?

**Health in Africa**

The 2022 IIAG shows that access to healthcare in Africa is worse in 2021 than in 2012. Health has been the third most improved sub-category between 2012-2021, with progress in the indicators Control of Communicable Diseases, Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR), as well as Access to Water & Sanitation. However, Control of Non-Communicable Diseases and Access to Healthcare, have deteriorated on the continent since 2012.


The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted Africa’s excessive dependency on external provision of vaccines and other health products. Africa accounts for 25% of the global vaccine demand but imports 99% of its routine vaccine needs.

**Increasing Africa’s ownership:** The Africa Vaccine Acquisition Task Team (AVATT) was set up by the AU in August 2020 as the African entity responsible for leading the continent’s COVID-19 vaccination strategy. Through the COVID-19 procurement agreement signed in March 2021, African countries had access to 400 million doses of the Johnson & Johnson single-shot COVID-19 vaccine. The Partnership for African Vaccine Manufacturing (PAVM), co-launched in April 2022 by the AU and the Africa CDC, committed to achieve 60% of locally produced routine vaccines by 2040.

**Pervasive brain drain in the health sector:** Annually, it is estimated that Africa loses around $2.0 billion through brain drain in the health sector. One in ten doctors in the UK come from Africa. With COVID-19, countries such as the US, Canada, Germany and France have issued additional calls for foreign medical professionals, especially those working on COVID-19 issues.

**Almost half of global health ODA goes to Africa**

In 2021, the health sector received one fifth of total ODA to Africa. Almost half (45.2%) of global health ODA went to Africa, totalling $16.3 billion.

**Most health ODA in Africa goes to Basic Health and Population Policies & Programmes (over 40% for each one).**
Nigeria, South Africa and DR Congo were the top 3 health ODA recipients in Africa in 2021 – receiving 18.9% of the total health ODA to the continent.

3 multilateral donors - the Global Fund, IDA and GAVI - provide almost 40% of total health ODA to Africa.

Aid crowding-out effect: 9 of the top 10 health ODA recipients in Africa spend less than 10% of their budget on health.

Among the top ten health ODA recipients in Africa in 2021, nine spent less than 10% of their public expenditure on health in 2019, the latest available data year.

Four of those countries even spent less than 5% of their public expenditure on health: Ethiopia (4.8%), DR Congo (4.4%), Nigeria (3.8%) and Uganda (3.1%).
In 2019, out-of-pocket health expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa amounted to 30.0% of the Current Health Expenditure (CHE), compared to a global average of 18.0%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 10 Health ODA recipients in Africa</th>
<th>Health ODA in $ million (2021)</th>
<th>Government health expenditure as % of general government expenditure (2019)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1242.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>928.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>902.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>877.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>868.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>867.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>831.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>727.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>617.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>555.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

China’s health support boosted by COVID-19

- 345 health aid projects were financed by China in Africa between 2006 and 2013, accounting for a total amount in 2014 of $764 million, an annual average of $95.5 million per year.
- The COVID-19 pandemic has boosted China-Africa health cooperation: vaccine donations, vaccine manufacturing by Chinese companies in countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and South Africa, construction of Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (AfCDC) headquarters in Addis Ababa, etc.

Non-state actors have a prominent role in health in Africa

Since 2000, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) has dedicated $65 billion dollars to global health, accounting for over 80% of all private sector contributions to the Global Fund in 2019. It operates across 49 African countries, and includes Africa CDC, the AU, the SADC, ECOWAS, the EAC, Amref, the WHO and UNICEF. To date, more than 5,000 grants worth over $8 billion have also been allocated to Africa, and $7 billion have been allocated in 2022-2026 for Africa.

The Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), the Aga Khan Health Services (AKHS) and the Aga Khan University (AKU)’s Faculty of Health Sciences focus on health service delivery, professional training, community health programmes and population research in East Africa. AKHS operates facilities in Kenya and Tanzania covering over a million patients per year.

Amref Health Africa, with almost 60 years of experience in health development, is the largest health NGO on the continent and has a multidisciplinary workforce. 97% of its 500 staff is African and Amref has a strong regional presence, working with over 100 poor and marginalised communities, local and national authorities in Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

Since 2021, the Mastercard Foundation’s Saving Lives and Livelihoods, a $1.5 billion initiative with Africa CDC, aims to vaccinate at least 65 million people in Africa, develop a workforce for vaccine manufacturing, and strengthen Africa CDC’s capacity.

Gates Foundation: $7 billion allocated to Africa over 2022-2026
**Education: a growing competition?**

**Education in Africa**

According to the latest IIAG, *Education* is the seventh highest scoring out of the IIAG’s 16 sub-categories in 2021 and the fifth most improved over the decade 2012-2021. Since 2012, *Human Resources in Education, Education Completion, Education Enrolment and Equality in Education* improved, however, concerningly, *Education Quality* has deteriorated.

In sub-Saharan Africa over one-fifth of primary-age children are out of school, and almost 60% of youth between the ages of 15 and 17.

Across Africa, 21% of enrolled students attend a private school, and that share is much higher in certain economies. Even in countries like Uganda, which offers free primary education, parents still have ancillary school expenses for uniforms, exam fees, school upkeep, books or hiring an extra teacher.

Students from sub-Saharan Africa are particularly mobile: 4.8% of them study abroad, compared to 2.7% on average worldwide. As of 2022, sub-Saharan Africa has 430,000 students of all degree-seeking studies abroad (7% of the world’s total). The main destinations for African students abroad are the EU (27%) and North America (15%).

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**Across Africa, 21% of enrolled students attend a private school**

**In a dozen sub-Saharan African countries, including Kenya and Nigeria, school fees are the most reported financial worry**

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**Sources:**

- MIF based on Campus France
ODA mostly focuses on basic and post-secondary education

In 2021, the education sector received 6.0% of total ODA to Africa. Almost 33.6% of global education ODA went to Africa, totalling $5.1 billion.

Almost 60% of education ODA in Africa went to Post-secondary Education and Basic Education.

Africa: total Education ODA (2021)

Increased focus on scholarships and training

Germany

Germany’s Skills Initiative for Africa (SIFA) with NEPAD and the African Union supports vocational training and employment for young people. The African-German Youth Initiative supports exchange among African and German pupils, students and young workers. Germany also supports the Pan-African University (PAU) and the Institute of Water and Energy Sciences.

China

In 2020, China offered more scholarships to African nationals than the leading Western governments combined. The number of African students in China increased from about 40,000 to 60,000 between 2016 and 2018. The 2021 FOCAC aimed to deepen cooperation in capacity building, technology transfer and technical training for youth. The Luban Workshops for capacity building are underway in 12 African countries with a focus on vocational education for high-level technologies. Chinese has been introduced into national curricula in several African countries, and China also plans to promote the teaching of African languages in China.

In 2020, China offered more scholarships to young Africans than the leading Western countries combined
Turkey

Through the state-run Maarif Foundation, Turkey runs 175 schools in 26 African countries. Approximately 15,000 African students have obtained full scholarships from the Turkish state since 1992: 5,259 between 2010 and 2019, while 1,147 African students received scholarships in 2019 alone. Turkey’s Yunus Emre Institute (YEE) has ten cultural centres on the continent offering language training courses and cultural exchange programmes.

Russia

As of 2019, at least 17,000 African students were enrolled in Russian universities. Rosatom, for instance, funds science, technology, engineering, and mathematics-education programmes as well as scholarships to study in Russia. Angola, for instance, plans to send 300 master’s level students to Russia annually. The Central African Republic announced in 2022 that learning Russian will become compulsory for university students, while the language has been taught in schools since 2019.

Japan

Between 1999 and 2008, the Japan International Cooperation Agency’s (JICA) education projects in Africa covered 16.1 million children as a result of construction of schools, teacher trainings and school management reforms. JICA provides advice and technical assistance to governments and The School for All project involves local communities in education. The first Africa-Japan Higher Education Partnership Workshop in 2018 gathered 25 African academic leaders. The Africa Center of Excellence (ACE) and the Partnership for Skills in Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology (PASET) facilitate collaboration amongst Japan, universities and companies, and African higher education institutions.

Mastercard Foundation: a major stakeholder

The Mastercard Foundation (MF) is the largest private funder of education in developing countries, with approximately $35 billion in assets and more than $8.6 billion spent in 74 countries since 2006, primarily in Africa. Its 2018 Young Africa Works strategy aims to enable 30 million young Africans to access dignified and fulfilling work by 2030, 70% of whom are women. The Scholars Program has grown into a $1.8 billion network aiming to have 100,000 scholars by 2030.

Rockefeller Foundation

The Rockefeller Foundation aims to advance new frontiers of science, data, policy and innovation to solve global challenges related to health, food, power and economic mobility.

Since the establishment of the Foundation’s Africa Regional Office in 1966, the Foundation has forged strong ties with African governments, academic institutions and pan-African entities.

The Foundation has supported capacity and institution building on the continent through a post-doctoral fellows program (RockyDocs) and seeding of regional entities including African Risk Capacity (ARC) and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA).

The World Bank’s Human Capital Project (HCP)

Over 40% of the World Bank’s total human development portfolio is focused on Africa. In 2022, nine out of 10 World Bank development policy operations in Africa supported reforms that bolster human capital. As of 2022, $8.2 billion was allocated for financing human capital projects Africa, with a total of 79 new projects.
Multilateral support: Africa remains the main recipient of UN and EU active missions

Africa is the main destination for both EU and peacekeeping missions. Of the 12 currently active UN Peacekeeping operations, six are in Africa.

African countries: active UN & EU missions (2023)

6 of the 12 active UN Peacekeeping Missions (UNPKM) are in Africa, with over 73,000 personnel. All have been ongoing for about 10 years or more.

The largest UNPKM in Africa is the MONUSCO in DR Congo, with over 18,000 personnel.

The oldest UNPKM in Africa at 22 years is MINURSO in Western Sahara.
EU cooperation for Peace and Security

A renewed and enhanced cooperation for peace and security.

Facing growing common security challenges, we announce a renewed and enhanced peace and security cooperation. The two continents have a long-standing cooperation premised on the principle of African solutions to African problems, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and reflected in the AU-EU Memorandum of Understanding on Peace, Security and Governance (2018), designed to combat instability, radicalisation, violent extremism, and terrorism, tackling the root causes of conflicts, and addressing the entire conflict cycle through the integrated approach. We express our commitment to foster our cooperation through support for adequate training, capacity building and equipment, to strengthen and scale up autonomous peace operations of African defence and security forces, including through EU missions and assistance measures, as well as support for law-enforcement capacity-building. Together, we will also continue to support African-led Peace Support Operations and the on-going discussions on the use of UN-assessed contributions for operations authorised by the UN Security Council.... We will intensify our cooperation on security, including on cybersecurity. We will join efforts to further promote the rule of law and the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security, Children and Armed Conflict and the Youth, Peace and Security Agendas, and underpin it with concrete actions to achieve durable peace.

6th EU–AU Summit: A Joint Vision for 2030 (February 2022)

Crowding-out effect
Almost all the funds disbursed from the EU’s new European Peace Facility, which replaced the previous African Peace Facility, have been redirected to buying weapons for Ukraine. The EPF has allocated €3.6 billion for Kyiv out of the total €5 billion earmarked in the 2021-2027 Multilateral Financial Framework. By comparison, it allocated €600 million to the AU for peace support operations 2022-2024.

13 EU civilian and military missions are currently operational in Africa:

- EUTM-S - Training Mission in Somalia.
- EUTM RCA - Training Mission in Central African Republic
- EUTM Mozambique - Training Mission in Mozambique
- EU RACC Sahel - EU Naval Force Operation ATALANTA
- EUCAP Somalia - Capacity Building Mission in Somalia
- EUCAP Sahel Niger
- EUCAP Sahel Mali
- EUBAM Border Assistance Mission in Libya
- EUAM RCA Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic
- IRINI (EUNAVFOR MED) Mission to Monitor Libya’s UN arms embargo
- EUTM Mali - Training Mission in Mali
- EUMPM Niger
- EUNAVFOR Somalia
A strategic foothold: 14 non-African states have established a military presence on the African continent

- 23 out of 54 African countries are currently host to at least one non-African military presence.
- The US has the largest number of military presences (16) followed by France (11), Germany, Italy and the UAE (3 each).
- France has held military bases in Africa since 1960, the US since 2003 and China since 2017.
- New actors have emerged, with Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia all establishing a presence over the last ten years.
- Djibouti, overlooking the Horn of Africa, hosts the highest number of non-African military bases (7): China, France, Japan, US, Germany, Italy and Saudi Arabia.

Military presence:
- Turkey in Somalia;
- Israel in Eritrea; Saudi Arabia in Djibouti

Djibouti, with its strategically important location, now hosts 7 non-African military bases

African countries: foreign military base or military presence (2023)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MIF based on ISS
France reduces its historical military presence in Africa
Following the end of Operation Barkhane in November 2022, President Macron announced in March 2023 that France would continue to further reduce its military presence on the continent. Starting originally in August 2014 to fight jihadist armed groups in the Sahel, Operation Barkhane, which represented approximately 3,000 French troops on African soil, officially finished in November 2022, following the coup in Mali. Led in cooperation with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger (G5 Sahel), it was later joined, to a small extent, by the UK (2016), Estonia (2018), and Sweden (2021). Parallel to the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane forces, France’s current permanent military presence in Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon and Senegal will be reduced from its current levels of over 3,000. The bases will be “africanised” and become ‘academies’ co-run by African and French armies. Only the French military base in Djibouti will remain in its current form (around 1,450 personnel). While the number of French soldiers present on the continent will continue to decrease, there will be increased focus on training and equipment.

Non-African countries: military base or military presence in Africa (2023)

- United States
- France
- Germany
- Italy
- United Arab Emirates
- India
- United Kingdom
- Belgium
- China
- Japan
- Russia
- Saudi Arabia
- Turkey
- Israel

The US has the largest military footprint in Africa with 16 military bases or cases of military presence in 2023

In early 2023, Russia announced the opening of a naval base in Sudan on the Red Sea

China is looking at opening an additional base in Equatorial Guinea in 2023
Chinese military expansion in Africa

- China is the second largest contributor to the UN Peacekeeping budget (18.68%), and there are currently 2,464 Chinese Blue Helmets operating on the African continent.
- For 2023, China is looking at opening an additional base in Bata, Equatorial Guinea.
- “To think that China, which talks about where it wants to be militarily in 2050, would be content with bases in Cambodia and Djibouti is short-sighted”
  E.A. Miller, US Africom’s Director of Intelligence analysis (Foreign Affairs, August 2022)

US military presence in Africa: “Advance US national interests and promote regional security, stability and prosperity”

- The US currently has the largest military presence on the continent, with at least 16 significant presences across Africa. A significant portion of the US presence is also suspected of being maintained in secret military bases or outposts, meaning the true number is likely higher.
- 6,000 or more US personnel are rotationally deployed in Africa, out of which 1,200 are in West Africa, with a significant percentage in Niger, which has become the key American hub in the region. Around 500 Special Operations forces are reportedly deployed in Somalia.
- Headquartered in Stuttgart, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) was created in 2008. “With partners, Africom counters transnational threats and malign actors, strengthens security forces, and responds to crises, in order to advance US national interests and promote regional security, stability and prosperity”.

In March 2023, 29 African countries, involving 1300 personnel, took part in the US annual military training exercise with West African armies.
Emerging actors:

India
• 4,576 Indian Blue Helmets are currently present within UNPKMs on the African continent (MONUSCO, UNMISS and UNISFA).
• India plans to establish 32 coastal radar surveillance stations around Seychelles and Mauritius to monitor activity in the Indian Ocean.
• India held its 2nd AFINDEX (Africa-India Field Training Exercise) on 21-29 March 2023 – 22 African countries participated, including 10 at Army Chief level: Congo Republic, Gambia, Kenya, Malawi, Niger, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Turkey
• After participating in NATO’s Combined Task Force for anti-piracy operations in 2009, Turkey has expanded its operations on the continent.
• Turkey opened its largest military base in Mogadishu in 2017.
• 30 African states have now signed different types of security-related agreements with Turkey, most of them in 2017. As of 2022, there are Turkish military attachés in 19 African countries.
• According to figures from the Turkish Exporters Assembly, Turkey’s defence and aerospace exports have increased more than five-fold between 2020 and 2021 (to reach $460.6 million).

The UAE
• The UAE opened its first African military base in Eritrea in 2015, with airfield and deepwater port facilities that have been used to support the UAE’s role in the Yemen conflict. However, in February 2021, under pressure from the US, it dismantled parts of the Assab military base.
• It has also established a presence in Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland and Socotra.

Diversifying partners: Tanzania’s example
Under President Suluhu Hassan, Tanzania, which is a long-standing partner of China on military training and arms procurement, is looking to diversify its security partners: the UAE for transfers of military technology, the UAE and Israel for speed and patrol boats and India at a more general level.

Drone diplomacy
• Turkey has sold drones to Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Libya, Mali, Niger and Togo.
• Iran has sold drones to Ethiopia, and is in talks with Algeria.
• China has sold drones to Ethiopia, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and recently DR Congo.

Humanitarian Aid
France’s Committee for International Cooperation and Development (CICID) in 2018 decided to increase the total annual (bilateral and multilateral) funding for emergency humanitarian action and post-crisis stabilization to €500 million by 2022.
• Japan – pledged $30 billion in African aid at the Tunis Summit in 2022
• US – announced in December 2022 to provide an additional $2 billion in humanitarian assistance for life saving assistance to support crisis affected people in Africa. In the fiscal year 2022 alone, USAID provided more than $6 billion in humanitarian assistance to Africa.
• In 2023, the US announced $150 million in new humanitarian assistance for the Sahel region as well as Western and Central Africa. As of March 2023, the US has provided $233 million in the FY 2023.
• United Arab Emirates – announced in 2022, a contribution of $85 million to address humanitarian situation in Horn of Africa
• UK – committed to spend £156 million in humanitarian aid to Eastern Africa in the financial year 2022-2023.
• EU Commission – allocated €181.5 million for humanitarian aid in 2023 to Western and Central Africa, this is in addition to the €102.5 million in humanitarian funding for Africa’s Lake Chad region.
Russia’s armed footprint in Africa

1. **Formal military-technical agreements**: Russia has already concluded bilateral military cooperation agreements with 22 African countries, 19 of which were signed after 2015, encompassing cooperation in the form of arms, ammunition, technology supply and military training.

2. **Private military contracts - Wagner Group**: a private military company with nebulous connections to the Russian government, known for its often-illicit activity and its frequent implication in human rights abuse allegations. The Wagner Group often supports Russian disinformation campaigns and provides military assistance to unstable governments in exchange for preferential access to resources.

African countries: strategic interests and military cooperation deals signed with Russia (2006-2022)

Source: MIF based on UNMISS and EEAS
Wagner Group’s existing military cooperation agreements in Africa

**Sudan**: Wagner Group provided security and logistical support to protect former president Omar al-Bashir. In exchange, Russian-owned businesses secured gold mining concessions.

**Central African Republic**: Wagner began supporting the government’s battle against rebel groups in 2017. In exchange, Russian advisers gained the state’s ear on political and economic matters.

**Mozambique**: Wagner Group supported government forces fighting jihadists in the north. A month before Wagner’s deployment in September 2019, Mozambique signed agreements on mineral resources, energy (particularly gas) and defence with Russia.

**Libya**: September 2019 - Wagner Group joined combat operations in Tripoli and currently has around 2,000 troops stationed.

**Madagascar**: Wagner Group was present in Madagascar during the 2019 presidential election, running campaigns initially in favour of the incumbent and then eventually supporting the winner Andry Rajoelina.

**Mali**: Late 2021 - Malian government contracted Wagner Group to fight extremism in the Sahel, confirmed by Sergei Lavrov.

**Mozambique**: Wagner exited and was replaced by Dyck Advisory (a South African private military company), who are also accused of human rights abuses.

**Mali**: April 2022 - UN experts called for investigations into Wagner Group’s role in the massacre of approximately 203 civilians in the town of Moura, Mopti region between 27-31 March 2022.

**Mali**: November 2022 - French Forces exited.

Russia’s 2023 projects:

**Sudan**: Construction of a Naval Base – The Russian and Sudanese governments reached an agreement in February 2023: a 25 year-long deal, to be extended every 10 years. It will provide a base for 300 soldiers and four navy ships, including nuclear powered ones.

**Niger**: Indications of expansions into Niger on Wagner’s Telegram channel. This could take the form of acquiring contractual access to Uranium mines in Arlit and Akokan, both located in the Arlit department of the Agadez region, as well as newly discovered gold deposits in northern Arlit.
Democracy trends in Africa

Democracy is backsliding at global level, and rapidly in Africa since 2018 which is a cause for concern.

- According to a V-DEM 2023 Democracy Report, the level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2022 has fallen back to 1986 levels. Almost three quarters of the world’s population (72%) live under an autocratic regime in 2022.
- According to the latest IIAG (2022), the indicator Democratic Elections has deteriorated rapidly from a peak score of 44.0 in 2018 to a decade-low score of 38.1 in 2021.
- Of the 16 coups recorded globally since 2017, all but one (Myanmar) have occurred in Africa.

Democracy remains the best system for the majority of people in Africa.

- According to separate surveys conducted by Afrobarometer and the Ichikowitz Foundation, 69% of Africa’s citizens still prefer democracy to any other kind of governance, while 74% of Africa’s youth believe that democracy remains preferable to any other kind of government.
- Political engagement among young people is on the rise, with 18% considering running for some political office.

African ownership

The AU’s African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG): adopted in 2007 and entered in force in 2012, it has been signed by 46 countries and ratified by 38.

- Countries that have neither signed nor ratified: Botswana, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Morocco and Tanzania.
- Countries that have signed but not yet ratified: Burundi, Cabo Verde, Congo Republic, DR Congo, Gabon, Mauritius, Senegal, Somalia, Eswatini, Tunisia and Uganda.
- Countries that have ratified without signing: Cameroon, Mali and Seychelles.

The AU’s African Governance Architecture: showcases the AU’s determination “to promote and protect human and people’s rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture and ensure good governance and the rule of law”. Its main objective is the implementation of the AU’s shared values and in particular the ACDEG.

**Western focus on democracy, human rights and the rule of law**

**EU**

The European Union has promoted democracy in Africa for decades through various initiatives, programmes and agreements.

**The 2000 Cotonou Agreement (for sub-Saharan Africa), and Association Agreements (Northern Africa): democracy and human rights clauses**

Replacing the 1975 Lomé Convention, the 2000 Cotonou Agreement covered relationships between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa/Caribbean/Pacific countries for 20 years and was based on three pillars: development cooperation, economic and trade partnerships and a political dimension.

The Cotonou Agreement contained a democracy clause setting out that democracy, human rights and rule of law are essential elements of the agreement. In the case of a violation, there was the potential for one party to take appropriate measures against the non-compliant party.

**African Union and coups**

The founding AU treaty authorises the Union intervention in a member state in response to grave violations of human rights, and reaffirms its opposition to “unconstitutional government change”, defined by either “a military coup d’état, an intervention by mercenaries, a seizure of power by armed dissident groups and rebel movements or a refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power after free, fair and regular elections”.

**AU’s challenges:**

- A key challenge for the AU is how to react to unconstitutional government change through popular discontent and mass uprisings.
- The border between what is considered democratic and non-democratic is blurred and makes it difficult for the AU to comment and adapt its policy.
- The AU also struggles with leaders who want to extend their terms through circumventing or removing their term limits.

**Countries suspended by the AU due to unconstitutional government change**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>CAR, Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>CAR, Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 countries have been suspended from the AU since 2003, some of them more than once, following an “unconstitutional government change” for 20 years (2000-2020), the Cotonou Agreement was a key tool used by the EU to promote democracy in Africa.
## Democracy & Human Rights clauses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African Country</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art. 9:2 Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, underpins the ACP-EU Partnership.</td>
<td>2000 Cotonou Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48 sub-Saharan African countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 2: Respect for the democratic principles and fundamental human rights established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall inspire the domestic and international policies of the Parties and shall constitute “an essential element” of this Agreement. Or</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 2: Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be “based on” respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes “an essential element” of this Agreement.</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2000 Association Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1998 Association Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All beneficiary countries “have to comply” with the principles laid down in core human rights and labour rights conventions including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.</td>
<td>Beneficiary countries of EU trade preferences (the vast majority of African countries)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MIF based on EU

---

### Post-Cotonou

Initially expected to expire in 2020, the Cotonou agreement was extended to November 2021 due to ongoing negotiations.

In 2021 the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States reached a new agreement to replace the Cotonou agreement. The post-Cotonou deal includes wider policy areas including migration issues, human rights and climate protection.

Despite the agreement being finalised by negotiators, it is yet to be signed due to a lack of unanimity on the part of the EU.
The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe

Launched on 14 June 2021, the NDICI now represents the EU’s external action main financing instrument.

Two out of their four thematic components cover Human Rights, Democracy, and Civil Society Organisations. Within the Human Rights and Democracy component, there are five overarching priorities:

1. Protecting and empowering individuals;
2. Building resilient, inclusive and democratic societies;
3. Promoting a global system for human rights and democracy;
4. Harnessing the opportunities and addressing the challenges of new technologies;
5. Delivering by working together

Global Europe Human Rights and Democracy programme: €1.5 billion 2021-2027

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Amount (MEUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Protecting and empowering individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Building resilient, inclusive and democratic societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Promoting a global system for human rights and democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Safeguarding fundamental freedoms, including harnessing the opportunities and addressing the challenges of digital and other new technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Delivering by working together</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

African elections are the most observed by the EU Election observers

Through its Election Observation Missions, the EU monitors and reports on the quality and legitimacy of elections globally.

- Between 2000 and 2022, the EU has sent election observation missions for 45 presidential elections and 45 parliamentary elections in Africa, the most of any world region.
- In the same period, Asia and the Pacific has only had seven presidential and 16 parliamentary elections observed.

Of the €1.5 billion under the Global Europe Human Rights and Democracy programme (2021-2027), around €750 million will be dedicated to country allocations - out of which Eastern, Central and Western African countries receive €170 million

Since 2000, the EU has deployed 90 presidential or parliamentary Election Observation Missions to Africa.
Countries in sub-Saharan Africa that are eligible for the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) have duty-free access to the US market for over 1800 products. As of 2022, 36 countries in sub-Saharan Africa are eligible for AGOA benefits.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a US foreign assistance agency that partners with developing countries who are “committed to good governance, and investing in their citizens and economic freedom”. MCC’s Board examines a country’s performance on 20 independent and transparent policy indicators.

Non-state actors

The Open Society Foundations (OSF) - OSF is the world’s largest private funded organisation focusing on justice, democratic governance and human rights.

Africa: Open Society Foundations expenditure (2016-2021)

Eligibility for US’s AGOA requires a market-based economy, the rule of law, political pluralism and the right to due process.

The 2022 US-Africa Summit: $165 million to support good governance and elections in Africa in 2023

Open Society Foundations has spent $708.2 million in Africa between 2016 and 2021.
Kofi Annan Foundation - “Supporting elections and democracy” is one of the “core areas of work” of the Kofi Annan Foundation, with two main initiatives:

- The Electoral Integrity Initiative, launched in 2013, focusing on “unaddressed political challenges that undermine elections”.
- The Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age convened in 2018 with the support of Stanford University and provides consultations and recommendations on leveraging technology to improve the integrity of elections.

The Ford Foundation - Funds a wide range of programmes globally, with a focus on social justice, through nine pillars, including Civic Engagement and Government and Gender, Racial and Ethnic Justice. In Eastern Africa, the programmes are related to civil engagement and government. In West and Southern Africa, the main programmes include gender, racial and ethnic justice.

Identity and biometry: World Bank’s ID4D Initiative

Instituted in 2014, the World Bank Group’s Identification for Development (ID4D) Initiative recognises the enabling and transformational role of identification systems in achieving several of the SDGs and advancing progress in many areas such as social protection, women and girls’ empowerment, financial inclusion, governance, healthcare, digital development and humanitarian response.

According to the 2021 ID4D Global Estimates Report, of the world’s estimated 843 million people without ID in 2021, 56% (471.9 million) were in sub-Saharan Africa.

As evidenced by an investment case commissioned by the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data, investments in strengthening data systems can offer an average rate of return of $32 of economic benefits for $1 invested.

- 28 African countries have World Bank financing operations approved or under preparation to improve the ID or Civil Registration systems.

With over half of the world’s unregistered population in Africa, there is a market worth €1.4 billion for biometric and digital identity technology.

- The boom is being driven by African governments, civil society as well as organisations such as ECOWAS, encouraging African countries to modernise civil society registration services. However, the main companies operating in Africa are European, including Semlex (Belgian), Veridos (Germany) and Idemia (France).

Ford Foundation’s global budget for civil engagement and government programmes: $31 million with a total of 205 grantees

1.1 billion people globally are unable to prove their identity. 1/2 of them are in Africa

“What is the most effective, impactful use of philanthropic capital?... philanthropy needs to be a catalyst, it needs to be an innovator, it needs to be a risk taker.”

Mark Suzman, CEO of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
Alternative choices: new 'model' competition?

In recent years, African countries have diversified their political and economic engagement with countries across the globe, and western partners’ ability to impose political conditionalities has waned. Alternative partners offer an alternative approach to the liberal democracy promoted by the West.

China’s model: “authoritarian capitalism” vs “liberal democracy”?

In recent years, China has opened political dialogue with Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. Economic growth and unprecedented development have enabled China to share the governance structures that have led to this success.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as defined by President Xi has five goals: Achieve policy, Infrastructure, Trade, Financial and People-to-people connectivity.

The “People-to-people connectivity” is fostered through political party training programmes such as:

- Lectures at Chinese education or training institutions
- Field trips to a local government for first-hand experience and meetings with local officials, farmers and businesses
- Cultural programmes to familiarise participants with Chinese traditional culture.

Another aim is to grow networks between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and other political parties in Africa while providing training on CCP style governance such as:

- Influencing public opinion
- Government-media relations
- Internet censorship and opposition monitoring
- Managing criticism of the party
- Fostering constituent loyalty

Although the CCP has engaged with ruling parties such as the African National Congress of South Africa and the Jubilee Party of Kenya (until 2022 elections), political training has also been offered to other political parties such as the Communist Party of South Africa, the National Congress Party of Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement of South Sudan and the South West African People’s Organization of Namibia.

Under the China-Africa Action Plan 2018-2021, China has pledged to train 50,000 African civil servants

China trained more than 2000 young political leaders in Africa between 2011 and 2015

Iran’s footprint in Africa

- Iran’s footprint in Africa is growing, based on the opportunity to capitalise on the anti-western mood, and to counteract the influence from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and the US on the continent, specifically when it comes to the control of the Red Sea corridor.
- For many years, Iran has opened “cultural centres” and financed schools and hospitals, especially in countries with a Shia community: Chad, DR Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania.
- Between 2022 and 2023, African countries have hosted diplomatic visits: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Tanzania. In January 2023, the Islamic Republic of Iran has announced the nomination of an ambassador to Burkina Faso.

“We have to discuss the repercussions of the emerging Cold War... between the West and Russia, and between America and China... the repercussions which will come to Africa. We will have to avoid being the field of this battle.”

Amr Moussa, Chair of Interpeace, former Secretary General of the Arab League
Latin America: increased cooperation prospects?

Brazil back on track

During his first two terms in office (2003-2010), President Lula initiated the opening of 19 Brazilian embassies in Africa. Bilateral trade between Brazil and Africa increased seven-fold, from $4 billion to $28 billion during this period. President Lula also devoted special attention to Africa, promoting investment in infrastructure, food security, health, biodiversity, science and technology. Africa remained a key focus for the Instituto Lula, including partnerships with the AU, NEPAD and FAO.

As his third mandate began in January 2023, President Lula is already planning his first trip to Africa in the coming months, not limited to Portuguese-speaking countries: Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal.

The PALOP group (Paises Africanos de Lingua Official Portuguesa)

Formed in 1992, the organisation groups the six African Lusophone countries: Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and Principe, Equatorial Guinea.

Brazil has technical cooperation agreements with all Portuguese-speaking PALOP countries, under the coordination of the ABC (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação), in partnership with several key Brazilian institutions, such as FIOCRUZ, SENAI, federal and state universities, the Ministry of Health, the Office of the Federal Public Defender, the National Council of Justice, the Public Ministry, the Central Bank of Brazil, the National Cancer Institute, and the National School of Public Administration.

Noteworthy are the Professional Training Centres implemented in Cabo Verde, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Principe and Angola, focusing on the employability of the local young population, the expansion of the supply of qualified professionals for the market, and the increase of competitiveness in the industrial sector.

“Cooperating in a mutating world”

Launched in 2012, the Atlantic Dialogues hosted in Marrakech by the Policy Center for the New South initial vision was to “underscore the growing importance of Africa and Latin America as key actors of the Southern Atlantic space”. The 2022 theme was: “Cooperation in a Mutating World: Opportunities of the Wider Atlantic”.

Brazil is a founding member of the BRICS group
Political interference: the rise of "hybrid threats"

According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), disinformation campaigns are rampant across Africa.

- Of the more than 50 documented disinformation campaigns on the continent, roughly 60% are externally driven.
- Russia has targeted at least 16 African countries.
- In Somalia, a disinformation campaign was led by Egypt and the UAE.
- China and Israel have also engaged in political campaigns in Africa.

According to the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), "sub-Saharan Africa is becoming a testing ground for hybrid threats. While violent extremism and terrorism will remain security priorities for the next decade and beyond, multiple forms of hybrid threats constitute an exponential challenge in the transnational security landscape."

Beyond cyberattacks and information manipulation, these threats also include foreign interference in elections.


According to the ACSS, Russia’s information manipulation activities have targeted at least 16 African countries – Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Ghana, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Source: MIF based on Africa Center for Strategic Studies
**SPOTLIGHT**

"Summit competition"

### Nine Africa summits/meetings between November 2021-December 2023

1. November 2021: Eighth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) ministerial meeting, Dakar, Senegal
2. December 2021: Third Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit, Istanbul, Turkey
3. February 2022: Sixth African Union/European Union (AU/EU) Summit, Brussels, Belgium
4. August 2022: Eighth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD8), Tunis, Tunisia
6. March 2023: Russia-Africa International Parliamentary Conference, Moscow, Russia
7. March 2023: Second Africa-India Field Training Exercise (AFINDEX), Pune, India
8. Scheduled July 2023: Second Summit Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum, St. Petersburg, Russia

### Europe: Sixth AU/EU, February 2022, Brussels

“A joint vision for a renewed partnership. The aims of the partnership are solidarity, security, peace and sustainable and sustained economic development and prosperity for the citizens of the two Unions today and in the future, bringing together people, regions and organisations. It aims to promote common priorities, shared values, and international law, and to preserve interests and common public goods. This includes the protection of human rights for all, gender equality and women’s empowerment in all spheres of life, the rule of law, actions to preserve the climate, environment, biodiversity, as well as sustainable and inclusive economic growth and the fight against inequalities”.


“The summit built on shared values to better foster new economic engagement; reinforce the US-Africa commitment to democracy and human rights; mitigate the impact of COVID-19 and of future pandemics; work collaboratively to strengthen regional and global health; promote food security; advance peace and security; respond to the climate crisis; and amplify diaspora ties”.

### Russia: Second Russia-Africa Summit, scheduled for July 2023, St. Petersburg

“The Russia–Africa Summit aims at bringing about a fundamentally new level of mutually beneficial partnership to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The goal is to promote efforts to strengthen comprehensive and equal cooperation between Russia and African nations across all areas of society including politics, security, economic relations, science and technology, and the cultural and humanitarian spheres”.

**The 2nd Russia-Africa Summit is scheduled for July 2023 in St. Petersburg**
Japan: Eighth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD8), August 2022, Tunis

"Placed in a post-COVID-19 context, the discussions during this Eighth Conference revolve around three themes: 1. Achieving sustainable and inclusive growth with reduced economic inequalities, 2. Realising a sustainable and resilient society based on human security, 3. Building sustainable peace and stability through supporting Africa’s own efforts”.

India: Second Africa-India Field Training Exercise (AFINDEX), March 2023, Pune

"Learning from the African experience in cooperative security & management of security crisis situations and conflicts, and promoting a collaborative approach in capacity enhancement of African armies are among the objectives. The first session will explore the key pillars of India-Africa defence partnership, while the second session will focus on the Indian defence industry’s outreach to Africa”.

Turkey: Fourth Turkey-Africa Economic and Business Forum (TABEF), scheduled for 2023, Istanbul

The third TABEF theme was Deepening Turkey-Africa Partnership: Trade, Investment, Technology & Logistics "Turkey and Africa used to seem far away from one another unfortunately despite their shared history dating back more than a thousand years. There used to be many artificial barriers placed between Turkey and Africa, with prejudices eclipsing the truth. We got started by first tearing down these prejudices. We have built bridges from heart to heart between our nation and the peoples of Africa. The essence of our relations with Africa is sincerity, brotherhood and solidarity" (President Erdogan, opening the third TABEF).

Africa +1 Summits are not new, but are recurring and more frequent than ever

• Since 1973: nearly 30 France – Africa Summits
• Since 1993: 8 Tokyo International Conferences on African Development (TICADs)
• Since 2000: 8 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Summits (FOCAC)
• Since 2008: 3 India-Africa Forum Summits (IAFS)
• Since 2008: 3 Africa-Turkey Partnership Summits
• Since 2014: 2 US-Africa Leaders’ Summits
• By July 2023: 2 Russia-Africa Summits

Summits held by rising powers are the most attended

• The 2018 FOCAC: attended by 51 African heads of state or government (HoSG)
• The 2022 US-Africa Leaders’ Summit: attended by 49 HoSG and the African Union.
• The 2019 Africa-Russia Summit: attended by 43 major African leaders

Extensive Financial Packages and Support for African countries

• 2021 FOCAC: $40 billion available for different sectors plus $1 billion for COVID-19 vaccines
• 2015 India-Africa Forum Summit: $10 billion in concessional credit over 5 years
• 2022 US-Africa Leaders’ Summit: $215 million in new funding to address the Covid-19 pandemic in Africa; $800 million Transformation with Africa (DTA) Initiative
• 2022 AU/EU Summit: €150 billion in investment packages

Between 2010 and 2016, more than 320 embassies were opened in Africa, likely the biggest embassy-building boom anywhere, ever
19-20 March 2023 - Russia-Africa International Parliamentary Conference

The Conference was attended by 40 African delegations.

“Russia and African countries uphold the norms of morality and social principles that are traditional for our peoples and oppose the neo-colonial ideology imposed from outside. Many states of Asia, the Middle East and Latin America adhere to similar positions, and together make up the world majority…We are ready to jointly shape the global agenda, work together to strengthen fair and equal interstate relations, and improve mechanisms for mutually beneficial economic cooperation.” (President Putin, opening the Conference)

Three roundtables were organised:

1. Legislative Response to Economic Challenges: “The modern economic challenges are crises caused by Western countries guided by the United States, numerous economic sanctions aimed at destroying the Russian economy, introduced in violation of all international trade rules and foreign economic relations. Unlike many Western countries, Russia does not have colonial experience, and the contribution of the Soviet Union to the liberation of African countries from colonial dependence is also well known. Africa stands for an equal partnership: mutual economic interests include investments, cooperation within production chains, cooperation in strategic infrastructure projects, energy, medicine and financial technologies. It is necessary to support the transformation processes of a multipolar world”.

2. Indivisible Security: Capabilities and Contributions of Parliaments. “Participants of the round table discussion on the topic ”Indivisible Security: Capabilities and Contributions of Parliaments” thoroughly examined the importance of sovereignty protection, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, fight against poverty, countering terrorism and military biological threats”.

3. Neocolonialism of the West: How to Prevent the Repetition of History. “Russia and African countries want an equal world without imposition of Western paradigm of consciousness”.

“(Increasing Africa’s international prestige) is an absolutely objective and logical trend which the collective West, led by the United States, does not want to acknowledge. They want to preserve their superiority and role as global hegemon, things that are becoming a thing of the past. They are reluctant to change their mentality of neocolonialism and are using well-known means of deterrence, such as sanctions, threats, blackmail, double standards, and blatant hypocrisy… Russia has always been committed to the principles of equality, mutual respect, the inherent right of each state to choose its own path of development, its own future without interference from the outside. Russia’s cooperation, mutually respectful, and equal, with African countries has been built on these principles for decades.” (V. Matviyenko, Speaker of the Federation Council)

“Russia and African countries are united by shared goals: We stand together for building a multipolar, just world based on respect for the traditions, culture, and history of the countries with which we are building mutually beneficial cooperation” (V. Volodin, Chairman of the State Duma).
Africa’s youth perspective

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Now Generation Network (NGN) consists of the Ibrahim alumni of Fellows, scholars, and thematic experts. The NGN is a pan-African network with members from all 54 African countries representing various sectors and disciplines.

NGN Survey on Global Africa

To gather a snapshot of African youths’ perspectives on Global Africa, we developed a specific survey, around 4 sections discussing: Africa in the world, the world in Africa, and Africa’s voice in the global multilateral system.

Each section contained a maximum of 12 questions, ranging from multiple-choice, open-ended questions to Likert scales.

NGN Survey Results

The survey analysis mainly highlighted the NGN belief that African countries need to foster intra-African relations.

Fostering African reliance

Should African countries pursue free trade with the rest of the world or rely on local production, protecting local producers from foreign competition?

- Yes, they should pursue free trade deals, but only within Africa (38.8%).
- Yes, they should pursue free trade deals (35.0%).
- No, African countries should prioritise the protection of local producers (26.3%).
  - The first and last can be lumped together as Africa-focused (65.0%).

What is the primary challenge in African countries’ relations with external partners?

- Foreign exploitation of Africa (35.4%), poor leadership and governance (20.3%), African financial limitations (12.7%), and lack of an African voice (10.1%).

“Our main challenge is to place ourselves in the position of negotiators, not beneficiaries. We need to value ourselves. And that implies valuing our populations, our seas, our rivers, our sea beaches, and our mountains as riches that put us in a situation of great advantage in relation to external partners.”

NGN Member
Who is the best investment partner for African countries?

- China seemed to be popular as the best investment partner (20.0%), followed by the EU (12.5%), then the International Monetary Fund/World Bank (11.3%).
- Interestingly the fourth most significant input was self-stated, stating that African countries should invest in other African countries and not look abroad.

Africa now and its future

What is Africa’s biggest asset?

- The people (67.9%: youth 37.6%, women 4.6%, generic human capital 25.7%); natural resources (21.1%), and African culture (11.0%).

What is Africa’s weakness?

- Poor leadership and governance structures (48.0%), corruption (14.0%), colonial history and Western drain (8.6%).
- Africa’s biggest challenge is to position itself as a crucial continent for the survival of the planet, showing itself with all its riches that it has as much or more conditions to lead in certain domains and to be recognised as such.
- The biggest challenge or obstacle we currently have is the lack of a collective awareness of the need to unite all in one voice in defence of the ideals of Pan-Africanism and in realising the aspirations of Agenda 2063 of the African Union.

“Africa is now positioned to be the most important driver of global business with a $3.5 trillion market opportunity. The continent of Africa has staked its position as the cornerstone of the world’s future. Africa is in its rightful place on the global stage, building new opportunities for itself and for the world. We are telling our own stories, recognising and addressing our mistakes, building powerful and viable economic engines, and no longer asking for permission for a spot on the global stage.”

NGN Member
Which of the African Union’s Agenda 2063’s aspirations is most critical to you at this stage?

- Aspiration 3: An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law (28.8%).
- Aspiration 1: A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development (25.0%).
- Aspiration 6: An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children (22.5%).
- Aspiration 7: Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner (15.0%).
- Aspiration 2: An integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance (3.8%).
- Aspiration 4: A peaceful and secure Africa (3.8%).
- Aspiration 5: An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values and ethics (1.3%).

Which international body would you most like to see greater African representation in?

- UN Security Council (47.5%), G20 (27.5%), International Monetary Fund (15.0%), World Bank (7.5%)
Chapter 04. Africa’s voice in the current multilateral architecture
**SPOTLIGHT**

**G7, G20, BRICS... how representative?**

Africa & inter-governmental groups: GDP (year of creation-2023)

![Bar chart showing GDP growth for G7, G20, BRICS, Africa groups over years 1976, 1999, 2011, 2023.]

- **G7**: less wealth, less people
  - The G7’s share of global GDP fell from 61.8% since its creation in 1976 (WB) to 43.5% in 2023 (IMF). The G7’s share of the global population fell from 14.3% to 9.7%, while the world population almost doubled from 1976 to 2023.

- **G20**: less wealth, less people
  - The G20’s share of the global population fell since its creation in 1999 from 67.2% to 61.7% in 2023. The G20’s share of global GDP fell from 89.5% in 1999, to 86.4% in 2023.

- **BRICS**: growing wealth, same people
  - The BRICS’s group share of global GDP grew from 19.6% in 2011 to 26.2% in 2023. The BRICS’s share of global population has stayed close to 40% over the period.

Notes: GDP data for the G7 at date of creation was collected from WB as IMF data only goes back to 1980, similarly, 2023 estimates were collected from IMF as WB only goes up to 2021. As such these data points are treated as proxies and are not directly comparable.

The Group of Eight (G8) was an inter-governmental political forum from 1997 until 2014. It had formed from incorporating Russia into the Group of Seven, or G7, and returned to its previous name after Russia was expelled in 2014. For the purpose of the GDP and population calculations here, only the original G7 countries have been taken into account: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US.

In 2023, Africa’s share of global population is 18% - almost double that of the G7
AFRICA’S PLACE AT THE UNITED NATIONS (UN)

At the General Assembly (UNGA): the largest voting bloc

Africa makes up the largest voting bloc in the UNGA with 28.0% of the vote, compared to Asia’s 24.4%
- North America has 1.0% of the vote, while Europe makes up 22.3%.
- Latin America and the Caribbean has 17.1% of the vote, while Oceania makes up 7.3%.

World regions: share of membership votes and power in UN bodies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Latin America and the Caribbean</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>North America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members (2023)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA Votes (%)</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC P5 (2023)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Time spent in UNSC Presidency (% of total time since 1946)</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: MIF based on UN

At the Security Council (UNSC): no permanent seat

While the overall membership of the UN has nearly quadrupled from 51 members in 1945 to its current 193 members, there has been no evolution of the UNSC membership.

There are five permanent members (P5): China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, holding veto power.

There are 10 elected members (rotating), without veto power.
- Three African countries are currently non-permanent UNSC members: Gabon, Ghana and Mozambique.

Russia chaired the UNSC in April 2023, despite being engaged in the conflict in Ukraine.
Since 1946, African countries have accounted for 16.3% of total month-long presidencies of the UNSC. Europe and Asia dominate chairmanship time with 38.0% and 20.8% respectively.

- For Africa, the country which chaired the UNSC the most is Nigeria (10 months), followed by Egypt, Tunisia, and Ghana (7 months).
- Of the bottom 20 countries to have chaired the UNSC, nine are African.
  France, China, the US and the UK are the countries with most time spent in the presidency.

Despite forming the largest group of any world region at the UNGA (28%), and with at least 50% of UNSC Resolutions in 2022 relating to African issues, only 3 UNSC members are African - none of them permanent.

UN Peacekeeping Missions (UNPKM): Africa contributes over 40% of all troops

Rwanda, Egypt, Ghana and Senegal are in the top 10 contributing states to UNPKM personnel on the ground.
African votes on the Russia-Ukraine conflict

**Evolution of African votes against Russia/Ukraine war: “friends or foes”?**

- **2 March 2022**: 1 against, 8 absent, 17 abstentions, 28 for
- **12 October 2022**: 0 against, 5 absent, 19 abstentions, 30 for
- **23 February 2023**: 2 against, 7 absent, 15 abstentions, 30 for

**Between March 2022 and February 2023**, Mali went from **Abstention** to **Against**, Gabon went from **For** to **Abstention**, Tanzania went from **Abstention** to **Absent**

**2 March 2022**
UNGA Resolution ES-11/1: Aggression against Ukraine

**12 October 2022**
UNGA Resolution ES-11/4: Territorial Integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations

**23 February 2023**

Source: MIF based on UN
AFRICA’S PLACE IN THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS

At the International Monetary Fund: the most members, the most programmes, only 6.5% of voting shares

Africa has more IMF members than any other world region, accounting for 54 out of the 190 members.
African countries have carried out by far the most IMF programmes and are the most directly impacted by the IMF operations.

Africa has had the most IMF programmes of any region this century

World regions: total IMF programmes (2000-2023)

Africa holds only 6.5% of voting shares at the IMF, the lowest weight of any region bar Oceania

The US and Europe’s ‘gentleman’s agreement’
According to a gentleman’s agreement between the US and Europe, the IMF is always led by a European and the World Bank by a US national.

Africa holds only 6.5% of voting shares at the IMF, the lowest weight of any region but Oceania

World region: share of IMF votes (2023)

The US, with 16.5% of IMF voting shares, has an effective veto power on major decisions which require an 85% majority, including any change in quotas.

The G7 alone holds over 40% of voting shares in the IMF despite representing less than 5% of IMF members and less than 10% of the global population.
At the World Bank: the most IDA eligible countries, the most IDA loans, only 11% of voting shares

Over 99% of World Bank lending to Africa occurs through the International Development Association (IDA), which provides concessional lending to the world’s poorest countries, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which primarily lends to middle-income countries.
- African countries account for 40 out of 75 countries eligible to receive IDA resources.
- Africa accounted for over half of total IDA loans (52.0%) between 2012 and 2021.

Africa accounts for over half of IDA lending

World regions: IDA loan disbursements (2012–2021)

Africa accounts for only 11.0% of IDA votes

World regions: IDA voting shares (2021)

Who runs the World Bank?

The World Bank Group’s daily operations are run by 25 Executive Directors. The US, Japan, China, Germany, France and the UK each appoint one Executive Director. The remaining 184 member countries elect 19 Executive Directors between them.

Source: MIF based on World Bank

Africa and IDA: most eligible countries, most loans, but only 11% of voting shares
The IBRD: Africa has a small voting share and less than one-fifth of loans

The IBRD covers roughly one third of World Bank lending to Africa. The IBRD primarily lends to middle-income countries. Only 16.4% of IBRD loans went to Africa between 2012 and 2021 and Africa only accounts for 7.3% of votes.

Even at the AfDB, non-African nations have considerable influence over bank policies and priorities. Voting shares are divided between African regional-members (58.8%) and non-regional members (41.2%) from outside the continent.

Even though the top voting shares are for Nigeria (8.7%), four of the top ten countries by voting shares are not African: US (6.5%), Japan (5.4%), Germany (4.1%) and Canada (3.9%).
WHO SPEAKS FOR AFRICA?

The African Union: dual leadership and limited budget

The African Union (AU) is a continental body made up of 55 member states. The Assembly, comprising the Heads of State and Government, is the AU’s supreme policy and decision-making organ. The Chairperson of the African Union is voted in by the member states, among the current Heads of State or Government, for one year only, without renewal.

For the EU, the President of the European Council (PEC) is appointed as a full-time President for a 2.5-year term, renewable once. Since 2009, all PECs have been former Prime Ministers.

The Chairperson of the Commission is elected by the Assembly for a four-year term, renewable once.

The AU struggles to self-finance

AU members are supposed to provide fees to pay for the operations of the organisation. In 2022, the AU began naming countries that were paying less than half of their fee contributions to the AU budget. 14 countries were subjected to cautionary sanctions.

With the implementation of the decision to impose a 0.2% levy on eligible imported goods, 11 Member States have used this levy to pay their dues partially or fully.

For the EU, the President of the European Council (PEC) is appointed as a full-time President for a 2.5-year term, renewable once. Since 2009, all PECs have been former Prime Ministers.

“We must take care of our security. 60 years after the formation of the AU, we cannot continue to depend on Europe, the EU, the US, China... to manage our affairs.”

H.E. William Ruto, President of Kenya

Over 1/3 of AU Member States do not pay their full contribution to the annual AU budget.
As of 2022, the AU is reliant on external contributors for 66% of its total annual budget, with 31% coming from Member State contributions and the remaining 3% from administrative and reserve funds.

The largest share of the AU’s total budget is spent on its Peace Support Budget, which is almost entirely funded by external partners.

**Comparing the AU and the EU**

While the EU’s 2022 budget was $180 billion, the AU’s budget for the same year was $650 million.

With 27 member states in the EU vs 55 member states in the AU (currently reduced to 51 with the suspension of Sudan, Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso following recent coups) and a population less than three times that of Africa, the EU has a budget 276 times bigger than the AU.

In 2021, the AU’s peace support budget was entirely funded by external partners.
African heads of multinational bodies

Amina J. Mohammed (Nigeria), Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations and Chair of the United Nations Sustainable Development Group since 2017

Audrey Azoulay (Morocco), Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) since 2017

Gilbert F. Houngbo (Togo), Director-General of the International Labour Organization (ILO) since October 2022

Ibrahim Thiaw (Mauritania), Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) since 2019

Louise Mushikiwabo (Rwanda), Secretary General of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) since 2018

Makhtar Diop (Senegal), Managing Director of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Executive Vice President since 2021

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (Nigeria), Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2021

Pramila Patten (Mauritius), Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict

Sanda Ojiambo (Kenya), Assistant Secretary-General and CEO of the United Nations Global Compact since 2022

Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus (Ethiopia), Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) since 2017

Winifred Byanyima (Uganda), Executive Director of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS) since 2019

Damilola Ogunbiyi (Nigeria), CEO of Sustainable Energy for All (SEforALL) and Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sustainable Energy for All
Africa’s economic powerhouses: representing the continent in global forums

As of 2023, three countries represent almost half (43.2%) of the continent’s GDP: Nigeria (16.9%), South Africa (13.3%), and Egypt (12.9%).

In terms of population share, Nigeria is 1st at 15.3% and Egypt 3rd at 7.7%. South Africa is 7th (4.2%). Combined, these three countries represent more than one fourth (27.2%) of Africa’s total population.

South Africa: the only African country represented on global coalitions such as the G20, BRICS and the OECD

G20: South Africa is currently the only G20 member representing Africa. In 2023, South Africa will be joining the G20 “troika” which is a three-member group of past, current and succeeding presidencies, and will take up the G20’s presidency in 2025.

BRICS: At the fifth BRICS summit in Durban (2013), South Africa called for BRICS-Africa cooperation on infrastructure. In 2023, South Africa is taking over the BRICS chairmanship and will host the summit scheduled for August 2023.

OECD: In 2007, South Africa became one of five key partners to the OECD. As of 2018, South Africa has been an associate in six OECD bodies and projects, and a participant in 15. South Africa has led many of the OECD’s regional initiatives in Africa.

Egypt: one of Africa’s most globally active countries

Egypt dominates the global diplomatic engagement with 131 diplomatic missions abroad and memberships of various international organisations. In 2023, Egypt became a member of BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB). Prior to that, Egypt hosted the UN Climate Change Conference (COP27) in 2022.

Nigeria: Africa’s most populous country

Nigeria is leading the demographic growth of Africa with a population expected to double by 2050.

Nigeria is also a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), as well as of MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey).

South Africa has the highest African voting shares in the IMF (0.6%), and comes 6th for the AfDB members’ voting shares (5.0%)

Egypt has the 3rd highest African voting shares in the IMF (0.4%), and comes 2nd for the AfDB members’ voting shares (6.1%)

Nigeria has the highest member voting shares in the AfDB (8.7%), and the 2nd highest African voting shares in the IMF (0.4%)
Reforming the multilateral architecture: multiple proposals

UN reform proposals

Main UNSC Reform Plans

- Proposal of the G4 (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan)
  - Enlarging the number of seats to 25
  - Permanent seats: The G4 + two states from the African Group including South Africa
  - Non-permanent seats: +4

- Proposal of the Coffee Club (Canada, Italy, Argentina, Pakistan, Mexico, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and others)
  - Non-permanent seats: +10
  - Creation of semi-permanent members
  - Limiting the veto power of permanent members on a case-by-case basis

- Proposal of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
  - Two options

- Proposal of the African Union
  - At least two permanent seats with veto power
  - Non-permanent seats: +5

Source: MIF based on UN

China suggestions

“Increasing the representation of developing countries as part of the reform of the UNSC. Any reforms should enable more countries, particularly small and medium-sized states, to get involved in the UNSC’s decision-making process. It should correct the over-representation of developed countries, improve the representation of developing countries, correct the historical injustice suffered by Africa. It should also provide more opportunities to small and medium countries from Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and small island countries.” - Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in 2022.

UK suggestions

- Expansion of both permanent and non-permanent seats.
- Permanent seats for the G4 (India, Germany, Japan and Brazil) as well as permanent African representation in some form.
- Co-sponsor the Veto Initiative which will hold vetoing powers to account.

US suggestions

In September 2022, President Biden affirmed US support for increasing the number of permanent and non-permanent representatives. Particularly, the inclusion of countries from Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, in addition to “those nations [the US has] long supported” - including the G4 countries.

J.E. Schwartzberg proposal: weighted voting in the UNGA, based on variables such as population and/or gross national income

G20 reform proposals

The G20 plays an important role in shaping as well strengthening the global architecture and governance on all major international economic issues.

Currently, the G20 comprises 19 countries plus the EU as such. South Africa is the only African country in the group. Of the nine guest countries, three are African (Bangladesh, Egypt, Mauritius, Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Singapore, Spain and the UAE).

Africa’s G20 fully fledged membership has been strongly advocated by the previous Chairperson of the African Union, Macky Sall. It has already been backed by Indonesia (outgoing G20 Chair), Russia, China, France and the US, as well as most recently by the European Council (30 June 2023) and India (current G20 chair).
Bretton Woods institutions reform proposals

In recent years, the challenging combination of the COVID-19 pandemic, worsening climate change, the fallout of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, and the spectre of a public debt crisis has led to growing criticism and concerns from the Global South, itself still facing tremendous development challenges over the efficiency of the current multilateral financial system, created almost 80 years ago.

“The impact of these compounding shocks on developing countries is aggravated by an unfair global financial system that is short-term oriented and crisis-prone, and that further exacerbates inequalities”. (UNSG’s SDG Stimulus to Deliver Agenda 2030- February 2023)

The financial environment has changed: countries are in higher debt everywhere, capital has become scarce, interest rates are soaring and volatility is growing.

Momentous additional funding is required to build resilience, prevent shocks and mitigate the impact of global crises, specifically climate change. The ongoing funding gap to achieve the SDGs is now estimated at more than a staggering $4 trillion annually.

The existing model appears unable to rise to the challenges of the 21st century. The international financial architecture has to be amended. The ‘clients’ of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), such as African countries, need their voices to be heard.

2023: a key year for reform

- April: IMF/WBG Spring meetings (Washington D.C.)
- May: G7 Summit (Hiroshima)
- June: Summit for a New Global Financial Pact (Paris)
- August: BRICS Summit (Johannesburg)
- September: Africa Climate Summit (Nairobi)
- September: Finance in Common Summit (Cartagena)
- September: G20 Summit (New Delhi)
- September: 2nd SDG Summit (New York)
- October: IMF/WB Annual Meetings (Marrakech)
- November: COP28 (Dubai)
- December: conclusion of IMF Quotas 16th General Review

Leveraging Africa’s own resources

Fighting illicit financial flows, enlarging tax revenues and making use of pension funds are also key to providing additional needed resources.

“Nearly 80 years later [after its inception], the global financial architecture is outdated, dysfunctional, and unjust. The global financial system perpetuates and even exacerbates inequalities. [Its] rules have become profoundly immoral.”


Pursuing the dual goal of sustainability and development is key, without deprioritising one for the other

$88.6 billion leaves the continent annually as illicit capital flight - more than the $83.0 billion received in FDI inflows in 2021
Making the global system work for the Global South

- Give a better voice to the Global South at IMF and WB
  - Balance the creditor-centred approach with borrowers’ priorities.
  - Create a double majority system on significant decisions which would require not only shareholder majorities but also member-state majorities.
- Expand concessional finance
  - Increase grant and below market rate financing for global goods such as climate mitigation and adaptation.
- Reduce policy conditionality
  - Give borrower countries the policy space to pursue their own development paths.
  - Scrap burdensome austerity measures on loan conditions.
- Leverage MDBs’ balance sheets
- Innovate in financial engineering (e.g. ‘hybrid capital’)
- Create specific financial relief mechanisms for potential natural disasters and pandemics
  - Automatically suspend servicing payments in times of crisis.
  - Launch specific fund/trust/mechanism for quickly raising reconstruction grants, to avoid raising the debt levels of the most vulnerable countries.
- Increase process efficiency
  - Remove lending approval delays.
  - Reduce the burden of excessive conditionalities.
  - Increase coordination on the ground.
- Limit the US dollar dominance
  - Democratise the issuance of reserve currencies and move towards a multipolar global monetary system.
  - Reduce the dependence on the dollar and hard currencies in trade and finance and increase the use of local currencies to reduce Africa’s financial instability.
  - Increase investor demand for local currency debt MDBs by expanding credit and risk guarantees for eligible borrowers.
  - Promote the use of GDP-linked local currency bonds to encourage demand for local currency debt.
- Extend SDR’s recycling
  - Increase the recycling of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) through MDBs (such as the AfDB) to complement the IMF’s Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST).

The Borrowers’ Club: Proposed by Development Reimagined, the ‘Borrower’s Club’ would allow countries to take loans together, using each other’s growth prospects as collateral. The loan repayments would be small, with low interest – while sufficient to build in a ‘cushion’ for temporary collateral.

Afreximbank’s Pan-African Payment System (PAPSS), launched in January 2022, will make African currencies freely convertible with one another without having to go through a third currency such as the dollar or euro. The initiative could save the continent an estimated $5 billion in transactions annually.

In 2012, the German government and its national development bank, the KfW, launched the African Local Currency Bonds Fund to support the growth of local currency bond markets on the continent.

PAPSS: Five major African commercial banks have signed the MoU at Afreximbank 30th Annual Meetings (June 2023)
Ongoing proposals:

The WBG Evolution Roadmap

The World Bank Group’s ‘evolution roadmap’ aims to better address development challenges such as poverty, shared prosperity, inequality and cross-border challenges including climate change, pandemics, and fragility, conflict and violence. The first draft outlines three building blocks:

- Clarifying and expanding the Vision and Mission – broadening the Twin Goals (ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity) and focusing on other Global Public Goods, and expanding the bank’s financial capacity.
- Reviewing the Operating Model – including options to enhance the country engagement model; broader definitions of poverty, shared prosperity and sustainability, boost private capital.
- Enhancing the Financial Model – exploring technical options to expand resources (risk transfer, non-voting hybrid capital and callable capital, and statutory lending limit amendments.

Both civil society and many shareholders consider that the paper lacked the ambition needed. The World Bank’s Development Committee has discussed an updated version of the proposal at the Spring Meetings.

The Bridgetown Initiative

Spearheaded by Mia Mottley, the Prime Minister of Barbados in June 2022, the agenda has been embraced by a number of philanthropic foundations and NGOs.

The first step would be to implement policies that respond to urgent financing needs and are achievable in six months.

- Getting the MDBs to better leverage their balance sheets (Capital Adequacy Framework) in order to increase lending to middle income countries by hundreds of billions.
- Creating contingent debt instruments - include climate and pandemic clauses in debt contracts triggering automatic debt service suspension when crises of a certain scale hit.
- Creating a Global Mitigation Trust seeded with IMF SDRs.

G20 Financial Architecture Working Group

The International Financial Architecture Working Group is one of the important workstreams under the G20 Finance Track with a focus on strengthening the international financial architecture. It also aims to address multiple challenges faced by vulnerable countries.
The World Trade Organization (WTO): African priorities on the sidelines

Unlike the World Bank and IMF, WTO major decisions are taken by member states rather than by executive directors. Decisions are normally taken by consensus and not based on majority shareholding. However, the rules agreed at its creation were heavily biased in favour of the priorities of rich countries to the detriment of poorer developing countries, and attempts to rectify this bias have been unsuccessful.

Many African countries believe the organisation sidelines African priorities. Key issues such as rich-world agricultural subsidies undercutting Africa’s farmers, the failure to facilitate the development of local value chains on the continent, inflexible positions on patent waivers for medicines or green technologies, rules against stockpiling that would increase food security, and the high costs of the dispute settlement mechanism are all points of contention.

Additionally, the 2001 Doha round of negotiations, intended to recentre the WTO on development objectives, was never completed, and WTO treaties are increasingly infringing on domestic policy space. The WTO has been accused of ‘kicking away the ladder’ by preventing developing countries from employing the ‘protectionist’ policies rich countries themselves employed while industrialising.

The World Bank/IMF 2023 Spring Meetings: disappointment for Africa

Key themes of the Spring Meetings included the ongoing fallout of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, global inflation, the sovereign debt crisis, the need for more climate finance, and ‘economic fragmentation’.

Key issues for the continent such as reform of the quota based voting system, dollar dominance of the financial system and issues with credit rating agencies were either not discussed or pushed to the side-lines.

The much-highlighted issue of ‘economic fragmentation’ and ‘friend shoring/near shoring’ felt dismissive of initiatives in the Global South to develop more local and regional supply chains, and improve national security, in the wake of COVID-19 and the conflict in Ukraine.

A lack of clarity remains over the World Bank’s core mission, with many developing countries critical of the proposed pivot towards global public goods, away from development/poverty alleviation.

Key takeaways

• Little talk about reform of Bretton Woods voting systems.
• Focused on increasing finance, rather than global financial system reform.
• Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable did not deliver decisive results.
• China yet to drop demand that MDBs take haircuts on outstanding debt.
• IMF and World Bank indicated willingness to provide more concessional and grant financing as an alternative to haircuts on existing debt.
• Much talk, but little in the way of concrete financial commitments.
• Capital increase for the World Bank or additional issuance of SDRs ruled out by US.
“A Breakthrough for People and Planet”

Appointed in March 2022 by the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) to advise Member States on the needed reforms to global governance in the lead up to the 2024 Summit of the Future, the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism (HLAB) is co-chaired by former President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and former Prime Minister of Sweden, Stefan Löfven. The HLAB Report, A Breakthrough for People and Planet, published on 18 April 2023, outlines an ambitious plan to strengthen the multilateral system around six “transformational shifts” and calls for a renewed effort to reform the UNSC, strengthen the UN peacebuilding architecture and broaden relations between the UN and regional organizations.

The six transformational shifts are:

- Rebuilding trust in multilateralism – through inclusion and accountability.
- Regaining balance with nature and providing clean energy for all.
- Ensuring abundant and sustainable finance that delivers for all.
- Supporting a just digital transition that unlocks the value of data and protects against digital harms.
- Empowering effective, equitable collective security arrangements.
- Managing current and emerging transnational risks.

G7 Hiroshima, Japan (19-21 May 2023): tentative support for Africa’s G20 bid

The G7 reaffirmed their commitment to deepening partnerships with Africa on and off the continent as well as their commitment to notably greater representation for Africa in international organisations such as the G20 which will further develop the G20 Compact with Africa.

The G7 acknowledged that the food security issue in Africa has been exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. The members will continue to provide assistance in relevant sectors to vulnerable countries and regions affected by the current food security crisis across Africa, in particular the Horn of Africa.

The Summit also stressed that publicly supported investment in the gas sector could be an appropriate response to the Russia-Ukraine war. This could have implications for the African gas sector.

The Summit stressed the severity of the security situation in several African countries including Ethiopia, Somalia, DR Congo and Sudan.

The growing presence of the Russia-affiliated Wagner Group across the continent was highlighted as a concern due to their destabilising impact and human rights abuses in Western Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region.

Japan’s government invited the African Union to the G7 summit in May 2023, instead of regular attendee South Africa
“Many of us will testify that the hundred billion dollars has never really been made available and this should stand out as something that needs to be addressed because sometimes, we sit at conferences like this and say yes we’ll make this available and that available and we believe it but now the tire must hit the tar.”

H.E. Cyril Ramaphosa, President of South Africa

“We need a new financial architecture... where power is not on the hands of a few people, we can agree on the governance of the institution, we can agree on the sharing of power so that all of us have access to resources.”

H.E. William Ruto, President of Kenya

“Nous sommes à un point d’inflexion historique. À l’échelle mondiale, dans cette époque de rupture de modèles et de transitions, les rafistolages et les rustines ne sont plus de mise, nous devons abandonner les dogmes et les certitudes. Embrassons de nouveaux paradigmes, plus conformes à notre réalité qui est faite de dureté insupportable pour certains et de menaces certaines pour tous.”

H.E. Mohamed Bazoum, President of Niger

“The global financial system must become the beacon of climate justice that delivers for our people and our economies.”

H.E. Nana Akufo-Addo, President of Ghana
After the grouping concept was coined in 2001, the 4 initial members – Brazil, Russia, India and China – held their first Summit in Yekaterinburg (Russia) in 2009. They were joined by South Africa in 2010.

As such, the BRICS already account for over one quarter of global GDP (26.2%) in 2023 and over 40% of global population.

As many as 23 countries in the Global South, and at least seven in Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe), have expressed interest in joining the BRICS. If all were to be admitted, the BRICS bloc could represent over one third of global GDP and over 60% of the global population.

To many members of the Global South, the BRICS system appears an increasingly attractive alternative to the current Bretton Woods system, that fails to address adequately their demands.

- The ‘New Development Bank’, headquartered in China, has been established in 2015. It was launched with $50 billion in capital and a $100 billion reserve currency pool. In 2021, Egypt, Uruguay and Bangladesh took up shares.
- The Bank has already issued green financial bonds in Renminbi, with a first issuance of RMB 3 billion in 2016.
- A Contingent Reserve Arrangement has been created to support members struggling with payments. The lending process will be on the next Summit agenda.

The BRICS have also engaged in discussions about the creation of an alternative reserve currency to counter dollar dominance in trade, while an integrated BRICS payment system has also been discussed.
Chapter 02. Africa in the world: vast potential and key assets, with hurdles to overcome


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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AATI</td>
<td>African Agricultural Transformation Initiative</td>
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<td>ACDEG</td>
<td>African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance</td>
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<td>ACE</td>
<td>Africa Center of Excellence</td>
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<td>ACMI</td>
<td>African Carbon Markets Initiative</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
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<td>African Center for Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>African Continental Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>Africa-India Field Training Exercise</td>
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<td>Africa Vaccine Acquisition Task Team</td>
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<td>Bill &amp; Melinda Gates Foundation</td>
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<td>BRI</td>
<td>Belt and Road Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS NDB</td>
<td>BRICS New Development Bank</td>
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<td>CAADP</td>
<td>Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
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<td>MEUR</td>
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<td>Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>NDICI</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Cooperation</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>International Organisation of la Francophonie (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie)</td>
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<td>PIATA</td>
<td>Partnership for Inclusive Agricultural Transformation in Africa</td>
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<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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This report puts together the main data-driven facts and figures about the ‘Global Africa’ theme, contributions and quotes from external experts, including members of the Foundation’s Now Generation Network (NGN), as well as the main takeaways from the 2023 Ibrahim Governance Forum, which took place in Nairobi on 28–30 April. The focus of the report is to assess Africa’s weight in the current world, the world’s presence in Africa, as well as the continent’s place within the multilateral architecture. This research publication does not intend, by any means, to be exhaustive. The topics and data selected are those that the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF) finds the most relevant.

This report makes use of the latest available data from a wide range of sources. A reference list containing all the sources used for this document is provided at the end of the report. Sources used are not always the primary data sources.

Each graph is accompanied by their respective data source. Where necessary, additional notes on the data used are also provided throughout the report.

Data included in the report was correct at source at the time of research (the last access date for each variable is provided in the references). In some cases, the numbers may not add up to the total due to rounding.

This report provides comparisons of regional averages. The composition of regions may vary according to source. When data in the report is presented disaggregated for Northern African and sub-Saharan African countries, this is done reflecting the choices made at source.

African averages are, in most cases, taken directly from source. If they have been calculated for the purpose of this report, they are unweighted. As not all sources provide data for the 54 African countries, some averages may not include data from all countries. Please see the sources for full details.

Data for Morocco may or not may include Western Sahara depending on the source.

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), which is featured several times throughout this report, is a composite index which gives a statistical measure of governance performance in 54 African countries, produced by MIF. The 2022 IIAG, its latest iteration, covers a ten-year time period from 2012 to 2021. Compiled by combining 256 variables from 47 independent African and international data sources, the 2022 IIAG is the most comprehensive collection of data on African governance. To download all IIAG resources and datasets, please visit: https://iiaag.online/downloads.html

Trade data in the report is predominantly sourced from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development database (UNCTAD STAT) that produces more than 150 indicators and statistical time series essential for the analysis of: international trade, economic trends, foreign direct investment, external financial resources, population and labour force, commodities, information economy, creative economy and maritime transport. Exports and imports data may not be in line with each other due to differences in the compilation methodology.

External debt figures in the report are sourced from the International Debt Statistics (IDS) database. The database is updated annually with the release of the World Bank’s International Debt Report (IDR) and provides policymakers and analysts aggregate and country-specific information on trends in external debt in low- and middle-income countries since 1951. Total public external debt stock in the report refers to the sum of all public and publicly guaranteed external debt, in addition to use of IMF credit. Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) values are subtracted from the use of IMF credit. Debt service is calculated through the debt service on external debt, public and publicly guaranteed in addition to IMF repurchases and charges.

Figures pertaining to Official Development Assistance (ODA) were shared directly with MIF by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC statistics) on 5 April 2023 and were sourced from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database.

Unless stated otherwise Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data has been collected from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Outlook April 2023 dataset. For representation of international groups’ GDP at date of creation in Chapter 3, World Bank data was used as IMF data only goes back to 1980, as such these data points are treated as proxies and are not directly comparable.

Figures calculated using IMF Fiscal Monitor variables including ‘Gross debt position’, referred to in this report as debt-to-GDP ratio, and ‘Expenditure % GDP’, used variables from the April 2023 edition of Fiscal Monitor.

Unless stated otherwise, population statistics are taken from the 2022 revision of the World Population Prospects from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). For population projections, mid-year medium variant estimates are used. For 2023 population data, 1 January medium variant estimates are used.

Dollars ($) are US dollars unless indicated otherwise.

MIF is committed to making data freely available and accessible. We welcome and encourage any accurate reproduction, translation and dissemination of this material. The material must be attributed to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, but not in any way that suggests that the Foundation endorses you or your use of the material.

To get in touch with MIF’s Research Team about this report, please contact: research@moibrahimfoundation.org
# Project team

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<td>Researcher</td>
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<td>Researcher</td>
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<td>Intern, MIF University of Birmingham Scholar</td>
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<td>Pakinam Moussa</td>
<td>Researcher (Former)</td>
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## Mo Ibrahim Foundation Design Team

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<td>Head of Design</td>
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<tr>
<td>Styliani Orkopoulou</td>
<td>Senior Graphic Designer</td>
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